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. - . ~ 
Th~ far-readling and recurrent consequences of the oil crisis, the upsurge in trade 
following the acceleration in the dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers in 
international trade and the relatively rapid development· of new competitive 
capacity in the Third World, notably the Far East, have hastened the international 
division of labour and shown up certain defects in the economic fabric of the 
Community. It is ~aving to face up not only to a series of structural problems, but 
also to the need to maintain its still substantial competitiveness, and to take up the 
challenge presented by the outside world. It is also having to deal with some of its 
own market operators who are pressing for the retention of traditional structures, 
an unrealistic improvement of living standards· and reliance on State financial 
intervention and protectionist measures. 
This is the climate in which European competition policy has to be determined. 
Opening up to the world market, even in time.of crisis, is fundamental to the sound 
development of our economy and will ensure maintenance of adequate competitive 
capacity. Generally speaking, the economic crisis has had least effect in industries 
where there is. effective comp.etition. However, there is no excuse for confusing 
political constraints with the tenets of free competition, which rule out all 
restrictions on firms' freedom. Although the Community economy must be placed 
fairlyand squarely on the road to efficiency, fruitful cooperation by means of joint 
endeavour must be encouraged; particularly in innovative sectors; Community 
industry must be protected against competitive conduct incompatible with 
international trade law. The pouring of oil on waters troubled by intolerable social 
tensions is. also part of a healthy competition policy. And this kind of competition 
policy cannot succeed without a stamp of approval from the social and political 
forces. . 
In current circumstances in particular,the Commission's competition policy not 
only has to sustain effective competition; it has to support an industrial policy 
which promotes the necessary restructuring. 
State aid is one of the requisite instruments of such a policy. However, in keeping 
with the spirit of a Community approach, cases of application cannot be assessed in 
a purely. national framework; they must be scrutinized solely in the general 
Community interest. State aid policies must therefore be implemented in strict 
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accordance with the Community rules designed to prevent any artificial creation of 
further imbalances likely to place the current and future functioning of the common 
market at risk. Since observance of these rules is so important, the Commission will 
remain vigilant, particularly in ensuring that the Member States fulfil their 
obligations to notify iIi advance as required by the Treaty. ' , 
. ....
When the economic ana social effects of rationalizing an.industry are paiticuhirly 
grave, the Commission introduces measures to deal with the specific circumstances 
involved,. for instance those applied to the synthetic fibres; steel, shipbuilding and 
textiles industries to help them regain their competitive capaCity. The Commission 
is also always prepared to take a favourable view 'of aid granted topr6mote 
environmental protection, energy~saving, advanced technology, 'future-oriented 
ipdustries and small busipesses, which are of considerable if.I1portance to the 
Community's econo'mic development and the' employment trend. " , 
Different types of public financial intervention have mushroomed and as a result it 
has become necessary to shed light on the financing of public undertakings arid to 
ensure that they do not:receive any direct or indirect advantages tantamount to aid 
incompatible with the common market. The Commission has accordingly adopted 
a Directive on the transparency of financial relations between Member'States and 
public undertakings. The Directive is designed to preserve the principle'ofequal 
opportunity for competing private a~d pU,blic-sector companies; moreover it is 
neither intended to nor. does it in fact discriminate ,against public undertakings by 
imposing particular constraints. Nor can it be interpreted as failure on the par~ of 
the Commission to recognize the ,special role the public undertakings can play in the 
Community's economic, system. 
Within the context ot'the rules of competition applic~ble to enterprises, ~aior 
importance has also been attached, in the piepara~ion of Commlinityrules on air 
and 'sea transport, to as'sessingtht:: role phlyedby, the Member S~ates. Governments 
bring their weight to bear, partiCularly in setti'rlg, fares andsha'ring caiiacity'on 
scheduled air services.~ In these circumstances, we must' determine the role that 
competition can play in air transport and find a way of stepping it up without 
compromising the industry'S special function. Despite' the fact that almost all 
Member States have been dragging their feet over policy aimed at improving the 
efficiency of transport, the Commission must cooperate with Parliament and lose 
no time in working to reach agreement on the necessary changes. 
As far as external trade is concerned, the Commission must stress its view that 
although imports from non-Member States cause problems which have extensive 
repercussions within the Community with regard to certain products or in certain 
industries, priority must be given to attempts to find adequate solutions by 
applying trade policy: measures. On no account can private arrangements 
COMP: REP; EC 1980 
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organizing trade flows within the common market be entered into between firms in 
non-Member States, or between such firms and Community firms, without 
reference to the public authorities. 
The Coinmission has 'always attached considerable importance to. the orderly 
functioning of distribution. It is accordingly continuing its work on adjusting the 
rul~s of competitioJl as applied to exclusive and selective distribution agreements so 
thaqht:Y,c,an serve their purpose, yet not be instrumental in .market-sharing . .The 
cOQclusions which the Commission draws from its experience will take account of 
.~h~ consumer's general interest, the principle of free trade within the Community 
and the particular concern of smaller businesses and industrial users to have access, 
in so far as possible, to secure and freely-selected sources of supply. 
Since the Council has still not adopted a regulation providing for more systematic 
merger control at Community level, the Commission continues to monitor, 
pursuant to Article ,86, the most significant mergers to see that they do not infringe 
the ban on abusive strengthening of a pre-existing. dominant position. In dealing 
wit,b variotis cases during the year, the Commission was able to work out, with the 
firms. concerned, splutions geared both to industrial requirements and the need to 
maintain adequate competition on the relevant market. ' 
Competition policy overall must constantly endeavour to integrate and harmonize 
inevitable public intervention with the action needed to ensure that effective 
competition remains the economy's principal regulating force. The contribution 
'made by'a system of undistorted competition framed in this way and applied to the 
extensive area covered by the common market is essential if the Community is to 
: adjust to present~day economic demands and wage the battle,'now more imperative 
than ever, against inflationist trends which jeopardize the living standards we have 
attained lind the cO!llpetitiveness' of our economy worldwide. Only by sparing no 
eHort to maintain. and, if nec~~sary, restore this co~petitiveness, which. must be 
sommensurate with the 'Cqrnmunity's leading role in ~9rlcl' trade, will high and 
stable employment be' ensured throughout the common market. . . 
COMPo REP. EC 1980 
· Part One 
Competition pol icy towards enterprises 
                                                          12-14
Chapter I 
Main developments in Communit~ policy 
§ 1 - Distribution 
1 - Exclusive dealing 
1. The Commission concluded its work on a new draft block exemption 
Regulation on exclusive dealing agreements1which will replace Regulation 67/67/ 
EEC from 1 January 1983. . 
2. The Commission's 'approach to exclusive dealing' agreements is largely 
favourable. However, in the light of experience it feels that a number of 
amendments must be introduced t~ forestall any misuse of the block exemption. 
Thus, if one manufacturer appoints another manufacturer of competing products 
to be its exclusive dealer the agreement should not be entitled to exemption ifrhe 
parties are large undertakings, but should qualify for exemption if one of the parties 
is a sinallbusiness; The main aim is to provide encouragement for small and 
medium-sized firms, either by enabling them to penetrate new markets more easily 
by using the distribution network of the large undertaking, orto use the products of 
a larger competitor to complete thbr own range. 
Similarly, the Commission would like to strengthen the provisions designed to 
forestall market-partitioning. The block exemption should not therefore continue 
to apply unless parallel imports are genuinely possible. The Commission has 
always considered that territorial exclusivity must in every case be counterbalanced 
by the possibility of such imports. 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 4. 
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I 
3. As regards exclus~ve supply agreements, the Commission is at present 
considering whether th~ appropriate rules for such cases should not preferably 
form the subject of a separate regulation. Such agreements, particularly when part 
of a network of similar contracts concluded by one or by a number of producers, 
can jeopardize the mai~tenance of effective competition within the Community 
since they tend to makJ access to the market more difficult. 
I 
! . 
4. As required by Cou.flcil Regulation No 19/65/EEC the Commission decided to 
refer its latest views and the relevant draft texts to the Advisory Committee on 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions. . 
, 
I 
2 -'- Selective distribution 
5. On 16 December 1980 the Commission con'vened the 31st conference of 
government experts on restrictive practices, which continued its general discussion 
on the problems of applying the Community competition rules to selective 
distribution.' : 
I . . , . 
Following the sarli.e line: as the previous conference~ 1 it concluded that it would be 
advisable to draw up·.guidelines applicable to all economic activities but that it 
would be easier to do so when a number of decisiorts had been taken on individual 
cases, illustrating in more practical terms the aspect~ of selective distribution which 
may and may not be permitted. 
However, with regard to the adaptation of generally' applicable measures to the 
specific requirements o~ a particular industry, the Commission plans to finalize in 
the near future a draft b~ock exemption regulation for selective distribution systems 
in the motor industry.! , , . . . , 
I . ' ' 
In any event the Comniission still considers~in accordance with the case-law of 
the Court of Justice-that selective distribution systems b~sed on objective criteria 
of a qualitative nature fire not caught by Article 8p(1), provided that the criteria 
relate to the technical qualifications of the dealer and his staff and to the quality of 
his premises, and prov'ided that they are laid down uniformly for all potential 
dealers and are not apblied in a discriminatory fashion. 
I 
i 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 6. 
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§ 2 - Patent licences 
6. The second consultation of the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices 
and Abuse of Dominant Positions on the draft block exemption Regulation on 
patent licensing agreements' mentioned in the Ninth Report on Competition 
Policy,l had to be postponed until 1981. 
The Breeders' rights-maize seed case2 has been before the Court since 1978: 
There have been four interveners; three governments of Member States (United 
Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany) and a plant breeders' 
association, with the result that no judgment can be expected until 1981. The 
question at issue is whether and to what extent exclusivity and territorial 
restrictions in a licence within the Community and related bans imposed on the 
parties are caught by the Treaty competition rules. The Commission's view as 
expressed in its Breeders' rights-maize seed Decision,3 is that they are,because of 
the obvious risk that such restrictions could isolate national markets. Holders of 
the opposite view consider that exclusivity and any territorial restriction of the 
industrial property right that is the subject of the licence relate to the very essence of 
that right and that therefore as a matter oflaw the rules of competition do not apply 
to them or to any contractual export ban designed to maintain the restriction. 
In the Commission's opinion this question should be decided in the same way for 
patents as for breeders' rights. It would accordingly be inadvisable to adopt a 
regulation before the Court of Justice has taken its decision on this legal issue on 
which most of the criticism of the Commission's proposal is based. 
Nevertheless, there has been an increasing tendency in industrial circles, not only in 
the Community but also among licensers in non-member countries, to adapt 
licensing agreements to the draft Regulation. 4 As for the Commission it n'arurally 
endeavours to apply the principles contained in the draft in dealing with the cases 
submitted to it.s 
The Consumers Consultative Committee gave its view on the draft at the end of the 
year. The Committee basically shares the Commission's opinion on the application 
of ArtIcle 85(1) to the various clauses mentioned in the draft. However, the 
Committee feels that the draft is too generous in many respects in granting 
1 Point 11. 
2 Ca'se 258178: Appeal against Commission Decision of 21.9.1978, Breeders' rights-maize seed: 
OJ L 286, 12.10.1978; Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 123. 
3 The same views had already been expressed in the Commission Decision of 2.12.1975, AOIP/ 
Beyrard: OJ L 6, 13.1.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 63. 
4 OJ C 58, 3.3.1979 and OJ C 110,3.5.1979; Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 7 et seq. 
5 Point 125 et seq. of this Report. 
COMP, REP, EC 1980 
18 COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
exemption under Article 85(3), particularly in relation to the ·exemption of 
exclusive manufacturing licences, the lines of demarcation within which exclusive 
sales licences and anal~gous prohibitions on exports are exempted, and the 
treatment of know-how connected with a patent. 
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§ 3 --.;.. Sea and air transport 
1 - Sea transport 
7. The Commission expected to put to the Council a draft Regulation applying 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to sea transport before the end of the year. 1 To this 
end, it continued exchanging views with the industry's professional bodies 
(notably, shipowners and shippers) and on two occasions discussed with national 
experts a preliminary draft Regulation containing provisions of substance and 
procedure. 
The draft had to meet three needs: 
(i) to involve the minimum of procedural requirements for firms; 
(ii) to grant an exemp'tion for liner conferences providing regular services, which, 
while respecting the Member States' obligations pursuant to the United Nations 
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 2 would supplement it on certain points 
by means of Community rules; 
(iii) not to embark as yet on the granting of such 'exemptions for shipping outside 
the conference system (e.g. bulk traffic or ferries), in view of a lack of experience 
in this area. 
8. The Commission had prepared a preliminary draft on this basis. Its structure is 
outlined below. 
,The procedural prOVISIons were taken over from Regulation No 1017/68 
governing the application of Articles 85 and 86 to inland transport, 3 which imposes 
the minimum of administrative burdens. on undertakings. 
As regards the substantive provisions, the preliminary draft first specified that 
certain technical cooperation agreements did not fall within the scope of 
Article 85(1). 
The balance of the rules for liner conferences operating regular serVices reflected 
the balance sought by the Commission and the Council when adopting Regulation 
I Memorandum annexed to the President's address on the programme for 1980. 
2 Council Regulation No 954/79 concerning the ratification by Member States of the United Nations 
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences: OJ L 121,17.5.1979; the Code does not yet 
apply since it has not been ratified by a sufficient number of countries: a minimum of 24 States whose 
tonnages account for at least 25% of world tonnage. 
3 Regulation No 17 applies to the whole of the economy except transport. 
COMPo REP: EC 1980 
20 COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
No 954/79 concerning the ratification of the United Nations Code of.Conduct for 
Liner Conferences: 
(i) given their 'stabilizing role' which ensures 'reliable services to shippers',1 
conferences were exbmpted; the exemption, however, must not go beyond the 
limits laid down in Article 85(3), as interpreted by the Court, so that certain 
conditions were attached to .the exemption; 
(ii) but in view of the need 'to avoid possible breaches by conferences of the rules of 
competition laid down in the Treaty', 1 they had to respect certain obligations 
and remain subject to surveillance for any pos~ible abuses. 
Certain of these obligations and conditions were rediIced to the essential minimum; 
some of them only repeated or spelled out provisions already embodied in the 
United Nations Code: or in the general agreements between shippers and 
conferences. 
They were drawn up in the light of the most frequent criticisms levelled at 
conference practices by. shippers and forwarding agents. 
. . i . , • Finally, exemption was also granted in respect of agreements between conferences 
and shippers, or their associations, relating to the (juality, rates or terms of liner 
services. 
As regards its field of application, the preliminary draft Regulation only covered 
international sea transport from or to one or a number of Community ports. It thus 
already restricted to a q:rtain extent the scope of the 'effect thec;>ry' flowing from 
the Treaty: Articles 85 and 86 apply to all agreements and practices that have 
economic consequences :within the <;:ommunity by affecting competition 'and trade, 
whatever the nationality or location of some or all of the parties. 
9. The discussions with national experts revealed that the conditions for 
submitting a proposal for a Regulation having some likelihood of Council adoption 
were still not satisfied. The Member States' sea transport experts have so far 
appeared rather reluctant to contemplate any regulation which does not simply 
confine itself to endorsing the United Nations Code. 
1 Last recital of Regulation No 954/79. 
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10. In ~hese circumstances the Commission decided to postpone presenting its 
proposal to the Council. The Commission reaffirms the worldwide importance of 
the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences to which the Community proposes to 
accede .at a later date. 
The Community's policy is to recognize the stabilizing role ~f liner conferences and 
at the same time to ensure that they do not infringe the competition rules laid down 
by the EEC Treaty. In the Commission's view, this policy implies thatitsproposal: 
(i) without running counter to the.rules of the Code of Conduct, must not merely 
endorse those rules but. must, where necessary, explicitly spell out pojpts which 
the Code does not touch upon or on which its provisions are not mandatory; 
(ii) must obey the principles of the Treaty that apply to the whole economy as 
regards both the granting of exemptions from the prohibitions laid down in the 
competition rules· and the scope of those rules,whilst possibly providing for 
procedures to avoid conflicts with the competition legislation of certain non-
member countries which might prejudice important commercial and maritime 
interests of the Community. 
These are the bases on which the ComIpunity will pursu~ consultations with the 
Member States, without prejudice to the normal investigationof certain complaints 
which may" be found to reveal discriminatory practices by liner conferences. 
2 - Air transport 
11. In its Memorandum 1 on the Community contribution to the development of 
air transport· services the Commission explained why it was necessary for the 
Council to adopt a regulation applying the competition rules· to the industry. It 
undertook 2 to send the Council a proposalto this effect during the ·course of the 
year .. 
On several occasions Parliament emphasized the need for a: regulation to confer on 
the Commission the powers of investigation and sanction necessary fora proper 
application of Articles 85 and 86 to the industry; 3 although such application should 
be gradual. 
1 Part 2, points 68 to 75; Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 12. 
2 Memorandum annexed to the President's address on the programme for 1980. 
3 Notably in the Resolution of 17 October 1980 on restriCtions on competition in the air transport 
sector, paragraph 16. 
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Furthermore, the SterlipgAirways easel showed the difficulty the Commission 
faces without such powers in trying to apply,the competition rules merely'on the 
basis of Article 89 of the EEC Treaty. 
12. The Commission therefore drew up a draft Regulation, which was discussed 
with national experts a~ two multilateral meetings. . 
As foreshadowed in the abovementioned Memorandum it was a purely procedural 
Regulation designed to' give the Commission its own powers to investigate and 
punish infringements,' powers'which it lacks at present. In view of the changing 
environment of the indu,stry and the need to acquire prior practical experience, the 
Commission considered it would be ill-advised to embarkon granting exemptions 
for particular forms of agreements or practices. ' 
The 'national ~xperts attending ,the two' m~ltilateral meetings tended to take a 
somewhat wait-and-see' attitude. However, most of the delegations wanted the 
Regulation to grant wide-ranging exemptions for scheduled services in regard to 
agreements on fares, capacity-sharing and even revenue. 
13. The Commission has pointed out on several occasions that the scope of the 
procedural Regulation ~ill have to be limited. 
. I 
Articles 85 and 86 are directly applicable oniy to agreements and practices by 
undertakings arising from the exercise of their unfettered acts. Thus, the 
Regulation will assist the application of those Articles mainly in those sectors of the 
air transport market where the airlines appear to possess such freedom (i.e. charter 
services). . " , . 
But it is in scheduled services that the competitive situation ,has given rise to 
complaints2 as to ,its compatibility, particularly with reg'ard to fares, with· the 
provisions of Articles 85, 86 and 90. Governments usually have the final say in 
setting fares for scheduled services following negotiations between companies as 
exprtissly hiid d'awn in government agreements, whether the 1967 international 
agreement on establishing tariffs on scheduled air routes 3 to which most Member 
States belonging to the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) are parties or, 
failing that, bilateral agreements betweengovj!rnments on r~ghts of traffic. These 
negotiations often take place within the International Air Transport Association 
(lATA); the companies concerned file tariff recommendations with their 
governments, which are in principle free to adopt them or not. 
1 Points 136 to 138 of this Report. 
2 By individual users and most recently by the European Bureau of Consumer Unions. 
3 Ratified by all Member States except the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg. 
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.In.so far as. the airlines' tariff practices merely carry out government instructions, 
the planned Regulation will not change the. present situation, since Articles 85 and 
86 cannot be applied directly to airlines. It is the conduct of the Member States 
involved and not that of the airlines that the Commission will have to challenge, by 
possibly maintaining that the conduct of the States concerned creates. in the relevant 
'ma~ket a sitmition incompatible wit~ the'Tre,:aty ~ules. . 
:The ~omriJ.ission does not exclude a priori that· such a situation exists' in' air 
trapsport,' and that, as the sector concerned is one where in the main those 
undertakings referred to in Article 90(1) (public undertakings or undertakings to 
'which Member States grant spi;!cial or exclusive rights) operate, action could ·be 
.taken against the Mt:mber States by means of Article 90(3) for infringement of 
Articles 90(1), 85 and 86. 1 This hypothesis is being tested and no .. conclusion has yet 
been reached; it is a complex legal question in view of the significant implications 
of the hypothesis for other government measures connected with priCes. 
However, even if the Commission were td come to the conclusion that it should 
take action under Article 90; it would still have to consider whether national air 
tariff regulations were contrary to Articles 85 and 86. This would necessitate in 
particular an extremely detailed study of the merits of the regulations themselves to 
ascertain whether they could qualify for exemption under Article 85(3) and of the 
relevant tariff,levels in order to assess whether they involve any abuse within the 
meaning of Article 86. Such an investigation would inevitalJIy take a long time. A 
comparison restri'cted to fares on other markets would not,' for example~ be 
sufficient to prove any abuse in fares within the Community. Ablise would have to 
be verified on a route-by-route and possiblyfare-by-fare basis, notably by means of 
comparisons with related costs. 2 Moreover, the Council requested the Commission 
to look into the various f~res charged. in the Community to passengers on scheduled 
fl~ghts. This study is still in progre,ss and will ~ontribute valuable information to 
~his assessment. ' 
Finally; if the Commissiori arrlv~s atthe conclusion that the tariff r~gulations in 
themselves do not qualify for exe,inpti~n under: Ari:icie. 85 (3), 01; that the f~re level~ 
they set constitute' abuse within the meaning' of Articl~ 86~ the Commission will 
al:so have to c,onsider whet~er !t,uch regulations or fare levels. are necessary, in the 
light of Article 90 (2), to the performance by the uridertakings concerned of the 
"particular ta'skS assi~ed to th~m'. . . . . 
1 In the case of undertakings not covered by Article 90(1), an Article 169 procedure would have to be 
used for infringements of Articles 5,85 and 86. 
2 The number of regular intra-Community air routes alone lies between·several hundred and several 
thousand, according to the category of airport considered; this gives an idea of the administrative 
problemsinvoh'ed in such a case-by-case examination. ' 
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These considerations will of course also have to take account of the special features 
of the air transport industry, as· already mentioned by the Commission in its 
Memorandum. ' 
14. In these extremely complex Circumstances the Commission felt it was 
advisable to postpone submitting the proposal for a Regulation to the Council until 
it can take a final decisioI:l on possible courses of action open to it with a view to 
applying the rules of competition to the air transport industry.. . 
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§ 4 - International Energy Agency 
15. Since the formation of the International Energy Agency, the Commission has 
been vigilant to ensure that oil industry participation i~,the Agency's work and the 
inte~-company cooperation which that implies are compatible, wi~h the rules of 
competition of the EEC Treaty. A specific problem arose in 1980 concerning the 
settlemerlt by an arbitration centre of disputes that ~ay arise from allocation 
procedures made in accordance with the International Enet:gy Programme. 
16: The Agreement on an Internationa:I Energy Programme; dated'18 November 
1974, provides, inter alia, for the establishment of an emergency s~aring system as a 
joint effort of the governments of the participating countries. These governments 
have undertaken to develop a self-sufficiency in oil supplies in emergencies and to 
allocate available oil among themselves on an equitable basis during a supply 
shortage. Twenty-one countries have signed the agreement so far. 1 All Member 
States of the European Community except France are signatories. The Commission 
has observer status.' ' 
The Agreement also provides for an International Energy Agency which was 
created within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. . 
1 - The institutional structure of the 
International Energy Agency 
17. The Agency has the following organs as provided ,for in Article 49 of the 
Agreement: a Goverriing Board, a Management Committee and four Standing 
Groups concerned with Emergency Questions, Oil Market, Long-term' Cooper-
ation and Relations with Producer Countries and Other Consumer Countries. 
Detailed discussions mostly take place in the different Standing Groups, where 
preparations are made for the meetings of the Governing Board. Each Standing 
Group is composed of one or more representatives of the government of each 
participating country: 
., . 
(i) The Standing Group on Emergency Questions reviews, on a continuing basis, 
the effectiveness of the measures taken by each participating country to meet its 
1 Austraiia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
COMP.,REP. EC 1980 
I, 
26 COMPETITION POUCY TO,¥ ARDS ENTERPRISES 
, emergency reserve commitments. Since what has been referred to as"a creeping 
crisis' started early in 1979, the Group has also regularly monitored the',oil 
supply situation. i 
,(ii) The Sta~ding Gro'up on the Oil Market deals with ~he infor'mati~n system on 
the international oi~ market. It geddes how to pres~nt information and stati~tics 
ori crude oil, and oil products, supply and movement, stocks, level of em~rgency 
reserves, availability and utilization of transport' facilities and the levels pf 
international supply and demand. . , " , , , 
The Agreement provid~s for consultation with oil companies on any matters withih 
their competence. For:' that 'purpose the oil industry has 'created two advisory 
bodies: the Industry Working Party and the Industry ~dvisory Board: ' 
(i) The Industry Working Par,ty's task has mainly been to work out procedural 
recommendations in relation to the general information system provided for in 
the Agreement and to advise the Standing Group on the Oil Market. 
(ii) The Industry Advisory Board (lAS), ~omp~sed of representati"e~of i6 major 
" oil companies, has been established to assist the Stariding Group on Emergency 
Questions by provi~ing advice and consultation on emergency oil sharing and 
related questions; it has sub-committees to study and make recommendations 
on specific issues (e.g. supply and legal questions) related to the emergency 
sharing system. In the event of the activation of the 'system, the lAB will be 
responsible, through its appropriate ad hoc groups, for the practical execution 
<;>f the allocation programme under the direct and close supervision of the 
Agency and its Secretariat. , . " ' . 
Confidential emergency arrangemen'ts have been made for the cooperation afthe 
oil companies in carrying out allocation procedures at internatiorial' and national 
levels and these procedures are tested periodically. ' ' , 
. ' 
2 - The Commission's attitude to the 
International Energy Programme (lEP) 
I 
18: The partiCipation by,' the' oil industry ini the IEP ra'ised ~luestions' 'of 
compatibilitY with competition law regimes and the compa~ies th~mselves were 
very concerned that their cooperation would not be subject to,at,tack on anti-trust 
grounds.' '" " ,,'" ' 
.. ., ' , 
The consequences for the EEC cO'mpetition rules were therefore examined by the 
Commission iIi .1976177. They concluded that the arrangements described above 
were not in themselve!! incompatible with,the rules of competition'. ' 
I 
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Two letters were addressed to the Chairman of the Emergency Questions Group, 
expressing the Commission'slview and laying down certainconditions enabling the 
services of the Commission to make objections to amendments to the Agency rules, 
should the need arise, and to s'upervise on a permanent basis the participation by oil 
companies in the Agency'sactivities~ The terms of the two letters require that the 
services ofthe Commission be informed of proposals for meetings of the lAB and its 
sub~cqmmittees, and th'e topics to be discussed. Its services have the right to be 
present at all such . meetings arid to receive record-notes of thOe meetings. 
While these two letters, known as the 'clearance' letters, are sufficient to cover the 
day-to-day participation by the' oii companies in the Agency's. work, the 
involvement of oil company personnel in the periodic testing of allocation 
procedures at international and national level requires more specific and detailed 
dearances and these are provided, under appropriate conditions and on an ad hoc 
basis, to, meet the needs of. the exercise.' , 
Finally it should be noted that by virtue of its observer status,.the Co.mmissioncan 
attend 'aJI Agency meetings, including those at whiCh the lAB is 'feprei;ented, and 
receives' c9pies of all relevant Agency documents. . ..' .... . 
3 ~ Oi$pute Settlement gentre 
19. A specific leg~l problem which has arisen within th~ IEp'concerns the solving 
of disputes arising from allocation procedures. It was felt 'that a.n interna'tional 
forum with particular experience in the,9il field \Yould be necessary. The services of 
the Commlssionpart~cipated in the preparatory 'workfor setting up a Dispute 
Settlement Centre. The Charter for the Dispute Settlement Centre was adopted by 
the Governing Board on 23 July '1980. The rules of procedure are still under 
discussion. 
The Tribunal set up under the Dispute Settlement Centre is intended to exercise 
jurisdiction only in disputes arising out of oil supply transactions during 
implementation of the emergency allocation of oil pursuant to the I,EP. The 
Commission was cOllcerned to en~ure that the Tribunal and all awards'given by the 
Tribunal comply with applicable Community law. ArtiCle XI of the Charter 
stipulates that awards are subject to enforcement in accordance with the applicable 
law of the State where enforcement is sought or in accordance with any applicable 
international obligation. The last sentence of the article reads: 'Recognition and 
enforcement of an award may be refused if the award is contrary to the public 
policy of the State in which recognition or enforcement is sought, including the law 
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of the European Communities in so far as it forms part of the public policy of .that 
State, being a Membe~ State of the European Communities'. 
The Commission also made a statement which was, incorporated in the conclusions 
of the Governing Board meeting, as follows: .. 
'The effect to be given to the Charter and arbitration awards made pursuant to the 
Charter would depend entirely upon the ·legislation of each IEAcountry and, if 
applicable, its existing1international obligations, and [the Commission} wishes to 
make it clear that Member States of the European Community have no power to 
exempt an award from any applicable nile of Community law. Indeed, they have a 
duty to ensure that tht:; implementation of the Charter of the Dispute Settlement 
Centre is consistent with Community law. . 
Given the fact that the,iurisdiction of the OisputelSettlement Centre is limited, in 
practice, to commercial matters, the Commission presumes that it is unlikely that 
awards made by the Dispute Settlement Centre would conflict with rules of 
Community law if the latter applied. However, if any conflict arose, the 
Commission would taKe all necessary measures to ensure continuing compliance 
with Community law.' . 
Article XI, and the Commission's statement are of considerable importance. They 
express firstly that arbitration, even if set up under public law or under 
international law, remains subject to applicable Community law. Furthermore they 
reflect the Commission's view that the competition rules of the Treaty are public 
policy within the meaning of the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 and should be so recogniz<:~ by 
the national laws of Member States of the Community. Awards contrary to 
Community law cannot therefore be legally implemented:· . . 
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§ 5 - Merger control in the EEC sphere . 
20. In this Tenth Report on Competition Policy the Commission must once more 
refer to its proposal for a Council Regulation on merger control. which was 
submitted to the Council on 20 July 1973. 1 Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee were consulted by the Council and approved the proposal by 
large majorities on votes taken respectively on 12 and 28·Pebruary 1974. 2 
Despite initial progress the Council has still not been able to termiriate its work on 
the proposaL Politically, the major outstandin~problems concern:' 
(i) the legal basis of any such Regulation which the Commission feels should refer 
not only to Article 87 but also Article +35 of the EEC Treaty; 
I 
(ii) a clearly-defined sharing of responsibilities between' the national and 
Community authorities in applying the relevant nati'onallaw and implemerit-
irig a future Community iaw; . 
(iii) closer association by the Member States in the Commission's decision-making 
process when establishing that a given merger is incompatible with the 
common market rules of competition or when granting exemption to these 
rules on account of other objectives. 
The Commission remains convinced that it is essential to introduce an instrument 
for the more systematic control of large-scale mergers at Community level if the 
Community as such is to be able to take effective action, when necessary, to deal 
with changes in structure likely to jeopardize the maintenance of effective 
competition in the common market. Moreover, it notes that during the preparatory 
stages a broad consensus emerged within the Council on the principle itself of such 
a Regulation. 
21. Since the Regulation has not been adopted, the Commission, at the request of 
the firms concerned or acting on its own initiative, continues to monitor, pursuant 
to Article 86, the main mergers that take place in order to ensure that they do not 
conflict with the provision prohibiting the abusive strengthening of a pre-existing 
dominant position. 3 
Developments in Commission decision-making and in the case-law of the Court 
with regard to the abusive conduct of dominant undertakings provide an indication 
I Third Report on Competition Policy, point 1. 
2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 17. 
3 See points 150 to 157 of this Report. 
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of the scope for mergeri control affor~ed by the Continental Can doctrine, when re-
examined in the light of more recent judgments (Sugar, United Brands, Huginl 
Liptons and Hoffman1J-La Roche). 
Furthermore, in keeping with the spirit of its proposal for a Regulation which 
provided that merger's having consequences iricompatible with the rules of 
competition could be exempted on the basis of more important considerations, 
defined at discussions within the Council as being in particular those pertaining to 
industrial and social policy, the Commission is examining whether it should take 
into consideration, witpin the limits of Article 86, ~he impact of any prohibition on 
industrial development and its social consequences. . .. 
This problem could abse, especially in current economic circumstances, when 
assessing whether such:provisions should be applied to a firm's merger with a large 
group in a case where this might prove to be either the only practicable way of 
forestalling plant clo~ures and redundancies or essential to the continuing 
profitability of an unaertaking located in a depressed area or in an industry 
ericountedng difficulties. ' . . 
", ' ... 
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§ 6 - Cases decided by the Court of Justice 
22. The judgments given by the Court of Justice in 1980 with regard to the 
competition rules applying to undertakings are of great significance as regardshoth 
substantive and procedural maners. ' , 
1,~' Substantive matters.: 
interpretation and application ,of Article 85 
23. A number of judgments shed fresh light on the scope of Article 85(1) and (3) in' 
general and, more particularly, with regard to selective distribution agreements. 
. . ,'- . 
.' "'. 
In the former case, two judgments were given in proceedings for. the annulment of 
two Commission Decisions. 1 , . 
In the ,latter case, four judgments were given in response to references for a 
preliminary ruling by the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance, 2 the Paris Tribunal de 
Commerce,3 the Haarlem Arrondissementsrechtbank4 and the Antwerp Recht-
bank van Koophandel 5 respectively, in connection with disputes relating to refusals 
to supply or proceedings to terminate practices involving unfair competition 
between French manufacturers of perfumery, beauty products and toiletries on the 
one hand and retailers and wholesalers in France, The Netherlands arid Belgium on 
the other .. 
OnlO July 1980, the Court delivered three judgments, referred to belO\~ as the 
'Perfume' decisions, in response to the first three references. 6 The Judgment 
relating to the fourth reference, referred to below as the 'Oreal' decision, was 
delivered on 11 December 1980.6 
1 Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck and Others v Commission: not yet 
reported in ECR; see also Commission Decision of 20.7.1978 Fedetab: OJ L 224, 15.8.1978; Eighth 
Report on Competition Policy, points 111 to 113. Case 30/78 The Distillers Company Ltd v 
Commission: not yet reported in ECR; see also Commission Decision of 20.12.1977 Distillers: 
OJ L 50,22.2.1978; Seventh Report on Competition Policy, point 125. 
2 Joined Cases 253/78 and 1 to 3/79 Procureur de /a Republique and Others v Guer/ain SA, Rochas SA, 
Lanvin SA and Nina Ricci Sarlo . 
3 Case .37179 Anne Marry SA v Estee Lauder. 
4 Case 99/79 Lancome SA and Cosparfrance Nederland BV v Etos BV and Albert Heijn Supermart BV. 
5 Case 31180 L'Oreal SA v De Nieuwe Amck SPRL. 
6 Not yet reported in ECR. 
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1. Article 85(1) 
A. General considerations 
(a) Meaning of restrictive: practice 
24. In the Fedetab case, the question arose of the status of a recommendation 
from an association 9f undertakings which was approved and implemented by 
several of its members. 
In its decision, the Commission had considered that this recommendation 
constituted both an .agreement between. undertakings and a decision by an 
association of undertakings. In particular, it had emphasized the binding nature of 
the recommendation. The applicants had challenged this interpretation. 
The Court confirmed the Commission's point of view. It considered that since the 
undertakings concerned had approved notification of the recommendation and had 
faithfully adhered to it for several years, the recommendation was an accurate 
reflection of the undertakings' intended conduct on the market and accordingly 
satisfied the conditions required for the application of Article 85(1). Like the 
Commission, the Court did not consider it necessary to draw a clear dividing line 
between the concepts of agreement, decision or concerted practice; 1 
The Court also considered, as did the Commission, that the recommendation in 
question, although adopted by a non-profit-makingassociation, could also be 
described as a decision by an association of undertakings since it was binding on all 
its members. Even if the recommendation had not been binding Article 85 (1) would 
still have applied to the case in point since the prohibition of restrictive practices 
also covers the actual conduct of an association or its members to the extent that it 
tends to give rise to the restrictive effects which this article proscribes. 2 
(b) Restriction of competition 
25. The Fedetab case has again highlighted a problem on which the Court had 
already given a ruling in the 'Sugar' case,3 namt;ly the extent to which Article 85 
I Ground 86. 
2 See also the judgments of the Coun in Cases 67/63 Sorema [1964J ECR 321, 347; Case 90176 Van 
Ameyde v Uel [1977J ECR 1091; Seventh Repon on Competition Policy, point 52; Commission 
Decision BDS, point 111 of this Report. . 
3 Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56,111,113 and 114173 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] 
ECR 1663, 1914 et seq. 
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still applies to restrictive practices relating to a market in which competition is 
already sharply restricted as a result of measures taken by the public authorities. 
According to the Court of Justice, the answer to this question depends on the 
circumstances of each case. In this connection, it is crucial to establish whether the 
measures taken by the State neutralize practically all the factbrs likely to promote 
effective competition or whether, on the other hand, there is residual though 
genuine scope for autonomous action on the part of undertakings. 
26. 'Thus in the Fedetab case, Belgian tax and price control legislation had 
virtually excluded any opportunity for undertakings to compete with one another 
as regards retail seIling prices. However, this legislation did not affect competition 
as regards wholesalers' and retailers' profit margins, end-of-year rebates and terms 
of payment. It is precisely competition in these areas that the undertakings 
concerned tended to preclude by means of the restrictive practices complained of by 
the Commission. 
After pointing out that Article 85 (1) prohibits any restriction of competition at any 
level of trade between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer the Court 
reached the conclusion that each of the measures in question had restricted 
competition to an appreciable extent. 
27. The Court, moreover, reaffirmed that it was sufficient to establish that the 
provisions adopted by the undertakings were clearly designed to achieve such 
restrictions without there being any need to consider whether and to -what extent 
they had been implemented. The Court thus enables the Commission to avoid 
having to carry out a detailed analysis of the effects of a practice the object of which 
is indisputably restrictive., 
(c) Effect on trade between Member States 
28. This condition for the application of Article 85(1) has also been considered 
from a practical angle in recent decisions of the Court. 
29. The Fedetab judgment defines the scope of the competition rules laid down in 
the EEC Treaty in a situation where administrative barriers to intra-Community 
trade exist. The undertakings concerned had maintained that, as a' result of the 
differences in the taxation of manufactured tobacco in the Member States and the 
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I ' 
impossibility of effecttng, parallel imparts undei the Belgian. tax system, their 
restrictive practices garerned anly a natianal situatian. 
! 
The Caurt rejected thi~ argument. Referring to. its earlier case-law,l it considered 
whether the restrictio~s af campetitian in regan~ to profit margins, end-af-year 
rebates and terms of payment were likely to deflect trade in manufactured tobacco 
fram the course which it wauld atherwise have taken. In the present case, the 
impact an trade was m?st marked on large-scale imports effected by manufacturers 
whoweremembers of Fedetab (51 % afcigarettes and 12 to 14% of cigars imported 
into Belgium, or ,apptoximately 5% af cigarettes and 10% of cigars sold in 
Belgium). According to the Caurt, in taking cancerted actian on the fundamental 
aspt;cts of the conditiops of sale to. be applied to. iIltermediari~s, the undertakings 
had further appreciaply reduced any inducement the latter might have to 
encourage, as consideration for individual pecuniiuy benefits, the' sale ofcerta'in 
imported pro.ducts as opposed to athers.2 
Consequently, the Caurt concluded that these restrictians af campetition were 
likely to appreciably affect trade between the Member St,ates. 
. '. , ,. 
30. The Distillers judgment clarifies another 'aspect af the effect of restrictia~s on 
intra-Cammunity trade. Even where a praduct· is neither imported from nor 
exparted to. another Member State, an agreement relating to. the prices charged for 
that praduct does not qecessarily escape the prohibition laid dawn in Article 85 (1),. 
, , ' 
I • 
Although it is true that; that prohibition daes not apply to agreements which 'affect 
the market anly to ad insignificant extent, having regard to the weak positian 
which thase cancerned have in the market in the products in question; the same 
cansideratians do, not~, apply in the case af a p:roduct of a large undertaking 
responsible far the entire production. 3 
I 
i 
B. Selective distributio,n,agreements 
, j , , 
31. The Lancome and Oreal cases presented the Court with ,an apportunity ,to. 
answer several questians concerning the compatibility af selective dlstributian 
systems with Article 85(1).,,-
1 Case 56/65 Societe technique miniere v Maschinenbau Vim [1966] ECR 337, 
2 Ground 172. 
3 Ground 28. 
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The Caurt recalled firstly that selective distributian systems canstituted an aspect 
af campetitian which accorded with Article 85 (1) provided that resellers were 
chasen on the basis af abjective criteria of a qualitative nature relating to. the 
technical qualifications af the reseller and his staff and the suitability af his trading 
premises and that such conditions w~re laid dawn unifarmly far all potential 
resellers and were not applied in a discriminatory fashion. 1 
In arder to determine the precise nature of these 'qualitativ~' c~it~riafar·chaasing 
resellers, it is also necessary to examine ..yhether the praperties of the product in 
questian require,for the purpose· af preserving its quality and ensuring" that it is 
used correctly, a selective distribution system, and whether these objectives have 
nat already been .attained by natianal legislation an the right to take up the 
occupatian af reseller or by conditions of sale in respect af the praduct in question. 
Finally, it is necessary to verify whether the criteria laid dawn do. nat go beyand 
that which is necessary.2 . 
Accarding to. the Caurt, the abligation to contribute to. the setting up af a 
distributian system, undertakings regarding turnaver and obligations relating to 
minimum levels of purchases and stocks exceed what is necessary for a selective 
distributian system based on qualitative n::quirements.2 .. 
Agreements laying dawn a system af selective distributian based an criteria for 
admission which go. beyond a simple objective selectian af a qualitative nature 
exhibit. features making them incompatible with Article 85(1) where such 
agreements, either individually ar together with athers, in the ecanomic and·leg~l 
cantext in which they are concluded and an the basis af a bady af objective.features 
af law ·and fact, are capable of affecting trade between Member States and have as 
either their' abject or their effect, the prevention, restrictian ardistartion· of 
campetitian.2 
Translating this principle into. practice, the Court af Justice stated that the natianal 
court should in particular take into consideration the existence, if any, of similar 
contracts as well as the consequences of the agreement in question an the passibility 
of effecting parallel imparts. . 
1 Ground 20, Case 99179; see also Case 26/76 Metro [1977] ECR 1875. 
2 Ground 16, Case 31180. 
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2. Article 85(3) 
32. Lastly, the Fedetab judgment clarifies the conditions governing exemption 
from the prohibition of restrictive agreements. 
According to the Court, the powers conferred on the Commission under 
Article 85 (3) show that the need to maintain effective competition can be 
reconciled with the need to safeguard objectives of a different nature and that, to 
this end, certain restrictions of competition are admissible where they are 
indispensable to the attainment of those objectives and do not result in the 
elimination of competition in respect of a substanti.al part of the common market. 1 
Applying this principle, the Court considered whether the maintenance in Belgium 
of a traditional very dense distribution network comprising, inter alia, 80 000 
retailer~, which was the agreement's stated objective, constituted a benefit that was 
sufficient to offset the disadvantages resulting from the severe restrictions of 
competition, an argument advanced by the undertakings concerned but rejected by 
the Commission. 
The Court considered that the number of intermediaries and brands did not 
necessarily constitute the essential criterion for improving distribution within the 
meaning of Article 85 (3). The quality of a distribution sector depends mainly on its 
commercial flexibility and its capacity to react to stimuli from both manufacturers 
and consumers. As far as the latter point is concerned, effectiveness of distribution 
implies particularly that it should be able to focus on those products which are. most 
sought after by consumers and also depends on its ability to adjust to new 
purchasing habits which consumers may adopt.2 
In view of the fact that sales of cigarettes by supermarkets have grown at a much 
faster rate than sales' by other resellers to consumers, despite the fact that 
supermarkets stock only a limited number of the full range of cigarette brands sold 
on the Belgian market, the Court expressed serious doubts as to whether an 
effective improvement in the distribution of cigarettes would come about as a result 
of the agreement. It did not, however, give a final ruling on this matter since the 
agreement enabled the member firms of Fedetab (whose share of total sales of 
cigarettes in Belgium was over 80%) to eliminate competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. Under Article 85(3)(b), this ruled out 
the granting of exemption.2 
1 Fedetab judgment, Ground 176. 
2 Fedetab judgment, Ground 184. 
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2 - Procedural matters 
33. A number of judgments provide considerable clarification of the law of 
procedure in the field of competition. 
The conditions governing notification, 1 its effects, 2 the extent of the Commission's 
power with regard to inspection,3 the rules to be complied with in the course of 
infringement procedures, 4 the legal nature and the effects of letters indicating the 
Commission's opinion that there is no need for it to take further action,s and the 
circumstances in which the Commission may take interim measures in the event of 
an alleged infringement of Articles 85 and 86 6 have thus been more clearly defined. 
1. Notification 
(a) Obligation to notify 
34. The question of whether, for the purpose of obtaining exemption under 
Article 85(3), the parties must notify their agreement in accordance with 
Article 4(1) of Regulation 17, or whether the agreement in question need not be 
notified, pursuant to Article 4(2), is of considerable practical significance. 
Article 4(2}(1} provides that there is no obligation to notify agreements to which 
the only parties are undertakings from oqeMember State and which do not relate 
either to imports or to exports between Member States. 
Article 4(2) (2) lays down the same· pr~visions iii respect of certain vertical 
agreements to which not more than two undertakings are party. 
, . ..,: . 
35. In the Fedetab case, the Court confirmed the Commission's view thatthese 
two provisions must be interpreted strictly. The Court accordingly held that a 
decision of an association of undertakings comprising some 150 Belgian 
manufacturers, Importers and distributors of tobacco products and one 
Luxembourg company, and an agreement entered into by that association and a 
1 Fedetab and Distillers judgments referred to· above. 
2 Case 106179 Vereniging ter bevordering van de belangen des boekhandels and Others v Eldi Records, 
referred to below as VBRB [1~801 ECR 1137. . . . . . 
Case 136179 National Panasonic (UK) Ltd v Commission: not yet reported in ECR; see also Ninth 
Report on Competition Policy, point 137. 
4 Fedetab judgment referred to above. 
5 Perfume and Oreal judgments referred to above. 
6 Court Order in Case 792/79R Camera Care Ltd v Commission [1980] ECR 119. 
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Belgian wholesalers' : association were not eligible for exemption under 
Article 4(2)(1). : 
The Court also dismis~ed the argument that the commitments ~ade to Fedetab by 
its members and the agreements on prices and t~rms of sale ,concluded between 
some of its members and their customers at the instigation of the association should 
be 'considered individually and therefore constituted bilateral agreements within 
the meaning of Article,4(2)(2)(a}. The Coun: held that they Wer~, on the contrary, 
collective measures to which the undertakings were' party through their 
association, which in fact acted on behalf of its members., 
(h) Form of notification 
, 
36. The Court also adopted 'a very narrow interpretation of the presc~ibed forms 
of notification. ' 
Article 4 of Commission Regulation No 27/62, as amended by Re'gulation 
No 1133/68,1 provides that 'notifications shall be submitted on Form A/B as 
shown in the Annex to;this Regulation and shall contain the information asked for 
in Form AlB'. Use of the form is thus obligatory and is an essential prerequisite for 
the validity of the notification. This requirement takes into account the need 
expressed in Article 87(2}(b) of the Treaty, as p~rt of the detailed rules for the 
application of Article 85 (3), 'to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to 
simplify administratio~ to the greatest possible e~tent on the other'. 2 " 
. . ' . 
37. In the Fedetab arid Distillers cases, therefore, the Court refused to regard as 
having been properly notified agreements which had been communicated to the 
Commission in reply to a request for information pursuant to Article 11(2) of 
Regulation 17. Since the agreements in question were not exempt from the 
requirement of notifkation, the, Commission was not ,required to determine 
whether or not they fulfilled, the basic conditions for exemption. 
38. The Court has held, however, that where the full text of an agreement is 
annexed to the notificition form, that agreement is properly notified, even if only 
some of its articles ar~ referred to on the form. 'By means of the notification, the 
Commission must be' given the information necessary to enable' it to take the 
decisions provided for;in Regulation No 17/62. Where the agreement isin writing 
1 OJ L 189, 1.8.1968. : 
2 Fedetab judgment, Groupds 61 and 62. 
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and a copy of the full text is annexed to the form, the sole purpose of the 
information given on the form is to simplify administration. If the information 
given is correct and if, in particular, it genuinely relate~ to the measures which, at 
the time, were felt to be the most significant, the aims of notification would appear 
to be achieved. In that case, the agreements must be regarded as hiving been duly 
notified'as 'a whole, except where the intention to notify only part of the agreement 
is clearly apparent from the information given'. 1 ' 
(c) Effects of notification 
39. Notification has a threefold significance: where it is obligatory, it, is an 
essential prerequisite' for the granting of exemption by the Commission 
(ArtiCles 4(1) and 5(1) of Regulation 17); undertakings are, not subject to the 
impo~jtion offines (Article 15 (5) of Regulation 17) ; and, lastly, in accordance with· 
the decisions of the Court, it enables provisional validity to be ascribed to existing 
agreements. 
As regards the last point; it is particularly important to make a clear distinction 
between existing and new agreements. 
40. -In theVBBB case, the question arose of whether a duly notified agreement can 
no longer be regarded as an existing agreement on the ground that some of the 
products covered by the notification were temporarily and deliberately excluded 
from the scope of the agreement and later re-introduced into it. 
Rejecting the interpretation of one of the parties to the dispute, before the national 
court, the Court stated that this was not the case. ' 
41.' . It must be noted that the Court confined its interpretation striCti y to the case 
in point, namely;' the deliberate and temporary limitation of the scope of the 
agreement notified. It did not rule on whether changes to the agreement had any 
effect on, the validity of ~he initial notificatiqn or the possible provisional validity of 
the agrec::ment. 
, , 
The Commission b~lieves that changes which affect the substance ~f the ~greernent 
or make it appreciably more restrictive by broaqening its scope require further 
notification. 
1 Judgment in VBBB and Others ZJ Eldi Records, Ground 10. 
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2. Investigation 
42. As the Commission indicated in its previous report, 1 it has been increasingly 
obliged to take formal decisions in regard to investigations 2 under Article 14(3) of 
Regulation 17 in order to be fully able to investigate possible infringements. 
43. In the Panasonic case, the Court had an opportunity to give a ruling on 
whether the Commissio'n may carry out investigations following a 'formal decision 
without having first endeavoured to carry out the investigations using a written 
authorization given to' its officials and without informing the undertakings in 
question in advance. ' 
The,Court gave a positive ruling, confirming the position of the Commission. The 
Court rejected Panascinic's submission that, by analogy with Article 11 of 
Regulation 17, investigation must follow a two-stage pro'cedure, in which the 
informal stage must precede the formal stage. 
The Court held that Regulation 17 laid down separate procedures for requests for 
information and investigations and that these procedures were not subject to the 
same conditions, since they fulfilled different requirements. While Article 11 gives 
the Commission the necessary powers to obtain the information it requires in order 
to take decisions with full knowledge of the facts on cases referred to it, Article 14 
enables the Commission to verify the accuracy and scope of information which is 
already in its possession. In the first case, the cooperation of undertakings is 
essential, while this is not so in the latter case. 
One of the aims'in providing for investigations following a formal decision is to 
avoid the possibility of investigations on the basis of a written authorization being 
refused. The Court does not regard this procedure as infringing the rights of the 
party concerned to be heard before a decision adversely affecting him is taken and 
to organize his defence. It holds that the exercise of such a right of defence is 
embodied primarily in administrative or court proceedings for the termination of 
infringements or the establishment of a legal incompatibility. 3 The sole purpose of 
the investigation procedure, however, is to enable the Commission to obtain the 
information necessary :to verify the accuracy and implications of a particular 
factual and legal situat,ion. 
1 Ninth Report on Compet~tion Policy, point 134. 
2 In 1980, the Commission was obliged to take a formal decision in order to carry out investigations in 
20 cases. 
3 Respect for the rights of the defence was expressly recognized by the Court as a fundamental principle 
of Community law (Case 85176 Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECR 461, 511; Ninth Report on 
Competition Policy, point 25). 
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In the latter case, the right to a prior hearing, as laid down in Article 19(1) of 
Regulation 17, cannot be invoked. 
This provision of Community law is not incompatible with fundamental rights 
and, in particular, with Article 8 of the European Convention for,the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, which states that: 
'Everyone has the right to respect for'his private and family life, his home and hjs 
correspondence' . 
This same article provides for an exception to the principle of non-interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right, where such interference' is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary for the protection of the general interes,t. 
The measures taken pursuant to Regulation 17, which are designed to maintain 
competition as required by the Treaty, are fully consistent" with this con?ition.. 
3. Rules to be followed in the administrative procedure 
44. The Fedetab case gave the Court the opportunity to clarify a number of-rules 
designed to ensure the proper functioning of the administrative procedure with que 
respect, inter alia, for the rights of the parties concerned and of third' parties to 
make their views known in regard to the sub~ect matter of the proc~dure. 
The Court held that there is nothing to prevent the Commission from usipg the 
same procedure to deal with a number of complaints in regard to a 'single 
infringement, which have been filed in succession, or from taking a single decision 
in regard to all of them. Where a complaint filed subsequently does not incoiporati! 
all of the .initial complaint but relates only to a point that arises in its general 
context,' it is' not necessary, for the purpose of ensuring respect for the rights of the 
defence, to deliver a new statement of objections. It is sufficient-to- 'inform the 
undertakings concerned of the filing of the second complaint and to obtain their 
written views on the subject. 
45. Confirming its earlier decisions,l .the Court also emphasized that the 
statement of objections may be confined to a brief, but clear, statement by the 
Commission of the essential facts on which its position is based, provided that the 
Commission furnishes the information necessary for the defence in the course of,the 
administrative procedure. It is not obliged in this respect to forward to the 
1 See, inter alia, the recent judgment in Case 85176 Hoffmann-La Roche (1979) ECR 461, 511; Ninth 
Report on Competition Policy, point 25. 
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. undertakings concerned all the documents on which its objections are· based, but 
only those relating to the essential facts. 
46. Where the undertaking concerned wishes to avail itself of the right, pursuant 
to Article 3(3) of Regulation 99/63/EEC on hearings,l to present witnesses who 
may corroborate the facts set out, it must state this clearly in its written reply to the 
written statement. 
If third parties showing a sufficient interest apply to be heard pursuant to the 
second sentence of Arti!=le 19(2), the Commission's obligations towards them are 
fulfilled if it affords them the opportunity of making known their views in writing. 
It is not,in general, obliged to afford them a subsequent oral hearing, except where 
they are again able to ~how a legitimate interest in such a hearing. 
47. Admittance as parties to the administrative procedure does not, however, 
confer on third parties, or inter alia the complainants, the right to acquire 
confidential information submitted to the Commission by the undertakings 
concerned. Even in the course of this procedure, the Commission is obliged to 
respect the obligation of professional secrecy,. pursuant, to Article 20(2) of 
Regulation 17. In thi~ respect, the. Court has emphasized that,' although 
information in the· nature of a prof~ssional secret, when communicated to a trade 
association by its members, ceases to be so regarded by the members of· the 
association, it remains a professional secret as far as third parties are concerned. 2 
Transmission by the Co'mmission of such information to a complainant third party 
would, however, entail annulment of the decision only if it were established that, in 
the absence of such a procedural defect, the substance of the contested decision 
might have been different. 3 . - , , 
48. The Court has reaffirmed that the grounds for a decision need not necessarily 
be a copy of the statement of objections. The.Commission must take accoilllt of the 
facts established during the administrative procedure and either drop objections 
which prove not to be well founded or reinforce and supplement the factual a,nd 
legal bases of its submissions in support of the objections it maintains. 4 . 
1 OJ 127, 20.8.1963. 
2 Fedetab judgment, Ground 46. 
3 Fedetab judgment, Ground 47. 
4 Fedetab judgment, Groun~ 68. 
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The Commission is not obliged to discuss in its decision all the factual and legal 
points raised by each party. Lastly, it is not obliged to make the file available to the 
applicant once the decision has been taken .. 
The Court thus defined the limits to the right to be heard and its exercise in the 
course of the administrative procedure. . 
49. Confirming its earlier decisions, which stated that the procedure adopted by 
the Commission in respect of restrictive practices and dominant positions is 
administrative rather. than judical in nature, the Court also stressed that, while the 
Commission is obliged to. respect the procedural safeguards laid down in 
Community law, it cannot be held to be a court within the meaning of Article 6 of 
the: European Convention on Human Rights. 1 It is not, therefore, obliged to 
organize its procedure in the manner of court proceedings. 
4. Letters terminating a procedure 
50. In the Perfume and Oreal judgments, the' Court gave a. ruling on the 
Commission's standard pra~tice of discontinuing prelimi~ary' investig~~ipns 
initiated in respect of restrictive. practices which may be caught'by the prohibi~ion 
laid down in Article 85 (1) without taking a formal decision, where it considers that, . 
on the basis of the information at its disposal, it should not take action in n!spec·t;~.f\ ... i~· 
the restrictive practice in question. In such cases, the Commi~sion informs ~h~ 
undertakings concerned of its opinion in writing, stating that· the file on the matter 
can therefore be formally closed. ' 
51. The Court regards these notifications as being simply administrative letter'S. 
Such letters, which are sent to the undertakings concerned by the Directorafe-
General for Competition without publication of a summary, as laid down in 
Article 19(3) of Regulation 17, or a decision, as laid down in Article 21(1) of that 
Regulation, clearly do not constit,ute either decisions granting negative clearance or 
decisions pursuant to Article,85(3), as defined in Articles 2 and 6 respectively of 
Regulation 17. 
Such letters, which 'are based solely on the facts made known to the CO!Dmission, 
cannot be relied upon as against third parties and they do not prevent national 
courts, when deciding whether the agreements in question are incompatible with 
1 This article states that, in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, everyone is entitled to a 
fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
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Article 85, from arriving at a different assessment of the agreements concerned in 
the light of the information available to them. While such letters are not binding on 
national courts, the opiqion expressed therein nevertheless constitutes a matter of 
fact which the courts may take into account. ' 
The letters do not, moreover, have the effect of suspending, within the meaning of 
Article 9(3) of Regulation 17, the competence of the national authorities to apply 
the prohibitions laid down in Articles 85(1) and 86. This provision presupposes 
that the Commission demonstrates its intention, by an official act, of taking a 
decision pursuant to the competition rules, whereas letters terminating a procedure 
indicate that it does nor intend to take a decision. . 
The competence of the civil courts based on the direct effect of the prohibitions is 
clearly not called into question, since there is no reference to it in Article 9(3) of 
Regulation 17.1 
52. Such letters are, however, essential for the proper administration of the 
competition policy. They also have a direct legal effect, since they terminate the 
provisional validity accorded to existing agreements upon their notification. While 
legal certainty in regard to contracts requires that,'where an agreement has been 
notified in accordance with Regulation 17, the court may declare it automatically 
void only after the Commission has taken a decision pursuant to the regulation, it is 
no longer justifiable to maintain this protection where the Commission has 
informed the parties concerned that it has terminated the procedure which relates 
to them. It is unlikely that the Commission will thereafter exercise its power to 
grant an exemption, possibly with retroactive effect, in respect of the agreements in 
question. There is, moreover, nothing to prevent the court in which jurisdiction is 
again vested from taking into account the opinion of the Commission as well as its 
decisions in their entirety. In any event, undertakings which have notified their 
agreements continue to· be immune from the pay~ent of fines. 
5. Interim measures 
53. In an increasing. number of cases, complainants are referring to the 
Commission suspected infringements of the competition rules with the request that 
it intervene quickly in orderto safeguard their vital interests. These complaints in 
general concern contestt;d mergers, refusals to supply or pricing practices which are 
regarded as unfair. 
1 This question was resolved in the judgment in Case 127173 BRT(l) [1974] ECR 51. 
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In view of the inevitable length of the normal administrative procedure leading to a 
decision on the merits, the Commission can, as a general rule, satisfy this type of 
request only by taking an interim decision using an accelerated procedure. 
The question arises, therefore, of whether and to what extent it has this· power 
under the Community competition rules. 
54. Under the third subparagraph of Article 66(5) of the ECSC Treaty, the 
Commission may at any time take such interim measures of protection as it may 
consider necessary to safeguard the interests of competing undertakings and of 
third parties. This power, for which express provision is made only in respect of 
concentrations between undertakings as laid down in paragraphs 1 to 6 of 
Article 66, has been accorded recognition by the Court in cases of abuse of a 
dominant position as defined in Article 66 (7).1 
55. Although the EEC Treaty does not expressly confer such a power upon the 
Comniission, the Court has also recognized its right to take interim measures.2 
This right derives from Article 3 of Regulation 17, which states that where the 
Commission, upon application or upon its own initiative, finds' that there is 
infringement of Article 85 or Article 86, it may by decision require the undertakings 
concerned to bring such infringement to an end. The power to take decisions, 
which is the central element of Article 3, may be exercised in successive stages. The 
Commission may accordingly take such interim measures as are essential to enable 
it to carry out its tasks effectively and to ensure, inter alia, that any decisions it may 
take requiring undertakings to bring infringements to an end have the required 
effect. 3 
Such an interpretation is necessary in order to make competition law effective and 
safeguard the legitimate interests of the Member States or undertakings concerned. 
The Court holds that it may be necessary under some circumstances to take 
protective measures, where the competition practices of certain undertakings are 
injurious to some Member States or prejudicial to other undertakings, or where 
they call into question the Community's competition law in a manner that is 
unacceptable. Under such circumstances, it is essential to avoid irreparable damage 
being caused during the preliminary investigation stage which cannot be remedied 
1 Order of the President of the Court in Case 109/75R National Carbonising Co. !I Commission [1975] 
ECR 1193. 
2 Order of the Court in Case 792179R Camera Care [1980] ECR 119. 
3 Paragraph 18. 
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by any decision the Commission might take at the end of the administrative 
procedure. 1 
56. The Court has stated, moreover, that such measures may be taken only in 
duly established cases of urgency with a view to remedying a situation which may 
cause serious and irreparable damage to the party who has requested such measures 
or intolerable harm to,the general interest. They must be interim, protective 
measures and must be confined to what is necessary in that particular situation. In 
taking such measures, the Commission must respect the essential safeguards 
accorded to the parties concerned by Regulation 17, inter alia the right to a hearing 
laid down in Article 19. The decisions taken must bt: in a form which renders them 
subject to appeal before the Court of Justice by any party who regards himself as 
being adversely affected. 2 . 
57. It is the Commission's intention to apply rigorously the criteria thus laid 
down. For example,it believes that the urgency which would justify the adoption of 
interim measures'can be established only in exceptional circumstances, inter.alia 
where the applicant tmqertaking is in danger of disappearing from the market or 
incurring a major commercial loss, for which it cannot obtain compensation, or can 
do so only with considerable difficulty, by means ,of an action brought before a 
national court. 
The application for interim' measures must be made in conjunction with a formal 
complaint, which must, prima facie, appear well founded and which must, 
therefore, be adequately substantiated and contain as much precise information as 
possible. 
1 Paragraph 14. 
2 Paragraph 19. 
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Commission involvement in work concerning 
restrictive practices in international trade, 
58. The Commission continued to play an active part in ,the work being done by 
the OECD and UNCT AD on competition matters and, in particular, on restrictive 
practices in international trade. ' , 
It-also increased, principally through bilateral contacts, its cooperation with the 
authorities of non-member countries responsible for competition matters. 
§1 - OECD 
59. On 6 November 1980 the Working Party on the position of the professi~ns in 
relation to competition rules' held its first meeting, which was devoted to the 
methods of carrying 'out the study. 
The Working Party set up to study the difficulties encountered'in the gathering of 
inform,ation abroad in the field of restrictive practices continued its work. It 
examined the powers of inquiry which the various authorities possess both at 
national and at international level and the limits placed on the exercise of such 
powers in the; case of undertakings situated outside the territory of the authorities 
concerned. The Working Party will try to outline proposals for a solution regarding 
the latter point. 
The report published by the Working Party which c~nsidered concentratio~ and 
competition policyl is now available. It recommends, in particular, that member 
countries be asked to take three series of measures, namely an increase in the 
amount of data available relating to concentration, publication of international 
data on concentration and a strengthening, or the more effective implementation, 
1 OECD, 'Concentration and Competition Policy', 1979, Paris. 
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of the competition rules of those countries which are concerned at the level of 
concentration. 
The current work of the OECD in this field includes an examination of the 
feasibility of updating data concerning mergers and concentrations and of the 
legislative position in this field. 
The Working Party which studied the problem of purchasing power submitted its 
report to the Council, which adopted it and authorized its publication. The report 
analyses the causes, visible signs and effects of purchasing power, summarizes the 
methods laid down by law and regulation that are used to combat the harmful 
effects of this phenome~on and suggests certain measures that might be taken. 
§2- UNCTAD 
Principles and rules on restrictive business practices 
. i 
60. The United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices held its 
second session from 8 to 22 April 1980. 1 At its closing meeting, on 22 April 1980, it 
approved a 'Set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules for the 
control of restrictive bu~iness practices' and transmitted it to the General Assembly 
at it,S 35th session for its adoption as a resolution. It also recommended that the 
General Assembly, five years after the adoption of the Set of principles and rules' 
convenes a further United Nations Conference for the purpose of reviewing the Set. 
The General Assembly adopted the Set of principles and rules on 5 December 1980. 
, , 
This world-wide code on restrictive business practices is addressed to States and 
enterprises. Its principles and rules are not legally binding. Its main objective is to 
ensure that restrictive business practices do not impede or negate the realization of 
benefits that should arise from the liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
affec.ting world trade; particularly those practices affecting the trade and 
development of developing countries, because these countries 'in general do not 
dispose of adequate means to control restrictive business practices. 
, I 
The principles and rules for enterprises apply to all enterprises' including those 
which are under State control or ownership. However, the code does not'apply to 
intergovernf!1ental agreements, nor to restrictive practices caused by such 
agreements. 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, points 38 to 40. 
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In order to ensure the equitable application of the Set of principles and rules States 
are encouraged to take into account in their control of restrictive business practices 
the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries. Thus the 
principle of preferential or differential treatment for developing countries has been 
recognized without there bei'ng an automatic exception in favour o(developing 
countries or their enterprises. 
States are also requested to take due account of the extent to which the conduct of 
enterprises is accepted or required under applicable legisliltion or regulations of 
another State. Thus, the principle of 'comitas' should guide the resolution of 
conflicts of policy between States in their control of restrictive business practices 
affecting international trade. 
According to Sectiori D3 of the code, enterprises, engaged on the market in rival or 
potentially rival activities, should refrain from agreeri:lt~nts or arrangements which 
limit access to markets or otherwise"unduly restrain competition, in particular from 
price fixing agreements, collusive tendering, market or customer allocation 
arrangements, allocation of sales and production quotas and concerted refusals to 
deal. ' , 
Under Section D4 enterprises are asked to refrain from abusing a dominant position 
of market power by way of anti-competitive acts such as predatory or 
discriminatory pricing, measures to increase their market dominance by way of 
external growth, vertical price fixing, refusal to deal, tying and imposing 
restrictions on resale or export. 
The principles laid down in Sections D3 and D4 of the code correspond largely to 
those contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. This is also true with 
respect to intra-enterprise restrictions to which the code only applies to the extent 
that there is an abuse of a dominant position of market power such as a practice not 
appropriate to the allocation of functions within an economic entity and having 
restrictive effects outside the' related enterprises. 
!.' 
States are encouraged to adopt and enforce appropriate legislation for the control 
of restrictive business practices but also to ensure treatment of enterprises which is 
fair, non-discriminatoi'y and in accordance with established procedures of law. 
States are also encouraged to collaborate more effectively in this field at the 
international level and consult each other in regard to issues' of mutual concern. 
61. Within the framework of UNCT AD an Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
on Restrictive Business Practices will be charged with various functions in order to 
make the Set of principles and rules operative. This institutional machinery may, 
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however, not act like a tribunal or otherwise pass judgments on ·the activities or 
conduct of individual governments or enterprises in specific business transactions. 
62. The Set of rules and principles applies ~o the Community as a regional 
grouping of States having competence in the area of restrictive business practices in 
the same manner as to Stat~s. 
The Commission together with Member States has,participated actively arid in a 
positive spirit in the negotiation of this code. 
63. The Community has always held the view that the development of 
international trade should take place under conditions .cif fair competition and that 
it is necessary to promote international cooperation in order to co~trol restrictive 
business practices adversely' affecting international, trade. ' 
The result of these negotiations, while reflecting tl':e need for compromise; meets 
the fundamental concerns of the Community· for a code respecting fundamental 
principles of law such as non-discrimination and incorporating rules and principles 
whose soundness has been established on the basis of experience gained in their 
application nationally and regionally. It should thus con'tr:ibute substantially 
towards amelioration of the international economIc order. 
International code of conduct on transfer. of technology 
64. The third sessio~ of the UN Conference on the code of conduct on the transfer 
. of technology took pla~e i~ Ge~eva fr'om 21 Ap'ril to 6 May 1980. There was 
progresS on some parts Of the code. Notably, agreement was within reach OIl' the 
whole text of the important chapter on guarantees and responsibilities. However, 
the developing countries (Gro~p ,of 77) did not giVe! their final consent to a 
compromise text. ',' 
The major. issues which need' to be resolved include the definition of an 
international transfer of technology, the proposed chapter on applicable law and 
settlement of disputes and the precise nature of the institutional machinery. 
. . · . 
The crucial problem which led to a deadlock of the Conference relates to the 
'chapeau' of the chapter on restrictive practices. ' 
The major issues are: 
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(i) whether the practices should be judged in terms of their effects on development 
in the technology-acquiring country or in terms of a more objective 'restraint of 
trade' or competition test, and 
(ii) to what extent the practices listed are appropriate in a parent/subsidiary 
relationship and should therefore be considered acceptable under the code. 
Also, major differences of opinion persist on the clauses concerning: 
(i) grant-back obligations, 
(ii) export restrictions, 
(iii) use restrictions after the expiration of the arrangement. 
A resumed session of the United Nations Conference is scheduled to be held in 
Geneva from 23 March to 10 April 1981. 
§ 3 - Cooperation between the Commission 
. and the anti-trust authorities of non-member countries 
65. The Commission intensified its bilateral cooperation with the authorities of 
non-member countries resJlOrisible for competition. 
Thus in 1980 bilateral contacts were established with the Japanese authorities 
responsible for restrictive practices: a delegation from the Fair Trade Commission 
came to Brussels in January and a delegation from the Directorate-General for 
Competition went to Tokyo in October 1980. The talks centred mainly on 
competition policy matters of common interest, including policies governing 
distribution, the control of oligopolistic behaviour and export cartels.' 
Bilateral contacts with the Canadian authorities were continued' during a visit by 
those authorities to Brussels at the end·of October 1980. 
Lastly, a delegation from the Directorate-General for Competition visited 
Washington in November and discussed with the Justice Department and the 
Federal TradeCommission.the objectives of the policies that were being pursued, 
inter alia, in the fields of distribution, crisis cartels and voluntary restraint 
agreemen'ts. The talks also' covered the procedures employed in carrying out 
examinations and checks, particularly by the'Federal Trade Commission. 
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66. The main legislative developments in competition policy in the Member 
States were the enactment of the Competition Act, 1980 in the United Kingdom and 
the entry into force of the Act amending the existing competition legislation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the fourth Kartellgesetznovelle. The British Act 
complements and strengthens the powers of the competition authorities, among 
other things improving the procedures for controlling the anti-competitive 
practices of individual firms. The German measure is designed primarily to 
improve merger control measures, to strengthen supervisory powers over dominant 
firms, to safeguard competition arising from efficient operation, and to strengthen 
competition in the field of energy supply. 
In France the process of removing restrictions on prices was completed. In 
Denmark the price freeze was made less stringent, the Profits Limitation Act was 
finally repealed, and dominant firms were required to notify proposed price 
increases to the Monopolies Control Authority in advance. 
France and the United Kingdom enacted legislation against the extra-territorial 
effect of foreign laws on actions by their domestic firms, in particular against the 
com~unication of information or the supply of documents to foreign authorities. 
The legislation does not affect the application of the Community competition rules. 
National competition laws were enforced in the Member States without giving rise 
to conflicts with Community law. 
Belgium 
67. There have been no changes in competition legislation during the period in 
question. The Act of 27 May 1960 on protection from the abuse of economic power 
remains applicable. 
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The review of legislation governing rules on competition in economic affairs is still 
in progress. An amendment has been drafted with a view to making the law more 
effective and speeding up the procedure. 
68. As regards the procedure relating to information employed by the 
Commissaire-rapporteur under Article 5 of the Act of 27 May 1960, a royal decree 
is being drafted under which officials of the Department 'of Trade with special 
responsibility for competition matters would be. empowered to assist the 
Commissaire-rapporteli'r. The royal decree will thus enable the Commi'ssaire-
rapporteur to call upon the services of officials of both the Board of Inspectors for 
Economic Affairs and ~he Department of Trade. . 
69. Three cases in which t~e Commissaire-rapporteur came to the conclusion 
that there was improper conduct were submitted to the Council for Economic 
Disputes for its opinion. 
,. 
(1) Distribution of newspapers and periodicals 
The findings of the COIhmissaire-rapporteur establish that a regional consultative 
committee had given an u.nfavourable opinion on the question of supplying 
newspapers and periodicals to a retailer: As a result of that opinion, the' publishers 
and distributors in question refused to supply the complainant, who has 'no 
opportunity of obtaining the newspapers through' other chanriels. The refusal is 
moreover, held to'be purely arbitary. ' 
(2) Ban on taking part in other exhibitions 
Under the rules of an international trade fair, exhibitors are barred from taking part 
in other fairs or regional exhibitions. In view of the dominant position of the fair in 
question, the normal organization of rival 'exhibitions, trade fairs or shows is 
restricted to an appreciable arid unjustifiable extent. 
(3) Refusal to accept a' competitor's advertising 
Advertisements for partic~lar ~akes of imported electronic equipment, radios and 
television sets appear regularly in the periodicals of a certain publisher. A parallel 
importer who had also' advertised in the same periodicals had had his 
advertisements refused· since 1977 on the grounds that they were prejudicial to the 
other importers and' manufacturers concerned. The Commissaire-rapporteur 
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considers that this refusal'constitutes abuse of a dominant position in view of the 
interest of certain categories of readers in these:periodicals. 
These ca~es have' been supmitted to. the Cou'ncil for Economic Disputes for i~s 
opinion. 
70. In 1980, the Council for 'Econo~ic Disputes gave its opinion on a complaint 
made in 1975 by a. bookseller in respect of a distributor of newspapers and 
periodicals for refusal to supply. the opinion was gIven following the decision by 
the Minister for Economic Affairs that the Council should investigate the matter. 
Having fouridthat the conditions for the application of tHe Act of 27 May 1960 
were not fulfilled, the COrrimissaire-rapporteur decided to'propose that the file on 
the matter 'be formally' dosed. " . 
The members of the Council for Economic Disputes felt that they had been able to 
acquaint themselves with a number of factors that resulted from investigation of 
the complaint which might have proved useful in determining whether there had, in 
the case in point, been an abuse of economic power on the ground that the company 
in question, which had a monopoly or quasi-monopoly, had prejudiced the general 
interest. 
However, since the act which had been condemne,d as an abuse, of econom,ic power 
i~ 1975, namely the refusal to supply, had terminated with the su'pply of the articles 
requested to the ,complainant prior to referral of th~ case to the .Council for 
Economic Disputes,and since there can be no repetition of the refusal to supply by 
the distributor under the same conditions as those obtaining when the complaint 
was filed because of the setting up of regional consultative committees which are 
consulted before any stockist is approved, the Council for Economic Disputes felt 
that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the investigation in order to 
obtain all the infoflpation required to determine whether, in its opil1ion, there had 
been an'1-buse of economic po'wer at the time. 
The Minister for E~o!1omi<;: Affairs decided that;.iri order to remedy the situation, 
the Commissaire-rapporteur. should be requested to initiate the procedure for 
obtaining in,formation in regard to the distribution of newspap~rs and periodicals. 
This procedure is laid down in Article 5 of the Act of 27 May 1960 and consists in 
the collection of general information on. all refusals' to supply retailers with 
newspapers and periodicals and the possible dominant position of the 
undert:ilking(s)' r~sponsiblefor s'uchrefusals to supply.. ' . 
. .' . '. .. . 
The Minister for Economic Affairs also ordered the information procedure to be 
initiated in regard to the maintenance of heating equipment. The members of a 
trade organization were, at the instigation of that organization, requiring payment 
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of a large additional sum on top of the charge for maintaining heating equipment in 
return for issuing a certificate stating that the equipment functioned properly, as 
provided for in the Royal Decree of 6 January 1978 on the prevention of 
atmospheric pollution when heating buildings by means of solid or liquid fuels. 
Denmark. 
71. With effect from 1 'january 1980 the law of4 November 1979 1 freezing prices 
and incomes was replaced by a new, less stringent Act, and the Profits Limitation 
Act, which had been suspended, was finally repealed on the same date. The new Act 
allowed firms to raise prices to cover increases in the cost of raw materials and 
other supplies and certain other specified items (including wages,public charges 
and rents). New features were (a) the provision that about 150 firms deemed to 
hold a dominant position under the Monopolies Act were required to notify 
proposed price increases to the Monopolies Control Authority (Monopoltilsynet) 
in advance, and (b) a special provision for trade in petroleum products, requiring 
advance approval of price increases by the Authority. The price freeze was one 
element in the Government's plan for a coordinated economic policy extending 
over several years; other aspects were laws limiting wage increases and amending 
the system of cost-of-living increases. Following an agreement between the political 
parties in May 1980, the range of cost increases which firms may pass on in prices 
was widened. 
In the standing legislation on prices and monopolies,2 the Prices and Profits Act 
1974 was amended to widen public access to information on prices and price 
differentials. 
72. The Monopolies Act does not apply to public undertakings (Section 2 of the 
Act). But it is not entirely clear when a firm is to be considered a public undertaking. 
The distinction came to the fore in a case in which it had to be decided whether the 
State-owned company pansk Olie-og Naturgas A/S (Danish Petroleum Gas and 
Natural Gas - DONG): was subject. to the Monopolies Act. The company is an 
ordinary public limited company, in which the State holds the entire share capital. 
It has the sole right to import natural gas into Denmark. It has also engaged in sorne 
buying of crude oil in the producer countries. The Monopolies Control Authority 
held that for purposes of the Monopolies Act the company was aprivate enterprise 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 49. 
2 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 70 to 75 ; Seventh Report on Competition Policy, point 
77. 
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on the grounds that it was not under the direction of any political body. The 
Authority justified this conclusion by reference to the aims of the Act, namely, the 
freedom of commerce and of competition. The Authority also emphasized that by 
its activities in the sphere of petroleum gas and natural gas the company could 
exercise an appreciable influence on the prices and production of these products. 
73. Section 6(1) of the Act lays down that agreements which exert or may exert a 
substantial influence on prices or production conditions must be notified to the 
Authority. Se~tion 8 of the Act states that agreements which have not been duly 
notified are not valid or enforceable before the COUITS. In 1977 the only two Danish 
producers of railway rolling stock, A/S Frichs and Scandia-Randers AIS, concluded 
an agreement unper which Frichs was to cease production and not to resume for a 
period of 20 years. A declaration.to this effect was registered against Frichs' factory 
properties. The agreement was concluded against a background of difficult 
economic conditions obtaining at that time in the production of railway vehicles. 
This agreement was not notified to the Monopolies Control Authority, as the firms 
did not feel that any appreciable restriction of competition was involved. The firms 
argued that they were not in competition with one another, one concentrating on 
motive power and the other on unpowered rolling stock, both passenger and goods 
wagons. After going bankrupt, Frichs was taken over by another firm which was 
prevented by the declaration from resuming production of rolling stock. The 
Monopolies Control Authority found that the agreement between the two firms 
was caught by the obligation to notify imposed by Section 6(1) of the Act, as it 
could exert a substantial influence on prices and production conditions for rolling 
stock. Scandia-Randers has challenged the Authority's decision before the 
Monopolies Appeal Tribunal (Monopolankenrevnet). 
74. Over the last 10 years a range of new retail distribution channels, such as 
, discount' houses, do-it-yourself supermarkets, and mail-order firms, has been 
growing in importance. In many cases these have met with opposition both from 
organizations representing the established specialist trade and to some extent from 
manufacturers. The Monopolies Control Authority'S policy has been to apply 
Sections 11 and 12 of the Monopolies Act to help to open the market to these new 
channels: 
(a) In June 1979; under Section 12(3) of the Act, the Authority ordered Sportgoods 
AIS, the supplier of 'Adidas' spons equipment, to supply the Bilka chain of 
discount houses, owned by Dansk Supermarked A/S. Sportgoods appealed to 
the Monopolies Appeal Tribunal, which upheld the Authority's order. The 
Tribunal found that Bilka had declared itself willing to fulfil Sportgoods' 
conditions for recognition as a dealer, and must be assumed to be capable of 
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doing so. The Tribunal further found. that to sell' Adidas' equipment properly it 
was not necessary that the dealer possess the same capacity to provide expert 
customer service, and the like as in the case of radio and television equipment 
where the Tribunal had in 1974 annulled an order to supply made by the 
Authority.! Sportgoods has appealed against this ruling. to the High Court 
(Landsret). 
(b) In October 1979, under Section 12(2) of the Act, the Authority ordered 
R0rforeningen, the plumbing equipment wholesalers' association, to delete 
certai'n ,clauses in I its rules which made it difficult for do-it-yourself 
supermarkets to obtain supplies' of plumbing equipment. R0rforenlngen 
challenged the decision before the Monopolies Appeal Tribunal, which 
annulled the Author~ty's order. The Tribunal found that certain of the clauses 
involved could not :be held to have the harmful effects referred to in the 
Monopolies Act, and that for the others the information before the Tribunal 
was not sufficient to enable the restrictive effects to be assessed. 
(c) The Authority is at present engaged in a study of the ironmongery trade. 
Preliminary investig'ation has suggested that e.f£orts have been made in the 
industry to ensure that only retailers of the traditional kind sell ironmongery. 
The 'study is still in progress. ' 
The Monopolies Appeal Tribunal has made a ruling in the A/S Ferrosan 
(contraceptive pills) case, discussed in the last report,2 in which the Authority had 
orderedql 30% reduction in prices. On the basis in particular of a comparison with 
the prices obtaining abroad, the Trihunallowered the price reduction required to 
20%. Ferrosan has challenged the Tribunal's ruling before the High Court. 
,j 
Federal Republic of Germany 
75. The Federal Government's fourth Kartellgesetznovelle3 'which came into 
force on 1 May 1980, introduced further improvementsto the existing competition 
legislation and provides.for stronger measures against concentration and the abuse 
of economic power. The new legislation is designed primarily to improve merger 
control measures, to strengthen supervisory powers over dominant firms arid to 
safeguard the competition that arises from efficient operation by' means of the 
existing ban on discrimination and by providing for a special power of prohibition 
I 
1 Seventh Report on Competition Policy, point 78(c). 
2 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 52, 
3 BGBL I, p, 458. 
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so as to give the cartel authorities a wider scope to prohibit systematic predatory 
practices by dominant firms. ,New rules were also introduced in' respect of the 
special field of energy supply, to strengthen competition in that sector. The new 
rules are designed in particular' to improve market opportunities for small and 
medium-siz~d firms and so to keep markets in general open and flexible to enable 
the process of adaptation to continue. 
,76. The Monopolies Commission published its third main advisory OpInIOn 
entitled 'Merger control remains a priori,ty' (Fusionskontrolle bleibt vorrangig). In 
the face of the growing tendency towards concentration, the Monopolies 
Commission stresses in, particular the need to apply the more effective' merger 
control measures introduced by the fourth Kartellgesetznovelle., At the same time 
its proposals on the subject of deconcentration are designed ta" focus discussion on 
the possibilities and limitations of such measures. 
77. As regards merger control, the Federal Cartel Office has banned nine mergers 
as at the end of November J980, including two in the press industry. One ban 
already has legal force; appeals have been lodged with die Berlin Court of Appeal in 
respect of the others. In 12 cases, the firms in question dropped their merger plans 
because of objections raised by the Cartel Office. ' , 
78. As regards the control of abuse by dominant firms, the proceedings against 
Hoffmann-La Roche, ordered by the Cartel Office in 1974 to cut its man'ufacturer's 
sales prices for Valium and Librium, have finally been settled in favour of 
Hoffmann-La Roche after aJive-year legal battle. 1 
The Federal Supreme Court confirmed that it is permissible to determine that an 
abuse has been committed by comparing the price demanded by a dominant firm 
with a price obtaining on another comparable market where competition is more 
intense (the concept of a geographically comparable market); differences between 
the market can be offset by appropriate additions and deductions. In the present 
case, 'l;1owever, the Federal S~preme Court,did not uphold the Cpurt of Appeal's 
finding, t~at,the comparable price afforded evidence of unfair prici~g. The deciding 
factor was that the Netherlands pharmaceutical firm, Centrafarm, which the Court 
of Appeal ,used, forcomp~rison,.had ,a market share of only 0.7% on the 
comparabiemarket, and the additions and deductions regarded asnec~ssary by the 
Court ,of Appeal were higher in total than the ~omparable' p,ice. The Federal 
Supreme Court held that in this situation the market could no longer be regarded as 
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 80; Seventh Report on Competition Policy, point 82; 
Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 59; Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 55. 
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comparable. Since the ~ourt of Appeal had from the outset used only the 
Netherlands firm's price as the basis for comparison, the Federal Supreme Court 
did not further consider the other standards of comparison invoked by the Cartel 
Office. It did, however, express doubts as to whether the concept of setting a limit 
to acceptable profit was an appropriate method of determining whether a 
particular pricing policy constituted an abuse of a dominant position. 
79. In order to clarify its policies in regard to cooperation between small and 
medium-sized firms, the Cartel Office has published guidelines explaining its 
practice whereby proceedings are not initiated in respect of cooperation 
agreements which only slightly restrict competition. Under these guidelines, the 
Cartel Office does not as a rule take proceedings against restrictions of competition 
where they concern cooperation between firms aimed at increasing efficiency by 
coordinating company functions, and involve only a small number of small and 
medium-sized firms which are legally and economically independent and whose 
total share of the market is not more than 5%. It should be noted that concertation 
on pricing, quotas and territories is not as such regarded as a means of cooperation 
aimed at increasing efficiency. 
80. On the assessment of cartels involving rebates on aggregate turnover, the 
Cartel Office continued the practice introduced in 1977. In that year the Cartel 
Office modified its legal opinion of such cartels and now takes the view that rebates 
of this kind cannot proP!!rly be regarded as remuneration for services rendered, so 
that the clause exempting rebate cartels from the general ban on cartels does not 
apply to them. Implementing its new interpretation, the Cartel Office declared four 
cartels of this kind to be null and void. It had raised no obi ection when these cartels 
were notified several years before and they had since been operating without 
opposition. Appeals were lodged with the Court of Appeal against the four 
prohibition orders. The Court of Appeal made it clear that it shares the doubt of the 
Federal Cartel Office on whether rebates of this kind can properly be regarded as 
remuneration for service's rendered, but it set two of the prohibition orders aside on 
the basis of the protection of legitimate expectations. Following an appeal by the 
Cartel Office, the Federal Supreme Court set aside the judgmeritsof the Court of 
Appeal and ruled that a rebate cartel, even after it h~s been operating for 10 years, 
can still be declared null and void by a cartel authority following a change in the 
legal interpretation of the conditions for exemption. The case was remitted to the 
Court of Appeal for a re~hearing and a decision on whether rebates of this kind are 
genuine remuneration for services rendered within the meaning of the conditions 
for exemption. ' . 
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France 
81. The process of removing restrictions on prices which was begun in 1978 1 was 
completed in 1980 with its extension to the distribution and services sectors. Under 
the agreements concluded between the Minister for Economic Affairs and the trade 
organizations in the distribution sector, the latter have undertaken to promote 
competition and to apply to retailing certain specific measures 'relating to 
information and consumer protection. The Ministerial Decree of 13 May 1980 laid 
down the principle that prices for the provision of services should be freely 
determined and that sole liability should rest with the persons providing the 
services, subject to the obligation of moderation, where appropriate; the only 
exceptions to this rule are'some services, the prices for which are fixed by decree or 
determined by agreement ratified by decree. 
82. Two major legislative measures were taken in 1980, one on the 
communication of information abroad and the other on the practice of loss-
leading. 
The Act of 16 July 1980 prohibits, subject to the provisIOns of treaties or 
international agreements, the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, 
financial or technical documents or information to public authorities in other 
countries in so far as such action might be prejudicial to the sovereignty, security or 
essential economic interests ofFrance or to public policy. The Act also prohibits the 
seeking out and communication of information for use as evidence in judicial or 
administrative proceedings in other countries. This prohibition, which does not, of 
course, apply to Community procedures under the Treaty of Rome; is designed to 
safeguard French sovereignty and protect French undertakings. It does not, 
however, constitute an impediment to the desired development, in particular in the 
competition sector, of inter-State cooperation on either a bilateral or a multilateral 
basis. 
On 22 September 1980, having obtained the opinion' of the Competition 
Commission and consulted numerous trade organizations and consumer 
associations, the Minister for Economic Affairs published a circular on loss-leading 
designed to remedy this improper practice and enable the machinery of competition 
to function in accordance with the principles of fair trade. The circular laid down 
that the simultaneous fulfilment ofthree objective criteria was necessary in order to 
establish loss-leading: ' 
1 Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 60; Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 58. 
COMPo REP, EC 1980 
62 COMMISSION POUCY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
(i) a promotion campaign undert~ken by.a dist~ibutor in regard to the price .of a 
given product; . 
(ii) a supply of products for sale which is inadequate in terms of the magnitude of 
the promotion campaign; 
I (iii)discriminatory price-cutting whereby the trader applies to the product in 
question a margin which is markedly lower than that applied to equivalent 
alternative products.: . 
This procedure, the dir~ct result o{which is the.div~rsion of sales, namely the 
orientation o£custorrier~ attracted by such adverti~ing towards the purchase of 
equivalent alternative o~ comparable products of different brands,. is injurious to 
the manufacturer whose brand is thus misused and abuses the good. faith of 
consumers. Consumers must, therefore, be able to defend themselves, and the 
circular points out the ~arious remedies available to manufacturers, traders and 
consumers who are victims of such' practices. It is possible to bring actions for 
damages under both criminal and civil law. Any manufacturer may, in addition; 
refuse to supply anydisttibutor who markets one of his products as a loss-leader: in 
this case, the dealer is acting in bad faith and the refusal to supply, which is 
normally prohibited, befomes legiti~ate. 
83. As regards the application of the competitio'n rules relating to individual 
restrictive practices, intervention, which has generally been on the basis of 
complaints lodged, has>been concentrated in particular on refusals to supply, 
discrimination and bonus-assisted sales. Local services' have also focused their 
attention on ensuring thilt the ban on recommended:prices for the sale to the pU,blic 
of certain products is 0pserved. 1 . 
For the most part, however, the emphasis has ~een on the dissemination of 
information and advice to traders, to enable them to become more familiar with the 
competition rules to be :observed and thereby to avoid the need for enforcement 
proceedings.' , 
From January to mid-December 1980, the Minister took ·eleven decisions on 
restrictive practices and; dominant positions, having first obtained the opinion of 
the Competition Commission. 
Some of these decisiohs are partiCulady signifiCant . .one. such case is that 
concerning the domestic electrical appliances and electro-acoustics sector, in which 
fines of from FF 25 000 ,to FF 2 500 000 were imposed on 13 major' manufacturers' 
1 Ninth Report on Competi~ion Policy, point 60; . 
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and distributors guilty of concerted practices in resisting a reduction in the seIling 
price of products in order to protect profit margins. Severe measures were also 
taken-the cases in question were referred to the Public Prosecutor with a view to 
action in, the courts-against anti~competitive practices on the part of drainage 
construction companies operating in the Paris region. The companies complained 
of had entere.d into agreeJnents for the geographical apportionment of the market 
and, when. tendering for vario,Us contracts; had made bids which were.deliperately 
non~conipetitive. Several of these companies belonging to the same group, which 
was in a dominant position, had also simulated competition by not informing 
potential customers of the financial links between them. These proceedIngs are part 
of the constant programme of action undertaken by the 'competent authorities 'to 
improve the conditions under which contracts are awarded and thus protect the 
public interest.' -
The Minister, ordered the principal' coOlpany in the street-furnitme market and its 
subsidiaries, on pain of periodic penalty payments, to limit the period of exclusive 
dealing laid down in contracts entered into with local authorities to a maximum of 
12 years or, in exceptional cas~s, 15 years. where this isjustified by the cost ofstreet 
furniture not used for adverti~ing. . 
, , 
The other cases are concerned with the industrial secto'r (wood preservatives, 
dispersants for oil pollution control, temperature control equipment, foot-and-
m()uth< vaccines). ,and :foodstuffs·, (nougat), the -provision of . services ,(building 
insurance, issue of luncheon vouchers) and activities combining the provision of 
goqds and services (marketing of spectacles). The cases were, inparticular,directed 
against anti-competitive practices such as pricing agreements, agreements designed 
to. bar new competitors from entering the market and arrangements for the 
exchange of trade information designed to monitor market-sharing. Depending on 
the ~eriousness of the facts taken into account in each case, the Minister imposed 
fines, made orders to restore satisfactory competition or'g~ve'a warriing to the 
traders in question; . . 
On ~~o ~ccasions, the Mi'nis~er'usedthe simplified'proc~dure under which h~ may., 
after consulting only the Chairman of the Competition Commission, impose fines 
of up to FF 200 000 on any company odegai p~rson that has infringed Article 50 of 
Order No 45-1483 on restrictive practices and abuse of a dominant position. The 
first decision was directed against the setting up of a commercial interest group of 
quarry owners in the same region, which resulted in artificial pric~ rises; the second 
against a departmental trade associatiori, whIch ha'd encoilraged its membe~s in the 
automobile, cycle: and motor-cycle'trades to. adopt uniform prices.' 
~. : .'. - - '.' : -" .' - ., • ,. '. -< 
84. In its capacity as adviser to the government and parliament on all matters 
relating to competition, the Competition Commission delivered an opinion on two 
COMP.'REP. EC 1980 
64 COMMISSION POLICY TOWA~DS ENTERPRISES 
legislative measures, one submitted by the Minister and the other by a 
parliamentary committe~. 
85. As regards court pr~ceedings, in a judgment handed down by the court of last 
instance, a number of carriers of perishable goods (largely meat) operating in 
central France were ordered to pay fines of from FF 1 000 to FF 12 OOO.'They were 
found guilty of entering ~nto an unlawful agreement to fix scheduled charges and 
not to encroach upon their colleagues' customers and routes. ' 
I 
The courts also conde~ned restrictive practices in regard to public contracts, 
where collusive tenderipg was found to have taken place (road works 1 and 
restoration of historic monuments). 
Ireland 
86. The basic legislati{m relating to restrictive practices has not altered in the 
course of 1980. ' 
87. Since last year, 33 proposed mergers have been notified. Thirteen of these did 
not fall within the scope pfthe Act. In one case the proposed merger did not receive 
any further consideration as the deal fell through. Decisions have yet to be reached 
in two cases. Sevente:en proposed mergers were considered and cleared. 
Manufacturing industry;accounted for eight cases, services for six, the distribution 
sector for two, and ene~gy supply sector for one. : ' 
The 17 proposals cleared include two which were notified pursuant to the Mergers, 
Take-overs and Monop'olies (Newspaper) Order, i979. 
r ' , 
The Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism referred two proposed mergers 
to the Examiner of Restrictive Practices for investigation under Section 8 of the Act. 
These mergers concer~ed the building supply and energy sectors. Having 
considered the Examiner's report in each case, the Minister decided not to make at1 
Order under Section 9 of the Act in relation to either of the proposals. 
There have been no enquiries into apparent monopolies under Section 10 of the 
Act. 
One of the statutory o~ders relating to the supply' and distribution of particular 
classes of goods, made u~der the Restrictive Practic~s Act, 1972, has been amended. 
1 Judgment delivered at the ;end of December 1979. 
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On 23 May 1980 the Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism made the 
Restrictive Practices (Motor Spirit) Order, 1980. This Order amended Article 3 of 
the Restrictive Trade Practices (Motor Spirit) Order, 1972 (as later amended). It 
extended by six months to eight years and six months the provision which prohibits 
petrol companies from operating additional retail outlets. 
88. Certain developments early in 1980 necessitated the reopening of public 
hearings in the enquiry held by the Restrictive Practices Commission in 1979 into 
certain aspects of the petroleum distribution trade. The Commission submitted the 
report of enquiry to the Minister in June, 1980. It is expected that the Minister will 
publish the report early in 1981 together with his decisions in relation to the 
recommendations made therein. 
The Commission submitted the report of its enquiry into the practice of under-cost-
selling in the grocery trade to the Minister during the year. 
Discussions are continuing between the Commission and various interests in the 
cinema trade in' connection with the preparation of fair~practice rules for the 
regulation ohhe supply and distribution of cinema films. 
Public hearings of the enquiry into restrictions on conveyancing and on advertising 
by solicitors commenced during the year and are continuing. 
Owing to the pressure of other matters the Commission has been unable to set a 
date for the commencement of their enquiry into restrictions into the provision of 
travel agency services. 
89. The Examiner of Restrictive Practices concluded his analysis of the 
information obtained during the investigation into the operation of the Restrictive 
Trade Practices (Cookers and Ranges) Order, 1962 which regulates the supply and 
distribution of cookers 'and ranges using solid fuel and liquid petroleum gas. The 
analysis revealed that the Order was operating effectively. 
The Examiner also investigated complaints of unfair practices in the provision of 
various services and in the supply and distribution of various goods. These included 
road materials, slates, footwear,' jewellery, motor-vehicles, vehicle spares, 
computers, newspapers, customs charges, credit union' membership, dental 
prostheses, groceries, liquid petroleum gas, intoxicating liquor, medical appliances 
and pharmaceuticals. 
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Italy 
90. There was no change in Italian competition legislation during the report 
period. .. . 
Luxembourg 
91. Application of the anti-trust legislation continued. The Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission examined various cases, notably involving discrimination in 
distribution and the abuse of buying power. . 
In one specific case die Commission came to the conclusion that the rules on 
restrictive trade practices do not apply when economic issues are not involved. 
The Luxembourg Government still has facilities for controlling prices with a view 
to stabilizing them at consumer level. In practice, the price of basic essentials may 
be fixed by the Minist~r for Economic Affairs or his delegate. Special rules also 
enable control to be exercised on the price of imported goods. J:he Prices Office 
deals with any complaints. Representatives of consumer organizations take part, 
together with dealers and manufacturers, in the Price Commission's discussions on 
the application of pri~ing systems; the Office subsequently takes the relevant 
decision. Price control has played and still does play, therefore, a rather important 
complementary role in: competition policy. ' 
The Netherlands 
92. The Bill introduced in December 1977, aimed at establishing a system of 
authorization for pric:e fixing and resale price maintenance agreements and 
conferring powers on the Minister of Economic Affairs to issue minimum price 
regulations, is still before Parliament. The Government has not yet submitted its 
memorandum of reply in response to the interim report delivered at an earlier stage 
by the Second Chambei's standing committee on economic affairs; it is expected to 
do so shortly. ; 
Work on the preparation of the Bill to give public access to the register of restriqive 
agreements has now advanced to the point wryere it can be expected to be 
introduced in Parliam~nt shortly. . . . 
On his own behalf and on behalf of the Ministers for Justice and . for Foreign 
I 
Affairs, the Minister fOF Economic Affairs has sought the opinion of the Economic 
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Competition Board on a proposed order under the Economic Competition Act 
which would declare unenforceable all clauses giving effect to foreign boycott 
measures in restrictive agreements or decisions. The object of the projected 
declaration would be to limit the impact of such clauses where they might result in 
unacceptable disturbance of the terms of competition in The Netherlands. The 
proposal is a result of the consultations which took place between the Second 
Chamber and the Government regarding the effects of Arab boycott measures 
against Israel on Dutch law and the terms of competition in The Netherlands. 
On 3 October 1979 the Ministers for Economic Affairs and for Agriculture and 
Fisheries extended for a further 18 months the declaration making an agreement on 
the minimum consumer price for sugar generally applicable. The agreement sets the 
minimum price at the level of the cost price to non-integrated retail businesses (plus 
turnover tax). The minimum price does not apply to imported sugar. 
93. Work is continuing on the preparation of legislation in the field dealt with by 
the Social and Economic Council in its Opinion on legal premerger control 
measures and statutory authority for its own merger code. 
94. Hoffmann-La Roche BV, of Mijdrecht, has initiated proceedings against the 
State of The Netherlands before the District Court of The Hague. Roche is seeking 
compensation for the damage it claims it suffered as a result of three orders, issued 
in 1977 and 1978, which set maximum prices for Valium and Librium. On 24 July 
1979 the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Business Appeals Tribunal) 
annulled the three orders. The orders had been made under Section 24 of the 
Economic Competition Act (which deals with the abuse of a dominant position), 
and required Roche to reduce the prices charged for Valium and Librium marketed 
in The Netherlands; the s~cond and third orders somewhat increased the 
maximum prices imposed on Roche by the first one. 
United Kingdom 
95. This year has seen an important development in the UK's competition policy 
with the enactment on 3 April of the Competition Act, 1980. Amongst other things, 
the Act introduces new procedures for controlling the anti-competitive practices of 
individual firms. The powers given to the Director-General of Fair Trading 
(DGFT) in this_regard complement those which he already possesses by virtue of 
legislation such as the Fair Trading Act, 1973 and the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act, 1976 and together they provide a framework within which 'competition in, 
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industry and commerce is encouraged to develop. The provisions of the Act dealing 
with anti-competitive practices came into force on 12 August 1980. 
96. The DGFT announced his first two investigations under the Act as soon as the 
relevant provisions of ttIe legislation came into force. One of those concerned the 
criteria used by TI Raleigh Industries Limited and TI Raleigh Limited in deciding 
whether to supply bicycles to retailers and whether the application of some or all of 
those criteria amounted to an anti-competitive practice. The other was concerned 
with whether Petter Refrigeration Limited induced or attempted to induce persons 
who service, repair or s~ll commercial vehicle or container refrigeration equipment, 
including spare parts, not to service, repair or sell equipment which was 
manufactured or supplied by Petter's competitors and, if so, whether this conduct 
was anti-competitive. The procedure for carrying out an investigation under the 
Act was explained in the previous Report. 1 
97. The Act also confers on the Secretary of State for Trade the power to refer to 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) for investigation, any question 
relating to the efficiency and costs of, the service provided by, or the possible abuse 
of, a monopoly position by nationalized industries and certain other public-sector 
bodies. Since the measures came into force on 4 April, he has made three references 
to the MMC, namely: London and South-Eastern Commuter Rail Services, the 
Central Electricity Generating Board and the Severn Trent Water Authority. 
98. Additionally, the Act makes several amendments to the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act, 1976. These include provision for the suspension of the operation of 
declarations of the Restrictive Trade Practices Court pending an appeal or the 
revision of the agreements concerned; for the exemption retrospectively from 
registration of copyright licences and certain similar agreements; and the extension 
of the category of persons to whose interests the Court must have regard when 
deciding whether or not an agreement containing restrictions is against the public 
interest. 
99. Since 1976 when the legislation on restrictive trade practices was extended to 
services, some 450 agreements in this class have been registered; to date some 55 of 
these have been brought to an end; 30 have had their restrictive clauses removed 
and in 69 cases representations were made by the DGFT to the Secretary of State 
that no. action should be taken as the restrictions· in issue were insignificant. 
To date five agreements have·been referred to the Court. Of these, the agreements 
of the Aerodrome Owners' Association and the Society of West End Theatre 
Owners were referred since the last Report. The Court's decisions on all of these 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 76. 
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agreements are still awaited. During this period the Court also considered the 
question whether there was a registrable agreement operating between those 
persons licensed by the stewards of the National Greyhound Racing Club and ruled 
that there was not. An appeal on the Court's decision is pending. It would be 
convenient to mention here that the examination of service agreements has proved 
far more complex than goods agreements and generally requires a great deal of 
correspondence and discussion, but in general, the aim has been to persuade 
organizations to abandon the restrictions in order to avoid being brought before the 
Court. 
100. Collusive tendering has continued to be a' feature of several agreements 
which have been uncovered. In its second report! the interdepartmental committee 
which reviewed the UK's competition policy examined the problems which were 
raised by this practice and proposed that the possibility of introducing criminal 
sanctions should be considered. A consultative document has since been circulated 
by the Department of Trade. 
101. In May the DGFT instituted proceedings against four manufacturers of 
'concrete pipes for contempt of court on the grounds that they had entered into an 
agreement between 1974 and 1978 with restrictions to the like effect of those 
condemned by the Court in 1965 and had therefore contravened their undertaking 
to the Court. After a hearing in July the Court found all four parties guilty and 
imposed fines ranging from UKL 5000 to UKL 100000. At the Court's request, 
proceedings are now being taken against another manufacturer for its participation 
in the same agreement. 
102. In the period since the last report and up to 31 October, the DGFT has made 
one further reference to the MMC under the Fair Trading Act, 1973, namely: the 
supply of ready-mixed concrete. There were, however, three MMC reports-all of 
which have been accepted by the responsible Minister-published during this 
period. These related to the supply of certain gas appliances; 2 the supply of 
tampons; 3 and the supply of credit-card franchises. 4 As regards gas appliances, the 
MMC found that the British Gas Corporation's (BGC) monopoly in retailing these 
appliances operated against the public interest as did certain other practices which 
were followed by all manufacturers of the relevant goods. The MMC 
1 'A review of restrictive trade practices policy' published by HM Stationery Office (HMSO) - Cmnd 
7512, 
2 'A report on the supply of certain domestic gas appliances in the United Kingdom' - HC 703 (Session 
1979-80) (HMSO) 29 July 1980. 
3 'A report on the supply in the United Kingdom oftampons-Cmnd 8049 (HMSO) 8 October 1980. 
4 'A report on the supply of credit-card franchise services in the United Kingdom - Cmnd 8034 
(HMSO) 17 September 1980. 
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recommended a number of alternative courses for remedying the detrimental 
effects of BGC' s monopoly, and these are now being considered by the Government 
with a view to further action. In the tampons investigation, the MMC found that 
the priCing practices of the tw9 monopoly suppliers, namely Tampax Limited and 
Southhall (Birmingham) Ltd, operated against the public interest. It recommended, 
however, that in the present situation where a new entrant was trying to. establish 
itself in the market, no direct immediate action should be taken. It did, however, 
recommend that the DGFT should keep the market under review with a view to 
making a further reference after two years if the entry of another supplier had not 
resulted in an improved competitive situation. In its examination of the credit-card 
franchise services, the MMC found that the 'no-discrimination' policy of the major 
credit-card companies (whereby retailers were bound to offer the same prices to 
credit-card customers as to cash customers) operated against the public interest and 
recommended that this policy should be abandoned. The DGFT is consulting 
interested parties about the implementation of the MMC's recommendations in 
this case. The MMC also recommended that the market be kept under review in 
view of the evidence that some credit-card companies had been earning high 
profits. 
103. The DGFT made recommendations to the Secretary of State for Trade on 
185 mergers and prospective mergers. While this figure is lower than the 248 which 
were considered in the preceding period, it should be noted that from 12 April there 
was an increase from UKL 5 million to UKL 15 million in the size-of-assets 
criterion for mergers qualifying for investigation under the Act. The Secretary of 
State referred five cases to the MMC, namely Compagnie Internationale Europcar 
and the short-term rental business of Godfrey Davis Limited; Hiram Walker-
Gooderham Worts Limited and Highland Distilleries Company Limited; Blue 
Circle Industries Limited and Armitage Shanks Limited; S & W Berisford Limited 
and British Sugar Cqrporation Limited; and Grand Metropolitan Limited and 
Coral Leisure Group Limited. The MMC has so far reported on the Blue Circle/ 
Armitage Shanks and the Hiram Walker/Highland Distilleries merger proposals, 
finding that the latter would be expected to operate against the public interest. This 
was, therefore, not allowed to proceed. Grand Metropolitan abandoned its 
proposal following refe,rence to the MMC; two reports are still awaited. 
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by the Commission 
104. In 1980 the Commission took 9 decisions applying Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty and 16 applying Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. In proceedings 
under the EEC Treaty 183 cases were settled without a decision being taken 
because the agreements were brought into line' with the rules on competition in the 
Treaty, were terminated or expired. As in previous years, most of these were 
distribution agreements, the cases generally being terminated after amendments 
were made to conform to the block exemption Regulation No 67/67/EEC. 
On 31 December there were in all 4203 pending cases, of which 3775 were 
. applications or notifications, 233 were complaints from firms and 195 were 
proceedings on the Commission's own initiative. Of the applications and 
notifications pending before the Commission 64% concerned licensing agreements, 
25% concerned distribution agreements and 1 i % concerned ·horizontal 
agreements. 
105. The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, 
which has to be consulted on any decision that Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty has 
been infringed, that gives negative clearance or that gives exemption under 
Article 85(3), met 8 times in 1980 and gave opinions on 9 cases. 
§ 1 - Article 85(1) of the 'EEC Treaty and Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty 
applied to restrictive practices 
Restrictive practices in imports 
lMA rules 
106. The Commission confirmed its opposition to any form of market-sharing, 
particularly national agreements imposing exclusive obligations which, by 
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safeguarding members'. respective positions hamper other dealers' access to. the 
various stages of distribution. 
107. Under Article 85(1) of the Treatyl the Commission adopted a Decision 
concerning practices by 20 Dutch plywood-importing firms which were likely to 
affect trade between Member States. 
The firms concerned were 11 importers and 9 exclusive agents which, together 
with other firms, fixed their business relations in an agreement known as the IMA 
(Importateursl Agents) rules. The IMA rules were based on the principle that their 
members should safegqard each other's position in the Dutch plywood import 
trade. Under the rules IMA importers could obtain their supplies only from IMA 
agents working for foreign plywood manufacturers while IMA agents could only 
supply IMA imports. In addition, the rules laid down restrictive conditions for 
admission to the cartel, designed to keep small firms and newcomers out of the 
trade. The cartel also involved a complete separation of market functions between 
agents, importers and wholesalers. 
The exclusi ve obligatio~s between IMA members infringed Article 85 (1), as did the 
obligations-in order to ensure compliance with the exclusive obligations between 
the members of the agreement-to provide the IMA supervisory bureau at regular 
intervals with detailed particulars of supply contracts entered into by them, to 
allow the IMA supervisory bureau to carry out checks at their business premises 
and to abide by decisions of IMA bodies imposing contractual penalties to ensure 
fulfilment of the exclusive obligations between the members. 
The offending obligations in the IMA rules (which had been duly notified to the 
Commission by the parties) did not qualify for exemption under Article 85(1) since 
the Commission found no evidence that they improved the distribution of goods. 
They also imposed on i the firms involved restrictions not indispensable for the 
attainment of any bene,ficial effects. . 
The Commission therefore ordered the firms concerned to terminate forthwith the 
infringement found, if they had not already done so voluntarily. If the infringing 
firms failed to comply with the Decision within two months of its notification, they 
were to be subject after the expiry of that period to penalty payments of between 
100 and 300 EUA per day, depending on their importance. 
1 Decision of 18.9.1980, IM:A Statuut: OJ L 318, 26.11.1980. 
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Quota-fixing agreements 
Cast glass 
108. The Commission also established that quota~fixing agreements in the Italian 
glass industry were incompatible with the EEC Treaty competition rules. Such 
agreements were applied between 1976 and 1978 by the major Italian 
manufacturers of cast glass (non-transparent glass, used mainly in the Industrial, 
agricultural, construction and furniture sectors) : Fabbrica Pisana, Pisa (a member 
ofthe Saint-Gobain group), SIV (SocietaItaliana Vetro), San Salvo, Chieti (a State-
controlled company) and Fabbrica Lastre di Vetro Pietro Sciarra, Rome. 
I!Ilplementation was organized by Unione Fiduciaria (FIDES), Milan, a firm 
providing management and accountancy services.! 
'the Commission became aware of the offending agreements following 
investigations carried out at FIDES; then, it had adopted a Decision requiring 
FIDES to submit to the investigations2 and imposed a fine of 5 000 u.a. each on 
Fabbrica Pis ana and Fabbrica Sciarra for submitting incomplete documents. 3 
The agreements, in the guise of specialization contracts, were designed to enable 
the firms involved to retain their shares of the cast-glass market. This involved 
sharing out sales of the various types of cast glass on the Italian market, the 
notification of. data relating to the production and marketing of the relevant 
products and supervision by FIDES of the proper implementation of these 
measures. 
The agreements caused serious restrictions of competition on the Italian cast-glass 
market because the parties' share of the market was more than 50% and because 
they made access to the Italian market more difficult for cast glass manufactured in 
I. , other Member States. 
On account of the nature of th~ ~l~ll!i~~ ~oncerned and the significant volume of 
business.by the firms concerned, the'Commission considered that the agreements 
did not qualify for the general exemp.tion laid down'in Regulation 2779/72, 4 
amended by Regulation 2903/77,5 for certain categories of specialization 
agreements. The Decision gives firms a clearer idea of the Regulation's scope. 
1 Decision of 17.12.1980: not yet published in OJ. , 
2 Decision of 21.1.1979: OJ L 57,8.3.1979; Ninth Repon on Competition Policy, point 135. 
3 Commission Decisions of 20.12.1979: OJ L 75, 21.3.1980; Ninth Repon on Competition Policy, 
point 138. 
4 OJ L 292, 29.12.1972. 
S OJ L 338, 28.12.1977. 
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The Decision is also of interest from another angle. The firms involved had 
entrusted FIDES, a firm providing management and accountancy services, with the 
task of implementing their cartel and the restrictions which they had agreed on. 
FIDES was responsible for collecting the business information to be supplied by the 
cast-glass manufacturers and for checking that they observed the mutual 
commitments they had entered into. By including FIDES in its procedure, the 
Commission intended, firstly, to make it clear to firms that even where they entrust 
third parties with the task of implementing their restrictive agreements they still 
remain responsible for them and, secondly, to dissuade these third party firms ftom 
helping to implement cartels prohibited by the Treaty on pain of being accused of 
joint responsibility with, the parties to such cartels. 
Quota and price-fixing agreements 
French and German special steel producers 
109. The Commission 'took three Decisions under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty 
condemning quota agreements and concerted pricing practices operated by the 
main producers in the French and German special steel industries and fined the 
undertakings concerned, a total of 900 000 EUA.1 
The main features of the' activities condemned by the three Decisions ;lre described 
below: 
(i) The French case: five of the principal French special steel producers jointly 
fixed prices for special constructional steels in 1974 and 1975. Two of these 
undertakings also participated, at least for some time, in a quota agreement 
operated between 1970 and 1974 by French producers, which regulated their 
deliveries of special ~onstructional steels on the French market. 
(ii) The German case: leight of the principal German special steel producers 
operated a quota agreement for their deliveries of special constructional steel 
and bearing steel in the German market in 1971 and 1972. Three of them 
operated a similar quota agreement for stainless flat products in 1971. In 
addition, certain producers jointly fixed prices for most types of special steel in 
1973 and 1974. ' 
(iii) The Franco-German case: most of the French and German producers operated 
an interpenetration agreement which tended to limit the quantity of 
1 Commission Decisions of 27.3.1980. 
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constructional alloy steels which they delivered into each other's home market, 
during at least six of the eight years 1967 to 1974; the same parties also engaged 
in certain restrictive pricing practices in 1974. 
110. When fixing the.level of the fines the Commission took into account the 
present financial position of the French and German stee,I industries. However, 
poor demand and excess capacity do not justify producers breaking the 
competition rules of the ECSC Treaty. The legitimate regulation of the steel market 
under rules and limits fixed by the Commission in the exercise of its powers under 
the Treaty, such as the current crisis measures designed, to help the steel industry to 
survive during a difficult period but with proper safeguards for the consumer, does 
not give the undertakings grounds for applying quota agreements and concerted 
pricing practices" thereby illegitimately regulating the market and usurping the 
powers of the Community; it is up to the Commission to determine the measures 
required to deal with any particular situation. 
Pricing information system 
Bundesverband Deutscher Stahlliandel eV (BDS) 
111. By another Decision under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty the Commission 
required the Bundesverband Deutscher Stahlhandel eV (BDS), an association 
embracing virtually all German steel stockholders, to terminate concerted practices 
in relation to the fixing of ex-stock selling'prices for rolled products. 1 This class of 
transaction covers all sales from stocks of products held at stockholders' depots 
which account for roughly one-third of all sales of steel products on the German 
market. ' 
By this Decision the Commissiori applied to the steel industry the principles which, 
in line with the case-law of the Court of Justice, 2 it has developed to deal with the 
exchange of information on prices in areas covered by the EEC Treaty.3 
The offending practices mainly involved compilation by BDS or with its assistance 
of detailed costing schedules and distribution to all members, on the association's 
initiative, of the major stockholding firms' new price lists before they became 
1 Commission Decision of 8.2.1980: OJ L 62, 7.3.1980. 
2 See in particular Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56,111,113 and 114173 Cooperatieve vereniging 
'Suiker Vnie' VA and Others v COf!1mission [1975] ECR 1663, 1942; Case 8/72 Vereeniging van 
Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities [1972] ECR 977,989. 
3 See in particular Seventh Report on Competition Policy, points 5 to 8. 
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operative. These practices tended to create concerted pricing at regional level by 
encouraging the stockholders to align their ex-stock selling prices on those of 
regional price leaders. ; 
There can be no justification for this type of private, detailed information system on 
ex-stock selling prices. Neither the need to ensure market transparency, nor the 
rules on advance publication of steel producers' price lists, nor the Commission's 
anti-crisis measures, provide grounds for stockholders to concert in establishing 
price lists or in fixing actual selling prices. 
The Decision does not: affect stockholders' rights to establish and publish 
independently individual price lists; however, the object, means or consequences of 
exercising this right may; not involve any agreement prohibited by Article 65. The 
Decision also indicated rules to be observed by associations of steel stockholders in 
connection with technical assistance to members on costing and information. The 
point is that the Commission can allow such associations to help small 
undertakings to calculate their costs accurately and fix rational selling prices, but 
this must not lead to a uniform pricing policy.l 
§ 2 - Permitted forms of cooperation 
Joint buying agreements 
National Sulphuric Acid Association 
112. Further clarifying its policy on joint buying agreements, the Commission ( 
decided that 19 companies which ensure the bulk of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland's sulphuric acid output could continue to buy imported raw sulphur via a 
joint buying pool for a period of eight years. 2 
However, the Commission insisted on a number of amendments to the pool rules, 
since the version notified contained restrictions which infringed the rules of 
competition. 
The main problem was an exclusive purchase clause obliging all pool tnembers to 
purchase their total requirements of imported sulphur for sulphuric acid 
1 Notice conceming cooperation agreements, Chapter 11(1): OJ C75,29.7.1968, corrected by OJ C 84, 
28.8.1968. 
2 Decision of 9.7.1979: OJ L 260, 3.10.1980. 
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manufacture through the pool. This restriction of competition was particularly 
significant in that the members produce over 80% of the UK and 100% of the Irish 
output of sulphuric, acid. 
The pool's status as exclusive supplier to its members was abolished. Members may 
now buy up to 75% of their total needs elsewhere, while the pool still purchases at 
least the reinaining 25%. This percentage enables .the group to maintain the 
strength of its negotiating position with the major suppliers (only eight worldwide, 
including one in the Community, the French company Elf Aquitaine). The cost and 
distribution benefits obtained via pool membership by members in general and 
those requiring small amounts of sulphur in particular are thus ensured. Since 
sulphur' accounts for up to 80% of sulphuric acid production costs these cost 
savings are reflected in the price by consumers of sulphuric acid and of the many 
products which require sulphuric acid in their manufacturing processes. 
j 
Other restrictions on pool members concerning the use and resale of sulphur have 
also been abandoned. 
113. By this Decision the Commission made clear under what conditions and to 
what extent a joint buying pool-made up of companies varying greatly in size, 
producing nearly all the output in question in two Member States and in the face\ of 
it small number of suppliers on the world market-is compatible with the 
Community competition rules. 
Technical cooperation agreements 
Solnhofener Natursteinplatten 
114. Spelling out once again the conditions for cooperation bet~een small 
businesses consistent with the rules of competi'tion, the Commission adopted a 
Decision granting negative clearance to. the articles of association of the 
Industrieverband Solnhofener eV, set up on 30 June 1980 and replacing a previous 
association 'Exportkartel Solnhofener Natursteinplatten'.1 
115. The object of the earlier association, comprising some 30 members, all small 
or medium-sized producers from the region of Solnhofen in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, was to promote exports of the natural stone found there. Their 
1 Decision of 16.10.1980: OJ L318, 26.11.1980. 
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agreement provided for collectively fixed prices, discounts and conditions of sale 
for export business and, in order to enforce compliance, for supervisory measures 
and penalties. The Commission took the view that the restrictions of competition 
caused by this price cartel, which had been notified, fell into the category of 
manifest infringements under Article 85(1) which is almost always impossible to 
exempt iJnder Article 85(3) because of the total lack of benefit to the consumer. 
Unlike certain collective purchasing or selling agreements, these restrictions do not 
contribute to rationalizihg prodiJction or distribution. 
Following Commission intervention the cartel was dissolved and replaced by the 
new association, whose articles no longer contain provisions involving restrictions 
of competition likely to affect trade between Member States. Cooperation between 
members is now restricted to: 
(i) quality control of the natural stone sold by members; 
I 
(ii) sales promotion by ineans of advertising; 
(iii) training of skilled labour; 
(iv) technical, economic and legal assistance to members; 
(v) measures designed to facilitate within the industry cross-deliveries of finished 
stone between producers and the purchase of unfinished stone from 
independent quarry-owners so that each producer can offer a full range of 
products. 
ECSC: Joint financial arrangement 
Equalization fund in the UK coal industry 
116. Following reference to the Consultative Committee and the Council, the 
Commission approved the establishment of an equalization fund by the Chamber 
of Coal Traders, an organization representing wholesalers, and the National Coal 
Board (NCB).! This financial arrangement is intended to reduce the price of certain 
domestic fuels coming from abroad. 
Despite domestic output of some 4.5 million tonnes of smokeless fuels, there is a 
shortfall of anthracite-based products on the market in the United Kingdom. The 
1 Commission Decision of 19.12.1980: OJ L 374, 31.12.1980. 
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leading producer, NCB, has made the investments needed to increase production, 
but it will be several years before the plant concerned becomes fully operational. 
To meet the shortfall in the meantime some 235 000 tonnes of such products would 
have to be imported from Community and non-Community countries between 
1 April 1980 and 31 March 1981 for distribution on the British market. The 
average delivered price of such fuel free of UK port is at present around UKL 15 
more than the comparable NCB price. The parties concerned therefore intend to 
arrange for imports and establish an equalization fund in order to cut the selling 
price of imported fuel and make a commercial proposition; A levy is to. be 
introduced for the 1980/81 coal year in order to provide resources for the fund. The 
levy }ViII initially be imposed at a rate of UKL 0.90/tonne on all the NCB's 
smokeless domestic fuels (some 3.55 million tonnes). 
Prior Commission approval under Article 53 of the ECSC Treaty is necessary for 
such financial arrangements common to several undertakings. They must also be 
compatible with the provisions of Article 65. The Commission authorized this 
operation since it was considered in keeping with the objectives of the Treaty 
concerning orderly supplies to the common market and the maintenance of 
conditions which will encourage undertakings to expand and improve their 
production potential (Article3(a) and (d)). 
The authorization applies only to the year ending on 31 March 1981, but may be 
extended beyond that. 
§ 3 - Article 85 applied to distribution 
Export ban 
Johnson & Johnson 
117. The Commission imposed a total fine of 200 000 EuA (UKL 112 894.20 or 
DM 510476) on Johnson & Johnson Inc., New Brunswick, USA, one of the 
largest manufacturers of pharmaceuticals in the world and three of its subsidiaries, 
Ortho.Pharmaceuticals Ltd, High Wycombe, UK, Cilag Chemie GmbH, Alsbach, 
Federal Republic of Germany, and Cilag Chemie AG, Schaffhausen, Switzerland, 
for having imposed on their United Kingdom and' German dealers a ban on 
exporting 'Gravindex' pregnancy tests, and for having continued to restrict exports 
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from the United Kingdom to the Federal Republic after the formal export ban was 
lifted.! 
The Commission acted following a complaint by a German importer, Eurim Pharm 
GmbH, Piding, which hfld tried to obtain 'Gravindex' pregnancy tests from UK 
chemists, where the traqe price WilS two-fifths of that in the Federal Republic. 
The Commission's investigations revealed that, at the request of Cilag Germany 
and Cilag Switzerland and with their assistance, Ortho tried to stop exports of 
'Gravindex' pregnancy tests from the United Kingdom to the Federal Republic. The 
firms had tried to dissuade the German importer from buying from British chemists 
on the grounds that exports by chemists were contrary to Ortho's terms of sale. 
Even after Ortho lifted the formal export ban in January 1977, the various Johnson 
& Johnson group companies continued their action to prevent exports from the 
United Kingdom to the Federal :Republic. 
Ortho threatened to cut pff one chemist's supplies and marked goods delivered to 
him with a special code to permit identification; it did in fact stop exportable 
supplies to certain chemists by totally withholding supplies or substantially 
restricting them. 
The export restrictions wer'e undoubtedly intended to protect the high price levels 
in other Member States, notably the Federal Republic of Germany, against 
competition from UK idealers. The actions of Johnson & Johnson and its 
subsidiaries prevented t~ose dealers from satisfying orders from other Member 
States, especially from dj.e German importer Eurim Pharm, whose trade prices for 
'Gravindex' in the Federal Republic were 25% lower than Cilag's. 
By this decision to impose for the first time a fine for an export ban in the 
pharmaceuticals industry,2 the Commission confirmed its determination to 
severely penalize this particularly serious form of market-sharing and also to ensure 
that pharmaceutical products, like others, can be freely traded throughout the 
common market. 
1 Decision of 25.11.1980: oj L 377, 31.12.1980. 
2 The Commission has previously condemned anti-competitive practices in this industry by decisions 
: imposing fines which were wholly or partially upheld by the Court of Justice: Quinine Decision of 
16.7.1969: OJ L 192,5.8.1969 and [1970] ECR 661,733,769; Commercial Solvents Decision of 
14.12.1972: OJ L 299,31.12.1972 and [1974] ECR 2213 ;"Hoffmann-La Roche (Vitamins) Decision 
of 9.6.1976: OJ L 223, 16.8.1976 and [1979] ECR 461. 
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Export ban and price-fixing 
Hennessy /Henkell 
118. The Commission also took action against the exclusive dealing agreement 
between Jas. Hennessy & Co~, Cognac, France and HenkeII & Co., Wiesbaden, 
Federal Republic of Germany concerning the distribution of Hennessy cognac in 
the Federal Republic. 1 
The agreement, which had been notified, restricted competition in the common 
market and appreciably affected trade between Member States, for Hennessy is the 
world's third biggest producer of cognac and the Federal Republic is the third 
biggest market for the product. 
The Commission considered that the agreement did not qualify for exemption from 
Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty .. 
It was also ineligible for the block exemption for exclusive dealing agreements 
provided for by Commission Regulation No 67/67 on certain categories of 
exclusive dealing agreements since it included a number of restrictions not covered 
by this Regulation: protecting the territory of the exclusive dealer from parallel 
imports and limiting his freedom to fix resale prices. Similarly, the agreement did 
not qualify for exemption by individual decision. On account of the combination of 
these two restrictions as well as the exclusive sales and purchase and non-
competition clauses the agreement did not improve distribution for the consumer's 
benefit, moreover the restrictions it imposed on the firms concerned were not 
necessary to the attainment of any beneficial effects. 
The Commission considered irrelevant Hennessy's arguments claiming exemption 
as a special case because of the long duration of the agreement (25 years) and the 
luxury nature of the products in question. 
I 
This is the first time since entry into force of Regulation No 67/67 that the 
Commission has refused to apply Article 85(3) to an exclusive dealing agreement 
for distribution which did not comply with the Regulation and was not amended 
voluntarily to the parties concerned. 
1 Decision of 11.12.1980: not yet published in OJ. 
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Advertising restrictions 
Boat equipment 
119. Barriers raised by means of pressure from competing firms in relation to 
access to certain facilitie~ which a manufacturer in one Member State would like to 
use to provide informati~n on his pr9duct in another Member State may constitute 
appreciable restrictions 'of competition. 
I 
120. This was the thinking behind the Commission's action on a complaint filed 
by a British supplier of boat equipment when in March 1979, the only two Belgian 
specialist journals in th~s field, Sur reau and Ik vaar, which belong to the same 
group, had refused to continue to carry advertisements similar to those published in 
the past. The journals had been approached by Belgian manufacturers who alleged 
that they were competi':lg under serious cost and tax disadvantages. 
The British supplier complained that his sales in Belgium had suffered seriously as a 
result and boat equipm~nt purchasers in Belgium had also been deprived of access 
to a cheaper and wider source of supply in another Member State. 
In response to Commission representations the journals agreed to. accept 
advertisements from suppliers in other Member States on the same basis as from 
their Belgian competitofs. 
I 
Guarantee 
Moulinex and Bauknecht 
121. As it had announced after adopting a favourable Decision on guarantee 
terms offered by the Italian group Zanussi to buyers of its domestic electrical 
appliances in the common market,1 the Commission continued its scrutiny, 
pursuant to the rules of competition, of guarantee schemes applied by other 
domestic appliance manufacturers, with the aim of persuading those who do not 
already do so to extend the guarantee given in the Member States where they 
organize the distribution of their products to all appliances which bear their trade-
mark, wherever they come from. 
1 Decision of 23.10.1978, Zanussi: OJ L322, 16.11.1978; Eighth Report on Competition Policy, 
points 116 and 117. . 
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Progress was made, in connection with Moulinex and Bauknecht appliances. 
Moulinex, one of the largest European manufacturers of small domestic 
appliances, initially provided only a national guarantee, giving as its reasons the 
differences between the safety requirements and technical standards in force in the 
various Member States. At the Commission's request, the firm extended its 
guarantee terms to provide coverage throughout the Community. The Moulinex 
organization in a country where one of its appliances is used provides the guarantee 
in accordance with local conditions, even where the appliance in question has been 
imported. Appliances supplied in another country not complying with that 
country's safety standards are also covered by the guarantee, on condition that the 
purchaser is prepared to bear the cost of adapting the appliance to local safety 
requirements. 
Similarly the Commission persuaded the various Community distributors of 
domestic appliances manufactured by the German company Bauknecht to alter 
their sale and guarantee terms so as to extend their guarantee in respect of 
appliances sold by them to Bauknecht appliances coming from other Member 
States, provided that they had been brought into line with local technical safety 
standards in the ,country where the guarantee claim is made. Formerly the 
guarantee was limited to appliances purchased on the home market from official 
Bauknecht distributors, which might have dissuaded consumers from buying 
appliances of this make abroad or from parallel importers. ' 
Standard distribution contract 
Krups 
122. The Commission took a negative clearance Decision on a standard 
distribution contract operated by the German firm Robert Krups of Solingen. 1 
Robert K~ups m~nufactureselectrical domestic appliances, personal-care 
appliances, clocks and kitchen and bathroom scales. It established a distribution 
network to handle the distribution of its products in the common market. It was not 
a closed system in the sense of allowing access to the relevant products only to 
authorized dealers. When Krups appliances are sold neither Krups itself not its 
appointed dealers are subject to any restrictions and Krups actually supplies its 
1 Decision of 17.4.1980: OJ L 120,13.5.1980. 
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appliances to dealers who do not belong to its distribution network. Access to the 
relevant goods is thus ~vailable to all dealers who wish to handle them. 
Membership of the Krups distribution network confers on appointed dealers no 
decisive competitive advantages over other dealers in the resale business. The sales 
promotion services offered by Krups to its appointed dealers, which are important 
to competitive trading-;-a wide range of intern~tionaI consumer advertising, 
international after-sales service, a policy on prices and terms adapted to market 
conditions, quality and modern design-benefit both member and non-member 
dealers, so consumers can derive their share of the resulting benefit also by 
purchasing from dealer~ outside the network. 
The standard contract contains no obligations constituting appreciable restrictions 
of competition. 
Duty-free distribution ; 
Distillers - Victuallers 
123. The Commission also found, on the basis of information available to it, that 
it had no grounds to act against a notified standard agreement on the basis of which 
subsidiaries of the United Kingdom firm The Distillers Co. Ltd (DCL) supplied 
Scotch whisky for cons~mption free of duty and tax. 1 
The 41 subsidiaries of the DCL group have concluded agreements of this type with 
some 500 victuallers in. the Community. 
The main activity of thb victuallers is duty-free trade, i.e. the supply of products 
intended for duty-free consumption, in particular to international shipping lines 
and airlines and embassies in accordance with the conditions and limits laid down 
by law. Scotch whiskies supplied to victuallers on the basis of the agreement in 
question are often labelled in such a way as to indicate their tax-free de~ignation, 
typical words being 'for duty-free sales only'. 
The standard agreement imposes no obligations on the victualler other than that of 
selling the whiskies supplied on the basis of this agreement only to customers who 
are known or may be supposed to use them for consumption free of duty and taxes. 
This obligation has to be passed on to all subsequent purchasers. 
1 Decision of 22.7.1980: O~ L 233,4.9.1980. 
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A victualler is thereby prohibited from providing whiskies supplied on the basis of 
this agreement to wholesalers, supermarkets, retailers or final consumers who se]] 
or consume products on which duty and taxes have to be paid. However, the 
provision of supplies to such purchasers is not normally part of a victualler's 
business. Consequently, the obligation does not in practice form a genuine obstacle 
to the freedom of action of victuallers in carrying out their normal activities and 
~:' does not constitute a significant restriction of ,competition within the meaning of 
Article 85(1) calling for action on the part of the Commission. 
\.,c' The Commission will be in a position to consider, in the light of this decision, a 
. riumberof agreements of the same type entered into by other producers of spirits. 
Distribution system 
SEITA 
124. Continuing its examination of conditions of competition in respect of the 
distribution of manufactured tobacco in all Member States, 1 the Commission took 
action against SEIT A (Service d'exploitation industrielle. des tabacs et des 
allumettes, now called SEIT A, Societe nationale d'exploitation industrielle des 
tabacs et des allumettes), which has a monopoly in the production of manufactured 
tobacco in France. In response to the Commission's representations SEITA 
amended from 1 January 1981 the conditions under which it opens up its ,,:, 
.. . distribution network to other 'Community producers of manufactured tobacco 
marketing their products in France; compliance ·-with the EEC Treaty rules of 
·.cotnpetition is thus ensured. 
The Commission stepped in following a complaint under Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty against the standard exclusive dealing agreement which SEITA offered 
foreign manufacturers wishing to have their products imported into France and 
distributed to wholesalers. 
After scrutinizing the complaint the Commission informed SEIT A that the 
standard agreement in question raised problems with regard to the rules of 
competition on the following counts: 
1 The Commission previously took action in this field with respect to the distribution system of Fedetab 
in Belgium, Decision of 20.7.1978: OJ L 224, 15.8.1978 ; Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 
111, upheld by the Court of Justice on 29.10.1980. 
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(i) its effect, on account of circumstances of fact and law prevailing on the French 
market, was to e~clude any parallel import into France of products from other 
Member States; 
Oi) on account of its duration the Commission took the view that it was likely to 
strengthen SEITA's, dominant position on the French market and deprive 
foreign manufacturers of any opportunity of setting up their own import and 
wholesale distributi;:'n networks; 
(iii)changes became even more necessary following adoption by the French 
authorities, wishing to comply with Article 37 of the EEC Treaty, of the Act of 
24 May 1976 adjusting the importing and wholesaling monopoly in 
manufactured tobacco, thereby freeing other Community producers from the 
obligations to impo~t and distribute their products through SEIT A; they could 
therefore set up their own wholesale networks in France. 
Following the Commission's representations SEITA decided to withdraw the 
offending standard agreement, which had been notified in the meantime, and to 
replace it by two new types of agreement, leaving the option open to foreign 
producers wishing to continue to deal through SEIT A with effect from 1 January 
1981. 
I 
The first option, a five-year group agreement, provides for the exclusive 
distribution of all present and future products of all companies belonging to the 
given group. The second, a company agreement, is entered into for only two years 
and provides for the exClusive distribution only of certain products as specified by 
the contracting company. 
The Commission approved the new arrangements, which will allow foreign 
manufacturers who so wish gradually to set up their own distribution networks; 
the proceedings against SEIT A were therefore terminated. 
However, the Commission will continue to keep a close watch on developments in 
the tobacco market in France as well as to monitor the implementation of contracts 
signed on the basis of the above standard agreements. 
It will also continue its :efforts to seek a solution to outstanding problems on the 
French market including: . 
(i) adjustment of the retail marketing monopoly held by the French State. The' 
appropriate reasoned opinion was sent to the French Republic on 15 July 1980; 
(ii) retail prices for mapufactured tobaccos are still set by the State despite the 
Council Directive of 19 December 1972 on the harmonization of tobacco tax 
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structures and subsequent directives; on 5 June 1979 the Commission therefore 
initiated proceedings against France under Article 169 of the Treaty; 
(iii)producers in other Member States consider that prices of certain products 
manuf~ctured, by SEIT A are artificially low; the Commission is now 
investigating the complaint. A reasoned opinion was sent to the French 
Republic on 31 October 1980. 
§ 4 - Article 85 applied to agreements related to 
industrial and commercial property rights and copyright 
125 .. The Commission took action on a number of occasions ~n order to have 
removed from such agreements obligations it regarded. as restrictions of 
competition contrary to Article 85. Since the firms concerned agreed to comply 
with the Commission's requests, it was not necessary to take formal proceedings. 
Patents 
Payment of royalties after expiry of patents 
Preflex/Lipski 
126. In line with previous policy 1 and also Articles 3, 4 and 12 of its draft block 
exemption regulation on patent licensing agreements,2 the Commission pointed 
out3 that the obligation on a licensee or assignee to continue paying royalties after a 
patent had expired constituted a restriction of competition under Article 85(1) in 
that the license<; or assignee was at a disadvantage because his manufacturing costs 
included the unwarranted burden constituted by the continued payment of 
royalties. 
The opportunity to issue this remil)der was provided by certain litigation involving 
the inventor of a process for making a new type of prestressed reinforced concrete 
girder and the company to which he had, according to the contract in question, 
1 AOIPIBeyrard Decision of 2.12.1975: OJ L 6, 13.1.1976; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, 
point 63. 
2 OJ C 58,3.3.1979. 
3 Bull. EC 5-1980, point 2.1.15. 
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assigned the ownership of his Belgian and foreign patents for a consideration 
consisting of a percentage of the turnover during the currency of the contract. 
The assignee unilaterally decided to stop paying the royalties when the basic patent 
expired. The dispute went to arbitration where it was decided that the royalties had 
to be paid so long as the: patented processes were still being worked, irrespective of 
whether the inventions covered had fallen into the public domain. A national court 
dismissed the assignee's claim that Community law had been violated and upheld 
the arbitrators' decision. 1 
The Commission then received a complaint from the assignee'; it came to the 
conclusion that both the terms for payment of the consideration and the 
reservations entered by the assignor regarding the definitive transfer of ownership 
of the assigned patents were such that the agreement partook of the nature and 
effects of a licensing agreement and should accordingly be assessed in the light of 
the rules of competition. The Commission pointed out that the clause at issue was 
contrary to Article 85 ; the parties accepted this view and subscribed to an amicable 
settlement that put an end to the dispute. 




127. In 1972 the Commission issued a Decision requiring withdrawal of a clause 
obliging the licensee to assign to the licenser ownership of patents relating to 
improvements developed exclusively by the former. 2 This principle reappears in 
Article 3(12) of the Co'mmission's draft block exemption regulation for patent 
licences. The Commission adopts the same approach towards an obligation for a 
licensee to make the licenser the joint owner of any such improvement patents. Any 
licenser obtaining such 'rights would enjoy an unjustifiable advantage as regards 
competition, notably after expiry of the contract, since he could prevent-or at 
least hinder-the licensee's autonomous exploitation of his own invention. 
This was the outcome :0£ an agreement by virtue' of which a large agricultural 
machinery manufacturer in France obtained an exclusive licence from independent 
1 Arbitrators' award made on 23 August 1971; judgment given by the Tribunal de premiere instance, 
Brussels, on 15 October 1975 (Journal des Tribunaux No 4964,18.9.1976; 8 International Review of 
Industrial Property and Copyright Law 473 (1977); 1977 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und 
Urheberrecht, Int. TeiI276). 
2 Raymond/Nagoya Decision: OJ L 143, 23.6.1972; Second Report on Competition Policy, point 45. 
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inventors to exploit two patents concerning systems for distributing seeds in seed-
drills.! The contract specified, inter alia, that patents concerning improvements 
developed solely by the licensee should be taken out in the joint names of the 
licensers and the licensee. 
A patent was taken out in application of this clause. 
At the Commission's request the licensers agreed to waive all rights arising under 
their joint ownership to the extent that the improvement patent was jointly owned 
merely as a result of the abovementioned obligation in the contract.2 .. 
Restriction of competition between jOint inventors 
Bramley IGilbert 
128. A complaint by a patentee enabled the Commission to give its opinion on 
restrictions in a patent licence where the licenser and the licensee both claimed to 
have contributed to the discovery of the patented invention, in this case electrified 
flexible sheep netting. As patentee, the complainant had granted a manufacturing 
licence; the licensee had agreed to sell all his production to the licenser and the 
licenser had agreed to buy only from the licensee. 
The Commission pointed out that it is not contrary to Article 85 (1) for a licenser to 
require a subcontractor to sell only to him the goods manufactured on the basis of 
the licenser's patent;3 however, an exclusive supply obligation may restrict 
competition where the licensee has· made a sufficient contribution to the 
development of the invention covered by the patent for him to be regarqed as a joint 
inventor with enforceable rights in this respect against the patentee. 
The Commission also felt" that the obligation on the licenser to purchase his 
requirements only from the licensee was a restriction that could not be justified by 
. . 
1 The law applicable in this case (Article 42 of the French Act of2 January 1968, amended by the Act of 
13 July 1978) lays down that the joint owner of a patent who does not exploit it personally may 
require payments from the joint owner who does exploit the patent personally or who grants a licence 
for his own benefit to a third party. More'over, before granting a licence he must give any other joint 
owners the opportunity to buy his share. In the case of an exclusive licence, he must in any event 
obtain the agreement of all other joint owners. 
2 However, proceedings are still under way before the French courts as to the question whether the 
licensers did in fact make some inventive contribution to the development of the improvement patent. 
3 Commission Notice of 18 December 1978 concerning the assessment of subcontracting agreements 
under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty: OJ C 1,3.1.1979; Eighth Report on Competition Policy, 
points 5 to 7. . 
COMPo REP. EC 1980 
90 COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES 
the fact that the licensee Claimed to be joint inventor~ A joint inventor's interest can 
be protected in other· less restrictive ways, such as payment of royalties 
proportionate to the value of his contribution to the invention. 
In accordance with this' view the parties settled their dispute by an arrangement 
under which the agreement at issue was treated as unenforceable and each party 
was enabled to manufacture and sell netting of the type in question independently 
of the other. 
Know-how 
Use of secret know-how after expiry. of 
licensing agreement : 
Cartoux/Terrapin 
129. Following Commission action arising from a complaint, a former licenser 
agreed to alter a post-t¢rm ban on the use of its know-how in relation to unit 
building systems for light prefabricated buildings so as to permit the former 
licensee to continue such use against the payment of reasonable fees for a 
reasonable period in respect of any such know-how as remained secret. 1 
As is indicated by Article 3(10) of the draft Regulation for exemption of certain 
categories of patent licensing agreements, the latter type of obligation in a mixed 
patent and know-how licence does not normally raise any difficulties from the 
point of view of the rules of competition. 
1 The former licensee also maintained that, in any event, the former licenser's know-how had fallen 
into the public domain. However, this is a question that will have to be settled by the national courts. 
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Trade-marks 
Right of licensee to sell in all Member States 
Poroton 
130. Two French firms complained to the Commission about the German 
association of Poroton insulating brick manufacturers. 
In addition to the standards certificate for materials issued by the German 
authorities, which the French firms had obtained, the German manufacturers 
established a joint quality label guaranteeing that the bricks satisfied certain 
requirements. The two French firms had concluded a licensing agreement with the 
inventor of the manufacturing process to manufacture and distribute the bricks 
under the Poroton trade-mark. So long as the patents covering these products were 
applicable (they have in the meantime expired both in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France) the firms were expressly authorized to distribure the 
products under this trade-mark in the Federal Republic where they acquired an 
increasing share of the market. 
131. In pursuing their business they later came up against various obstacles on the 
German market: the legality of their using the Poroton trade-mark was disputed, 
they were required to pay a membership fee to join the association which they 
considered prohibitive and discriminatory, and proceedings were brought against 
them before the German courts for unfair competition, notably for having used 
details on the standards certificate in a manner likely to cause confusion. 
The Commission accepted the complaint that barriers had been raised by the 
association's members against the two French firms' marketing activities in the 
Federal Republic. The parties came to an arrangement which acknowledged the 
complainants' right to use the trade-mark, while they in turn undertook to ensure 
that there' was no likelihood of confusion in the details on the standards 
certificates; they also withdrew from the association, considering that membership 
was no longer necessary to their activities in the Federal Republic. 
132. The Commission is normally concerned to see that firms in all Member 
States may subscribe to joint label schemes on equitable conditions, where 
membership is necessary for the economic success of commercial activities on the 
relevant market. 
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In the case in question, however, it appeared that the barriers were not sufficiently 
serious to warrant proceedings leading to imposition of a fine. 
Designated wines and I trade-marks 
Free movement of designated wines within the Community 
Winninger Domgarten 
133. The German wine protection association lodged two complaints with the 
Commission on behalf of the owners of the 'Wlnniger Domgarten' vineyard on the 
Moselle. 
The British firm which is proprietor in the United Kingdom of the trade-marks 
'Domgarten' and 'Domgarden' markets under these trade-marks, in conjunction 
with another British associated firm, a white wine bottled by a German firm. 
The two British firms threatened to take trade-mark infringement proceedings 
against the imports into the United Kingdom of 'Winninger Domgarten'. The UK 
Patent Office, as national trade-mark authority, had ruled that the 'Domgarden' 
and 'Winninger Domgarten' trade-marks could not be confused. The complainant 
considered that these threats constituted an infringement of the rules of the Treaty 
concerning free movement of goods and competition. 
134. The Commissioh considered that the mere threat of infringement 
proceedings did not warrant its intervention. However, it shared the complainants' 
point of view based on the principle of the free movement of goods pursuant to 
Article 30 of the Treaty. Using the British 'Domgarten' trade-mark to prevent 
imports into the United Kingdom would constitute an infringement of Council 
Regulation No 355179? laying down general rules for the description and 
presentation of wines, which constitute the basis of the relevant Community law. 
Since the complainant obtained satisfaction by putting forward these arguments, 
the Commission did not pursue its investigation under Article 85. 
However, this case shows that the Commission is watchful in regard to the 
observance· of Article 85 by firms which could attempt to solve the difficulties 
I OJ L 54,6.3.1979. 
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arising from the existence of two identical or confusingly similar designations, by 
agreements or practices restricting the free movement of goods beyond the scope of 
the exceptions to the principle of free movement permitted by Article 36. 
Plant breeders' rights and trade-marks 
Varietal name registered as a trade-mark by a person 
other than the proprietor of the plant breeder's right 
in a country applying for Community membership 
135. The Commission was informed that third parties in Spain systematically 
register as trade-marks varietal names of plants appearing in the common 
catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant species. 1 This practice is prohibited in all 
Member States belonging to the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV)2 since varietal names of plants are generic names and so 
cannot be registered as trade-marks. A third party holding an identical trade-mark 
in Spain could represent "a substantial barrier to the free movement of goods and 
competition when that c~)Untry accedes to the Community. 
The proprietor of a trade-mark could use it to keep out of the Spanish market seeds 
or plants moving freely throughout the Community. By means of agreements that 
are restrictive within the meaning of Article 85 he could regulate terms of access to 
the Spanish market for these products. The venal aim of such practices is to make 
the proprietor of the plant breeder's right purchase the trade-mark for a substantial 
sum. 
The Commission informed the Spanish authorities of its reservations on'. these 
practices. Its views were based in particular on rulings of French and German 
courts which consider that registration of a trade-mark for the sole purpose of 
making access to a market more difficult for a third party constitutes unfair 
competition. 
1 Common catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant species, sixth complete edition: OJ C 330, 
31.12.1979. " 
2 The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties was set up by the Paris Convention of 2 
December 1961. 
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§ 5 - Article 86 applied to abuse of dominant position 
I 
Sterling Airways 
136. In the field of air transport the Commission does not have any power of its 
own to investigate and impose penalties similar to that conferred on it by 
Regulation No 17; 1 in Qrder to investigate complaints made by a Danish private 
airline, Sterling Airways, therefore, it acted under Article 89 of the EEC Treaty, 
which enables it to call: upon the assistance of the competent authorities of the 
Member State concern~d. The complaints were lodged with the Commission 
between June 1975 and May 1979. They were made against Scandinavian Airlines 
System (SAS) and the Danish Government; the main allegations were: 
(a) because of SAS's m~)flopoly, Sterling Airways had been denied entry to the 
international scheduled flights market in general and the Copenhagen-London 
route in particular, and to certain sectors of the charter market; 
(b) by approving the farJs in question, the Danish Government had allowed SAS to 
abuse its dominant position by charging excessive fares on the Copenhagen-
London route; this constituted an infringement of Article 86(a). 
I 
137. As regards the alleged abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 86, Sterling Airways pointed out that on 1 November 1977 a standard 
Copenhagen-London economy-class return ticket cost DKR 2 560, while Sterling 
Airways undertook to provide a daily return service for DKR 600, still making a 
profit of DKR 45 per p~ssenger with a load factor of 50%. 
. , 
The Commission found, first of all, that as a result of prorating arrangements2 
SAS's average revenue per passenger is far below the standard economy-class fare. 
Furthermore, there were numerous obstacles to the establishment of a valid 
comparison between companies: 
(i) firstly, the service offered is not necessarily the same; in the case in question, 
Sterling Airways proposed to provide the service under certain restrictive 
conditions; there was to be no advance booking, for example, and only one 
flight a day. This arrangement holds little attraction for those passengers who 
1 Points 11 to 14 of this ReJort. 
2 Prorating occurs where several airlines share the revenue of a through non-stop ticket when the 
passenger completes his journey in stages, travelling on aircraft belonging to different companies. 
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attach great importance to advance booking and the possibility of changing 
. their flight; 
(ii) secondly, it would be dangerous to compare the recorded figures actually 
obtained'by one company with the hypothetical figures put forward by another 
company seeking entry to the market; 
(iii)lastly, even if the services provided were identical, and the data comparable, the 
difference in price would not necessarily establish that an abuse of a dominant 
position existed. It might well reflect the higher cost of the established 
company, obliging it to charge prices higher than those of the newcomer. 
For these reasons the Commission examined SAS's cost/revenue ratio in order to 
determine whether or not SAS fares on the Copenhagen-London route constitute an 
abuse within the meaning of Article 86(a). The Court of Justice had previously held 
that a price is excessive where it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of 
the 'l'roduct or service. 1 
The Commission at first experienced some difficulty in obtaining the information it 
required from the Danish Government; after a certain amount of delay this 
obstacle was overcome and information covering the years 1977-80 was supplied. 
Upon analysing this information, the Commission came to two conclusions: 
(i) In 1977 and 1978 the very high level of fares on the Copenhagen-London route 
compared with those charged for equivalent distances and the very high 
profitability 'of the route might indicate prima facie an infringement of 
Article 86. The Commission notified the Danish Government and SAS of its 
findings and asked for their comments. 
(ii) Thereafter, the level of SAS's fares on that route dropped considerably in 
comparison with its other international routes. This can be explained by the 
fact that later proposals to put up fares on the Copenhagen-London route were 
for the most part turned down by the Danish Government. 
The Commission therefore felt that, in the light of the latest information to hand, 
the fares were no longer unreasonably high and that, since any infringement of 
Article 86 had ceased, there were no longer any grounds for it to consider further 
action. 
I Case 26/75 General Motors Continental [1975] ECR 1367, and Fifth Report on Competition Policy, 
. point 25; Case 27176 United Brands [1978] ECR 207, and Eighth Report on Competition Policy, 
point 21. 
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138. The matter of the right of entry to the international scheduled flights market, 
which was also raised in the Sterling Airways complaints, is closely linked to the 
question whether there are limits to the power of Member States to grant rights 
concerning the transport of passengers by air on certain routes within the 
Community which are tantamount to denying other airlines access to the part of the 
market in question. 
Since the Chicago Conv~ntion of 1944 the international air transport market has 
developed on a bilateral basis. The jurisdiction of States extends to the airspace, 
above their territory, and they therefore claim the right to designate the airlines 
providing flights between their territory and the territory of other States. In the 
bilateral air service agreements it concluded, the Danish Government designated 
SAS for this purpose, thus granting it special or exclusive rights. 
Article 90(1} of the EEC Treaty states that 'in the case of public undertakings and 
undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member 
States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules 
contained in this Treaty; in particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and 
Articles 85 to 94'. This provision thus permits Member States to grant special or 
exclusive rights. ' 
Article 61(1} provides, moreover, that freedom to provide services in the field of 
transport shall be governed by the provisions of the Title relating to transport. This 
means that such freedom to provide services must be introduced by means of 
measures taken by the Council pursuant to Article 84(2}. 
On the basis of that Article the Commission is actively preparing proposals to the 
Council, specified in more detail in its Memorandum, 1 aimed at gradually changing 
the present system of exclusive rights granted' on the basis of bilateral 
intergovernmental agreements, with the objective of creating a more flexible 
system. 
Nevertheless, in the prevailing legal situation and in the light of the information it 
had at its disposal, the ~ommission did not feel that it would be appropriate to 
dispute the legality, in terms of Community law, of the grant of special or exclusive 
rights to SAS or of the ~efusal to grant them to Sterling Airways. 
1 Contribution of the Europe~n Communities to the development of air transport services (July 1979), 
points 52 to 64. 
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§ 6 - Joint ventures 
Vacuum Interrupters 
139. Under Article 85(3) the Commission issued a favourable Decision 
concerning the agreement'entert!d into in 1978 by the United Kingdom companies 
. Associated Electrical Industries Ltd '(AEI), Reyrolle Parsons Ltd (RP), Brush 
Switchgear Ltd (Brush) and Vacuum Interrupters Ltd (VIL) concerning the joint 
shareholding of the first three companies in their subsidiary VIL. 1 
This agreement, which had been notified, amends and replaces, as the principal 
agreement, the 1970 agreement under which AEI and RP acquired a joint 
shareholding in VIL and which had already been exempted by the Commission. 2 
The new agreement allows Brush a shareholding in VIL and reorganizes the 
management of VIL and the relationship between the parent companies within the 
joint venture. 
The vacuum interrupter is a sophisticated type of circuit breaker designed for use in 
complex switchgear apparatus. Although it cannot compete with conventional oil 
and compressed-air interrupters because of its high production costs, the 
advantages it affords of reliability and durability have encouraged a number of 
manufacturers throughout the world, particularly in the United States and Japan, 
to continue researching and marketing the product. 
The technical and economic problems encountered by VIL in manufacturing the 
product led the companies which had set it up in 1970 to seek the collaboration of 
another company, Brush, which would strengthen VIL's financial position and, in 
particular, provide an important technical contribution. 
The Commission considered that the new agreement, like its predecessor, was 
caught by the prohibition i~ Article 85 of the Treaty, since the companies in 
qtiestioncompete with each other on the electrical goods markets. The agreement 
was also likely to have an appreciable effect on trade between the Member States, 
notably in view of the parent companies' activity in the field of electrical 
interrupters in general, which made them potential major purchasers of vacuum 
interrupters. 
However, the Commission noted that ten years after its formation VIL had not yet 
overcome completely the technical and economic barriers to the optimum 
1 Decision of 11.12.1980, Vacuum Interrupters Ltd: not yet published in OJ. 
2 Decision of 20.1.1977: OJ L 48, 19.2.1977; Sixth Report on Competition Policy, point 175. 
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performance of the vacuum interrupter. It therefore exempted the agreement in 
question from the prohibition in Article 85(1) from the date of notification, 12 May 
1978, until 31 March 1988, considering that this was the time needed to enable the 
collaboration between 'yIL's parent companies to produce the desired results. 
Aiming to keep new developments arising in that period under constant review, 
however, the Commisston made the exemption conditional upon the provision of 
information, including'the periodical submission of technical reports. 
§ 7 - Merger control (Article 66 ECSC and Article 86 EEC) 
Merger control in the steel industry 
Continued restructuring 1 
140 . . The Community steel industry continued to deal with the two-fold need to 
improve its market competitiveness and to muster for this purpose the financial 
resources required for modernization. ' 
Major reorganization plans involving amalgamations, pursuant to the restructur-
ing of the Belgian steel industry carried out with government financial 
participation, were authorized in 1980 under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty (ALZI 
KlockneriBelgian State and Kempense Investeringsvennootschap and Tubemeusel 
Belgian State/Benteler group).2 
In view of the steel undertakings' current financial situations and not WIshing to 
stand in the way of the desired restructuring operations, the Commission raised no 
objection in these cases to the fact that part of the shareholding in question was 
acquired by means of a share transfer. However, the outcome of the transaction 
had to remain a minority shareholding. In line with its policy of avoiding personal 
links between steel groups, the Commission insisted that this holding should not 
involve representation on the other undertaking's management bodies, since this 
was not warranted on economic grounds. 
Pursuant to cooperation on restructuring by the Belgian and Luxembourg steel 
industries, the Commission also authorized the joint establishment by the Cockerill 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 121. 
2 Points 143 and 144 of this Report. 
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and Arbed groups of Galvalange, 1 a sheet-coating undertaking, thus enabling the 
twq firms. to share the risks involved in introducing a new product; a relatively 
small share of total Community coated-sheet production is involved. 
The Commission also authorized vertical integration in the steel scrap processing 
and dealing sector by the main Dutch steel producer (Hollandia/Hoogovens}.2 
141. The Commission also authorized the steel-making aspects of mergers by 
steel-processing undertakings under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty but first made 
sure that the transactions did not lead to any abuse of dominant position in respect 
of non-ECSC products within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
(mergers of handling and transport equipment and nut, bolt and screw 
manufacturers, notably involving the steel producers Arbed and Otto Wolff).~ 
142. The Commission also keeps a close watch, pursuant to Article 66, on the 
consequences of mergers by major steel producing groups and independent 
stockholders and developments on their relevant markets. The Commission has so 
far not had to take any action to ensure that such transactions comply with the 
rules. In such circumstances the Commission makes sure that the int~grated 
stockholding of the various producers remains fairly well-balanced and that no 
links are created at distribution level between major steel-producing groups. In 
1980 the Commission was thus able to authorize the Arbed group's acquisition of 
the Lommaert network of stockholders in The Netherlands, Belgium and the 
Federal Republic of Germany where it had previously had no direct represen-
tation. 4 
ALZ/Klockrier IBeigian State/KIV 
143. The Commission authorized the establishment of joint control over the _ 
Belgian steel company ALZ NV, Genk, by the German steel producer Klockner-
Werke AG, the Belgian State and Kemperise Investeri'ngsvennootschap NV (KIV) 
which acquired shareholdings in ALZ of 48%,24% and 28% respectively after an 
increase in share capital. 5 . . 
1 Point 145 of this Report. 
2 Point 146 of this Report. 
3 Points 147 and 148 of this Report. 
4 Point 149 of this Report. . 
5 Commission Decision of 25.2.1980: Bull. EC 2-1980, point 2.1.18. 
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This undertaking produces stainless steel cold-rolled sheets; the main shareholder 
had been Cockerill SA. 
As part of the plan for restructuring the Belgian steel industry, ALZ's capital was 
increased by a Belgian: State holding and an additional holding by an existing 
minority shareholder KIV. Cockerill transferred its shareholding in ALZ in 
exchange for a minority shareholding in Klockner, not involving representation on 
any of the undertaking~' management bodies. 
The transaction therefote satisfied the tests of Article 66. Klockner had not hitherto 
been a producer of stainless cold-rolled sheet, so consumers can still make their 
choice from the same, number of producers. ALZ accounts for some 7% of 
Community output of this product and competes with larger integrated producers 
in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Tubemeuse/Belgian State/Benteler group 
144. In another transaction pursuant to the restructuring of the Belgian steel 
industry, the Commission authorized the Belgian State and the German tube 
producer Benteler to jointly take over control of the Societe Anonyme des Usines a 
Tubes de la Meuse (Tubemeuse).l 
This undertaking produces steel tubes; its shares were previously jointly held by the 
French tube producer Vallourec and the Belgian steel group, Cockerill, which 
decided to withdraw in view of the cost of putting the undertaking back on its feet. 
The transfer of control satisfied the tests of Article 66 as regards the semis for steel 
tubes which are covered by the ECSC Treaty. Moreover, the merger of Benteler and 
Tubemeuse, in that it concerns mainly tubes which are covered by the EEC Treaty, 
was not regarded as abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86, 
notably because there ~re four major Community tube producers (Mqnnesmann, 
Finsider, Vallouret and the British Steel Corporation) whose output is far greater 
than the combined production of Benteler and Tubemeuse. 
Galvalange 
145. The Commissio~ also authorized the joint establishment by Arbed SA and 
Cockerill SA of an undertaking known as Galvalange Sari, Luxembourg. 2 The 
1 Commission Decision of 2.12.1980: Bull. EC 12-1980, point 2.1.35. 
2 Commission Decision of 24.7.1980: Bull EC 7/8·1980, point 2.1.33. 
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main activity of the new undertaking will be the operation of a line for coating both 
faces of cold-rolled sheet, involving in particular the introduction of a new product 
(Galvalum sheet, coated with a zinc/aluminium alloy). Galvalange's initial 
production capacity of 100 000 tonnes per year will, depending on market trends, 
be increased in a second stage to 150000 tonnes per year. 
This transaction also forms part of the plan for restructuring the BelgIan steel 
industry and represents a significant investment in an area particularly hard-hit by 
the. effects of the steel crisis. 
The Commission took the view that this joint transaction by Cockerill, the leading 
European producer of coated sheet, and Arbed, which has only a small output in 
this sector, satisfied the tests of Article 66. An additional effect will be the 
appearance of a new product apt to compete with existing products on the 
Community coated-sheet market, where other major integrated steel-making 
groups are also represented. According to the stages envisaged for the project, the 
production capacity of the new undertaking will represent only 2% to3% of all 
coated sheet produced in the Commu~ity. 
Hollandia/Hoogovens 
146. The Commission authorized Hoogovens IJmuiden BV (Hoogovens), the 
main Dutch steel producer, to acquire the entire share capital of IJzerhandel 
Hollandia BV, Amsterdam (Hollandia), a steel scrap and processing company. 1 
Hollandia, together with the scrap dealing company Verenigde Utrechtse 
IJzerhandel BV, which is already controlled by Hoogovens, provides over half of 
total deliveries of scrap by Dutch scrap merchants. However, the relevant market is 
not confined to The Netherlands. The country's scrap exports are twice that of 
home consumption of bought scrap; the scrap market is international. Scrap is 
freely traded within the Community and prices tend to be determined by the 
interplay of supply and demand on the world market. 
By obtaining control of Hollandia, Hoogovens acquired for the first time a major 
processor of scrap and thereby brought itself into line with several major steel 
producers elsewhere in the Community who already own important scrap-
processing companies. 
In the circumstances the Commission concluded that the transaction satisfied the 
tests of Article 66(2) of the ECSC Treaty. 
1 Commission Decision of 14.3.1980: OJ L 85,29.3.1980. 
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Merger of handling arid transport equipment and 
nut, bolt and screw manufacturers 
I 
147. The Commissio'n authorized Arbed SA and Otto Wolff AG to merge their 
respective handling and transport equipment subsidiaries into a single unit: Pohlig-
Heckel-Bleichert Vereinigte Machinenfabriken AG, (PHB) Cologne, and Weser-
hiitte AG, Bad Oeynh~usen.l 
The new unit will be jointly controlled by Arbed and Otto Wolff and its main object 
will be to manufacture and sell handling, transport, transhipment and open-cast 
mining equipment. 
As a result the companies concerned should have a better chance of competing with 
large Community manufacturers and they should also be big enough to undertake 
major projects in their respective fields, which can only be undertaken by firms 
with considerable fina-\1cial and industrial resources. 
148. The Commission also authorized Arbed SA to merge into a single unit its 
subsidiary Karcher Schraubenwerke GmbH, Bekingen/Saarland, its own nut, bolt 
and screw works at Gh<;:nt, and Kommanditgesellschaft Bauer & Schaurte (B & S), 
Neuss. 2 
The new firm will mainly use wire rod-an ECSC product of which Arbed is a 
major producer-to rhanufacrure screws, nuts and bolts. It will be jointly 
controlled by Arbed aJ;ld B & S's principal shareholder. The undertakings hope 
that this merger, by making full use of their existing synergic and complementary 
capabilities, will enable them to rationalize their nut, bolt and screw business and 
to offer a full range of: products. 
The two transactions satisfy the tests for authorization under Article 66 and, in the 
light of the merging companies' positions in branches covered by the EEC Treaty, 
also satisfy the tests of Article 86. 
Lommaertl Arhed 
149. The Commission authorized Tradearbed Participations, a company 
controlled by Arbed sA, to acquire the entire share capital of Lommaert-ODS 
International BV (Lominaert), Rotterdam. 3 
1 Commission Decision of 29.5.1980: Bull. EC 5-1980;point 2.1.17. 
2 Commission Decision of 29.5.1980: Bull. EC 5-1980, point 2.1.80. 
3 Commission Decision of 10.10.1980: Bull. EC 10-1980, point 2.1.27. 
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Lommaert, a holding company, controls, inter alia; steel stockholders in Belgium, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and The Netherlands. 
These stockholders mainly deal in beams, concrete reinforcing bars, merchant bars 
and hot-rolled and cold~rolled products; in 1978 their shares of the market in these 
products were estimated at 4 %, 17% and 0.4 % of the Belgian, Dutch and German 
stockholder markets respectively. 
Since the Arbed group did not control any stockholders in those countries, it was 
not directly represented in those markets. However, the producer undertakings of 
the Arbed group had for a long time been the principal suppliers of stockholders in 
the Lommaert group and covered almost 40% of their requirements of the products 
in question. 
As a result 6f these mergers, existing trade relations will be consolidated; the Arbed 
group will gain' access to the Belgian, Dutch and Germari stockholder markets and 
will also be assured of a broader trading base in an area where its competitiors have 
long been established .. 
Scrutiny of mergers for compatibility with Article 86 EEC 
150. The Council has ~till not adopted a merger control Regulation,1 so the 
Commission has to scrutinize individqal mergers which could, following the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in the Continental Can case l l~ad to ·an abusive 
strengthening of a dominant position by certain firms within the meaning of 
Article 86. In assessing conditions for applying Article 86 to mergers, particularly 
as regards the concepts of dominant position and abuse, the Commission also 
based its action on the line taken in later judgments in the United Brands and 
Hoffmann-La Roche cases. 3 
A dominant position can generally be said to exist once a market share to the order 
of40% to 45% is reached. 4 Although this share does notin itself automatically give 
control of the market, if there are large gaps between the position of the firm 
concerned and those of its closest competitors and also other factors likely to place 
it at an advantage as regards competition, a dominant position may well· exist. 
Strengthening by means of merger is likely to constitute an abuse if any distortion of 
the resulting market structure interferes with the maintenance of remaining 
, . 
1 See point 20 of this Report. 
2 Case 6172 [1973] ECR 215. 
3 Commission answer to Written Question No 67/89 by Mr Bangemann: OJ C 167, 7.7.1980. 
4 A dominant position cannot even be ruled out in respect of market shares between 20% and 40% ; 
Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 22. 
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I 
competition (which ha~ already been weakened by the very existence of this 
dominant position) or its development. Such an effect depends, in particular, on the 
change in the relative m;arket strength of the participants after the merger, i.e. the 
position of the new unit' in relation to remaining competitors. . 
Experience of recent casbs has confirmed that, even if Article 86 is difficult to apply 
on account of the conditions for its application, it still enables the Commission to 
monitor to a certain extent large-scale mergers and, if necessary, to prevent them 
being carried through ot to have changes made which are desirable from the point 
of view of competition: 
i 
I 
151. When dealing with major transactions which could have been caught by 
Article 86 the Commission has so far been able to work out solutions with the firms 
concerned which take ~ccount of both industrial requirements and the need to 
maintain adequate com'petition on the relevant markets. 
I 
The transfer of interestJ from BSN to Pilkington enabled the British manufacturer 
to acquire flat glass installations in the continental part of the Community and the 
French group to develop its food business, yet the scope of the transaction could be 
regarded as compatible~with Article 86. 1 
In view of the business linkS existing between Michelin and Kleber, the changes in 
their relations, which ~ere dictated by circumstances, were regarded as internal 
reorganization and ther'efore consistent with Article 86. Michelin was thus able to 
integrate Kleber's busines~ into its group and rescue the firm.2 
Both the Michelin/K:leber-Colombes and Baxter Travenol Laboratories/ 
SmithKline RIT3 cases:and many other significant mergers were scrutinized for 
compatibility with ArtiCle 86 at the request of the firms concerned. Since there is no 
system of prior notifidtion, the Commission had to take the initiative in other 
cases by requesting infdrmation under Article 11 of Council Regulation No 17.4 A 




152. Following subst~ntial changes to their origi~al planand undertakings given 
~y the companies con~erned, the Commission decided to raise no objection, 
1 Point 152 of this Report. : 
2 Point 156 of this Report. I 
3 Point 157 of this Report. ; 
4 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 130. 
I 
COMPo REP. EC 1980 
MAIN DECISIONS AND MEASURES TAKEN BY'THE COMMISSION 105 
pursuant to the Community. competition rules, to the sale of the French group BSN-
Gervais-Danone's German interests (Flachglas AG) to the British glass group 
,Pilkington. 1 
Pilkington had originally planned to acquire all BSN's flat glass subsidiaries outside 
France: Flachglas AG in the Federal Republic of Germany, Glaverbel SA in 
Belgium and de Ma~s BV in The Netherlands, This operation could have been 
caught by Article'86 on account of the abusive strengthening of a dominant 
position by means of merger. Pilkington already held a dominant position on the 
British-and possibly also on the Irish and Danish-flat glass markets. The 
acquisition would have reinforced its dominant position and extended it to 
neighbouring m~rkets, in The Netherlands and the Federal Republic at least. In the 
north-west of the Community it would thus have held major market shares (over 
80% in the United Kingdom, and between 50% and 60% in Ireland, Denmark, The 
Netherlands, and the Federal Republic), two or three times those of its closest 
competitor, Saint-Gobain, in this part of the common market. 
The Commission sent the firms concerned a warning to this effect. 
153. The two parties hadin the meantime opened fresh negotiations with a view 
to finding an alternative which would satisfy ~he objections raised by the German 
Federal Cartel Office,· which also took the view that the transaction initially 
planned would establish or'strengthen a dominant position on the German market, 
thereby contravening German competition law. The parties agreed to limit the 
operation to the purchase of Flachglas and the Commission accordingly, assessed 
the new proposal. . 
The Commission found that there were no longer grounds for objection under 
Article 86. The increase in the Pilkington group's share of the relevant flat glass 
markets in the Community would not be as substantial; the gap between its share 
and that of its closest competitor, would be markedly reduced, while the next 
largest competitor, BSN (with Boussois, Glaverbel and de Maas), would have a 
more substantial share of the relevant market in the north-west of the common 
market. 
The resulting structure of supply would be more balanced an'd should no longer 
endanger the undistorted play of competition in the common market, particularly 
since there were no links between the two companies which might adversely affect 
competition and infringe Article 85. 
1 Bull. EC 5-1980, point 2.1.16. 
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154. The Commission'then went on to deal with the removal and adaptation of 
these links. The outcome was essentiaHy as foHows: 
(i) the firms gave an undertaking that neither would be represented on the'board of 
the other; 
(ii) BSN will not hold shares i~-,Pilkingtd~ made over to it in part-paymerit for any 
longer than three years, and will not in the meantime exercise the voting rights 
atta~hing to those shares; , ' 
(iii)on completion of the operation, the Pilkington/Flachglas and, BSN distribution 
networks will be completely separate. 
155. This case provides an example of possible simultaneous' application of 
national and Community competition law to the same transaction. Tw<;> paraHel 
actions may be brought by the relevant national authority and by the ,Commission 
in respect of the same merger.' 
In this case, although the steps taken by the German Federal Cartel Office and the 
Commission were aimed at different objectives, their development was not 
contradictory. There was no conflict between Community and national law. Had 
the two actions led to contrasting decisions, Community law would have prevailed 
over national law. National authorities would have to comply with a Commission 
decision establishing that a given merger' infringed Article 86. However, if the 
Commission ruled that a merger did not infringe Article 86, itcould not, in current 
circumstances of the law, raise objections to'any prohibition of that merger by a 
national authority, based on stricter national law.! 
Miche1in/Kleber-Colombes 
156. The Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin wanted to know 
whether an operation it:envisaged could be considered as an abusive stri;:ngthenihg 
of a dominant position by means of merger and asked the Commission whether a 
reorganization of the KI,eber-Colombes business within the Michelin group would 
be caught by Article 86. 
Michelin is the EEC's ~iggest manufacturer and supplie~ of tyres with a market 
share of around 40% arid the second biggest in the world after Goodyear. Kleber-
Colombes' market share of around 5% puts it into fifth place in the EEC, behind 
1 GKN/Sachs Case, Sixth R~port on Competition Policy, points 110 to 113. 
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punlop-Pirelli (18-20%), Continental-Uniroyal (13-15%) and Goodyear Europe 
(10-12%). 
Kleber-Colombes has been in severe financial difficulties for a number of years and 
in recent months these have worsened. After the failure of several attempts by 
Michelin to arrange a link-up of Kleber-Colombes with other tyremanufacturers 
(notably the Austrian·firm Semperit between 1973 and 1978 and the Continental-
Uniroyal group in June 1980), it seemed that the only way of overcoming Kleber-
Colombe's difficulties would be to reorganize its activities within Michelin. 
The Commission bore in mind the fact that since 1972 Michelin had held, directly 
or indirectly, a majority shareholding in Kleber-Colombes-when Michelin was 
not in a dominant position on the Community tyre market-which, in view of the 
distribution of the remaining capital, enabled it to control the company. 
The reorganization envisaged by Michelin in the present circumstances-like its 
previous policy of allowing Kleber-Colombes to preserve a certain amount of 
independence-would therefore amount to no more than an internal organization 
measure within the group already formed by the two firms. It is consequently not a 
new merger likely to constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning 
of Article 86. 1 
From a more general angle this statement of view is interesting in that it goes back 
to the principle that it is the acquiring of possible control over a firm which 
substitutes a merger under Article 86. 
Baxter Travenol Laboratories/SmithKline RIT 
157. At the request of the firm concerned, the Commission also scrutinized, 
pursuant to Article 86, the proposed sale by SmithKline RIT, the Belgian subsidiary 
of the US pharmaceuticals group SmithKline Corp., of its perfusions business to 
Travenol Laboratories SA, the Belgian subsidiary of Baxter Travenol Laboratories 
Inc. 
Baxter is a leading manufacturer of products for hospitals worldwide and ranks 
second among Community perfusions suppliers. It holds first place on the Belgian 
market, the area directly concerned by the proposed transaction. 
However, on account of the nature of the products concerned, and their 
manufacturing, shipping and marketing conditions, the Belgian market should not 
1 Bull. EC 11-1980, point 2.1.20. 
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be considered in isolation from a wider geographical area, the north-west of the 
common market, where Belgium is centrally situated. Moreover, over one-third of 
total Belgian consumption of perfusions and other specialist supplies is imported 
from neighbouring countries. 
. . . 
The Commission found that, on the relevant geographical market as a whole, the 
shares held by t~e firms concerned were not such as to allow Baxter to domina~e the 
market or to strengthen dominance by the proposed acquisition of RIT. The 
Commission therefore informed the parties concerned that it had no reason to take 
action in respect of their proposed transaction. 
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Chapter I 
State aids 1 
§1 - General 
158. 1980 saw a continuation and deepening of the economic recession with its 
consequent pressure on Member States to intervene in their economies through the 
grant of State aids. From the point of view of the development of the Commission's 
policy in the field of State aids, 1980 saw the judgment of the Court in the case of 
Philip Morris (Case 730/79) which clarified the interpretation of application of the 
Treaty in regard to State aids and in particular to general aid schemes. The 
implications of this judgment are examined in more detail below (see points 214 to 
217).1980 was notable also in that the Commission took steps to remind Member 
States of their obligations of prior notification of aid proposals, pursuant to 
Article 93(3) EEC, and issued its directive on the transparency of the financial 
relationships between· Member States and their public undertakings. 2 This is 
discussed in detail at point 235 et seq. below; 
159. The past decade ha~ seen on the one hand a growing number of interventions 
by Member States on which the Commission has taken a formal position, and on 
the other the development of a cohererit frame of reference of the principles and 
methods of their application within which the Commission has worked. The table 
on the following page shows the position as regards the former. 
160. The Commission's general approach to the problem of State aids is governed 
by the basic principle stated in the Treaty, that State aids are incompatible with the 
common market.· The Treaty gives the Commission a discretion to grant a 
derogation from this principle if the State aid proposed contributes to the 
1 For State aids concerning the products listed in Annex II to the Treaty, see Fourteenth General 
Report, point 374. 
2 OJ L 195, 29.7.1980. 
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Positions taken by the Commission concerning State ai~s hom 1970 to 19801 
Of which Formal negative 
Year Total decisions 
no objection2 procedures under 
published 
Article 93(2)3 in the OJ 
1970 21 15 6 1 
1971 18 11 7 3 
1972 35 24 11 3 
1973 22 15 7 4 
1974 35 , 20 15 -
1975 45 29 16 2 
1976 47 33 14 2 
1977 112 ! 99 13 1 
1978 137 118 19 -
1979 133 I 79 54 3 
1980 105 I 72 33 2 
Excludes virtually all agricultural aids. . 
In most of the cases, subject [0 conditions and/or modifications of the aid scheme originally notified, after negotiations between the 
Commission and the Member Stare concerned. . _" 
J Opened and closed. During these proCedures"roposals may be accepted after further examination, or modified after negotiation. The 
negotiation may result in the withdrawal 0 the proposition by the Member State after it has bec~mc deal that the proposal is 
incompatible with the common market. 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 92(3) EEC. In the light of the 
structure of Article 92 et seq. EEC the Commission reacts to proposals to grant or 
alter the grant of aids notified by Member States. It is not incumbent upon it to put 
forward policy statements on the application of State aids which might be 
interpreted as encouraging Member States to implement aid programmes. 
Nevertheless, the Commission over the past years has made and administered two 
series of measures, covering on the one hand certain economic sectors which have 
encountered difficulties in all Member States and where consequently the pressure 
for State intervention has been greatest, and on the other, areas where State aids 
may be used to promote:Community policies. In such cases a clear statement of the 
. approach the Commis~ion will take in judging proposals has been thought 
advisable. 
In consequence, the Commission has made know~ its positioq in policy documents 
for the following areas: 
(i) the principles of coordination for regional aids; 1 
1 OJ C 31,3.2.1979. 
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Tenth Report on Competition Policy 
Point 161 should read as follows: 
161. The depth of the economic recession has opened up the possibility 
of using State aids to assist industries with some degree of viability, in one 
Member State in particular. Searching discussions have been held on such 
plans. 
Its position strengthened by the Court's decision of 17 September 1980 in 
the Philip Morris case, the Commission considers that the grant of such 
aids is in principle not compatible with the common interest. 
However, the Commission may look favourably on certain measures 
planned specifically to combat the crisis in certain sectors where, by means 
of some degree of reorganization, they are capable of helping to adapt 
existing industrial structures to the new requirements of the world 
economy. The Commission may also give sympathetic consideration to 
measures likely to promote policies of common European interest, such as 
the grant of aids to investments in, for instance, energy conservation, 
environmental protection, or innovation, etc. which at the same time may 
contribute to the stimulation of investment in general and the reduction of 
unemployment. 
These are examples of ways in which State aids, under certain conditions, 
could help in implementing positive adjustment policies now being discus-
sed in many quarters. 
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(ii) . Commission communication to the Council on general policy on sectoral aid 
schemes;l 
(iii) framework on aiq to the textile industry;2 
(iv) Fourth Directive on aids to shipbuilding;3 
(v) decisiol1 on aid to the steel industry;4 
(vi) framework on aids for the protection of the environment; 5 
(vii) Directive on the transparency of the financial relationships between Member 
States and their public undertakings. 6 -
Jt should be noted that 1980 saw a prolongation of the framework on aids for the 
protection of the environment, while discussions have been started for a Fifth 
Directive on aids to shipbuilding. 
161. The depth of the economic recession has opened up the possibility of using 
State aids to ~ssist industries with some degree of viability, in one MemberState in 
particular. Searching discussions have been held on such plans. 
Its position strengthened by the Court's decision of 17 September 1980 in the Philip 
Morris case, the Commission considers that the grant of such aids is compatible 
with the common interest only in so far as the aids contribute, at Community level, 
to reducing unemployment or stimulating investment or encouraging restructuring 
operations. . 
However, the Commission may look favourably on certain measures planned 
specifically tp combat the crisis in certain sectors where, by means of some degree 
of reorganization, they are capable of helping to adapt existing industrial'structures 
to the "new requirements of the world economy. The Commission may also give 
sympathetic consideration to measures likely to promote policies of common 
European interest, such as the grant of aids to investments in, for instance, energy 
conservation or environmental protection. 
These are examples of ways in which State aids, under certain conditions, could 
help" in implementing positive adjustment policies now being discussed in many 
quarters. 
1 Eighth Report on Competition Policy, points 172 to 179. 
2 SEC (77) 317, 25.1.1977. 
3 OJ L 98, 11.4.1978. 
4 OJ L 29,6.2.1980. 
5 C (80) 795,23.6.1980. 
6 OJ L 195, 29.7.1980. 
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162. The Commission has heen giving consideration to the degree of observance 
by Member States of their obligation to notify proposals to grant or alter the grant 
of aids. At the 360th meeting of the Council of Ministers on 2 October 1974 the 
governments of Mem ber States declared that 'the rules of the EEC Treaty regarding 
aids (Articles 92 and 93) shall be strictly observed both with respect to existing and 
future aid measures'. Notwithstanding this declaration the Commission has 
become increasingly aware of a growing tendency, particularly marked in the case 
of certain Member States, not to fulfil the obligations laid down by. Article 93(3) 
EEC in respect of notification of aid cases and their non-implementation during the 
time allowed to the Commission to evaluate their compatibility with the Treaty. 
The Commission considered that in some cases, indeed, the extent of the tendency 
towards non-notification would appear to indicate the possible exist~nce of a 
general decision not to tespect the provisions in question. _ -
The Commission therefore took a-decision to write to all Member States to remind 
them of their obligation in this respect. The letter was also published in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities. 1 While the majority of cases involved have 
tended to be in the field of agricultural aids, many of which were of limited duration 
and regional applicability, there has also appeared to be a tendency in certain 
Member States to disregard their obligation in respect of notification of individual 
cases of gerleral aid sch~mes. These matters are currently the subject of further 
investigation. The Com'mission would underline that any aids implemented by 
Member States without due notification and adoption of a decision by the 
Commission are paid illegally and may therefore be subject to a decision that 
repayment be made of the aid in question. 
163. The Commission also paid careful attention to the danger of Member States 
circumventing the control system on national aids by granting aids indirectly. 
Apart from the area covered by the Directive on transparency of financial 
relationships between Member States - and their public undertakings, the 
Commission has come across two instances of indirect aids. In one case an aid 
scheme which the Com~ission had insisted be terminated was being continued 
through the national employers organizations using funds contributed and 
collected 'voluntarily' from firms through the national insurance system. After 
discussions between the :Commission and the organization concerned, this scheme 
was terminated. In another case a Member State proposed to give fiscal advantages 
to banks which form consortia to undertake rescue operations of major companies 
in difficulties. The government in question did not consider this an aid scheme. The 
Commission intervened~ The case is described in detail in point 220 below. _ 
1 OJ C 252,30,9.1980. 
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§ 2 -:- Regional aid schem~s 
General 
164. In the principles of coordination of regional aids and in various decisions 
taken on schemes of· assistance 1 the Commission has consistently expressed its 
opposition (although certain exceptions can be made) to the granting of aid which 
is not conditional on initial investment or the creation of jobs, but is linked to a 
firrn's production and constitutes operating aid. Itis difficult to assess and quantify 
the scope of such assistance which can often conceal the precarious circumstances 
of the firm in question and the need for corrective action. This lack of transparency 
makes it impossible to check whether benefits are being granted to viable firms 
capable in time of facing up to competition. Thus the assistance may create new 
regional problems in the medium term. 
In this respect the decision on the United Kingdom Regional Development Grant 
(RDG) was an important step forward. The RDG is an investment subsidy granted 
automatically for any investment (including the renewal of capital goods) and was 
introduced for an urilimited period. Following lengthy discussions, both bilateral 
(at different levels between the Commission and· the British authorities) and 
multilateral, the British Government undertook to amend this aid to make it 
compatible with the rules of the common market. 
Specific statements on certain national regional aid schemes 
165. The Commission continued scrutinizing certain national regional aid 
schemes for compatibility with the common market pursuant to Article 92 et seq. 
of the EEC Treaty. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
166. Following the initiation of the Article 93(2) EEC procedure in January 1979 
in respect of certain measures under the· German regional aid system, 2 the 
1 The principles do not apply to aids provided for under these schemes which concern the products 
listed in Annex II to the Treaty.· , 
2 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 142. 
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Commission decided in July 1980 to extend the procedure to certain new measures 
introduced under that system. 
The measures 1 are based on an Act of 6 October 1969 relating to the joint task for 
the improvement of regional economic structures;2 a general plan is adopted 
jointly by the Federal Government and the Lander each year. 
The extended procedure is concerned with amendments introduced in particular by 
the Seventh General Plan which were repeated in the Eighth and Ninth General 
Plans. In preparing the Seventh General Plan the Federal Government proceeded to 
update the indications used to designate the 178 labour markets established on the 
basis of municipalities.: The Federal Government and the Lander reached no 
agreement on the outcome of this work. The Federal Government pointed to the 
general weakness of the economy and uncertainties in calculating the indices to 
warrant the addition, until 1 January 1981, of five new assisted areas (Aachen, 
Aschaffenburg, Gummersbach, Kleve-Emmerich and Rosenheim), although 
existing assisted areas whose overall indicators no longer attained the threshold 
value for assistance and which in accordance with the Federal Government's 
method should have their. assisted area status, were not excluded. 
The Commission also compared regional aids in the Federal Republic of Germany 
with those in other Member States and came to the conclusions that the amount of 
regional assistance gra~ted under the joint task and the aid programmes of the 
Lander was excessive. 
: 
It accordingly objected 'to this extension of assisted areas. 
The Federal Government has stated that the indicators used up to now will be 
updated for the Tenth General Plan, so the Commission did not carry out a socio-
economic analysis of all the assisted areas, but initiated the Article 93(2) EEC 
procedure in respect of the continued granting of assistance in five areas with 
indicators well below the threshold value (Bad Kreuznach, Lingen-Nordhorn-
Rheine, Meppen, Sigm~ringen and Wilhelmshaven). 
167. The Commission also stated its views on a number of changes made by the 
government of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen in its regional development 
programme, which had been notified to the Commission as required by 
, 
1 Bundesragsdrucksachen: 8/2014, 26.7.1978 (Seventh General Plan); 8/2590, 20.2.1979 (Eighth 
General Plan); 8/3788, 133.1980 (Ninth General Plan). , 
2 Gesetz iiber die Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur (Bundes-
geserzblatt 11969, p. 1861; amended version, 23.12.1971: Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 2140). 
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Article 93 (3) EEC. 1 The main effect of the amendments was to extend the scheme 
by the addition of new zones. 
In view of the high unemployment rate in these areas, which for a number of years 
has been far above the national average, and the relatively low rate of assistance, \ 
the Commission raised no objection to the introduction of these amendments up to 
the end of 1980. It will reassess the situation in these areas on the basis of a report 
on aid granted and will be taking a decision as to whether they may retain their 
assisted statu·s. 
Belgium 
168. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Commission Decision of 26 April 19722 on the 
Economic Expansion Act of 30 December 19703 the Belgian Government was to 
notify a new proposal concerning the scheduling of development areas. 
Despite numerous bilateral discussions between the Belgian authorities and the 
Commission, at the end of 1979 work on the proposal had still not progressed 
sufficiently and the relevant notification could not be prepared. 
However, following the Commission's new analysis of the socio-economic 
situation in Belgium's regions and repeated reminders, in November 1980 the 
Belgian Government notified a proposal concerning the scheduling of its 
development areas. 
In December the Commission requested further information, notably the method 
used to select these areas. 
However, on account of the country's current socio-economic situation, the 
Commission raised no objection to a further extension until 31 December 1980 of 
the complementary regional aid4 provided by the Economic Expansion Act 
implemented by a Royal Decree of 23 May 19755 for an initial six"month period. 
1 Richtlinien fUr' die Gewahrung von Investitionshilfen zur Verbesserung der regionalen 
Wirtschaftsstruktur des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Regionales Wirtschaftsfiirderungsprogramm: 
Minister for Economic Affairs, Small Businesses and Transport, circular dated 15.8.1978. 
2 OJ L 105,4.5.1972. . . 
3 MoniteuT beige, 1.1.1971.. 
4 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 144. 
5 MoniteuT beige, 29.5.1975. 
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Denmark 
169. The Danish Government requested Commission approval of a proposal 
extending for a further :period of one year, until 31 December 1981, the assisted-
area status of the municipality of Kalundborg, West Zealand. 
In its decisions on the Danish regional aid system 1 in 1977 the Commission had 
authorized the Danish Government to schedule this municipality as an assisted area 
for two years: At the end of 1979 it agreed to the extension requested for the area 
until the end of 1980. 2 
In arguing their case the Danish authorities stressed the importance of retaining 
their assisted areas unchanged until the -rescheduling planned for 1981 is 
completed. Moreover, they felt that the three initial years of application were not 
sufficient to assess the effects of the aid measures in the area in question. 
The Commission scrutinized the socio-economic situation in the area again and 
established that it had improved substantially since 1977. At that time 
unemployment, a decisive factor in the Commission's decision, had attained a very 
high level, notably on account of the closure of certain large factories in the area 
which had caused major redundancies. By 1979 most of the unemployed had been 
taken on in new activities, and the Commission approved retention of the assisted-
area status for one year in order to make sure that the favourable employment trend 
had not been caused by exceptional circumstances. The rate of employment is now 
around the Community average. 
. , 
The Commission accordingly considered that the municipality of Kalundborg 
should not receive assistance after 1 January 1981 and initiated the Article 93(2) 
EEC procedure to enable the Danish Government to submit its comments. 
France 
170. The Commission stated its views on a number of French aid schemes. 
In December 1979 the Article 93(2) procedure was initiated in respect of Article 2 
of Act No 79-525 of 3 July 19793 concerning assistance for investment in 
productive industry, a measure permitting an increase in firms' allowable 
depreciation on fixed assets acquired or created with the aid of a regional 
1 System set up under Act No 219 of 7.6.1972: Lovtidende A, 7.6.1972. 
2 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 145. 
3 Journal officiel de la Repl;th/ique fTan~aise, 4.7.1979. 
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development premium (PDR).l the Commission took this decision in particular 
because the assistance was likely to exceed the ceiling laid down by the 1978 
principles of coordination.2 It also asked the French Government to provide 
information on the socio-economic grounds for the assistance. 
In the course ~f the procedure two Member States declared their support for the 
Commission's position. Since the French Government did qot reply within the 
allotted time, the Commission notified it that if no reply were received it would be 
obliged, to take a decision forthwith on the compatibility of the measures in 
question with the common market on the basis of information at its disposal. It a,Iso 
reminded the French Government that the measures could not be applied while the 
procedure remained open. 
171. The Commission also continued its examination of the Special Industrial 
Conversion. Fund (FSAI) which came into force 'in 1979 and provided for the 
combined award of State grants and loans in quasi-equity form in certain French 
industrial conversion areas. 3 Following initiation in 1979 of the Article 93(2) 
procedure.inrespect of the FSAI loans with the aim ~f ensuring their compatibility 
vvith the Treaty; 4 many discussions were held .and much information passed on by 
the French authorities. The Commission came to the conclusion that granting of 
these loans was to be regarded as a measure of regional assistance and that they 
thereforeha'd to. be assessed in the light of 1978 principles of coordination. It 
therefore worked out, in conjunction with the French authorities, a standard 
method for calculating the net grant equivalent of the FSAI loans. 
The Commission then informed the French Goyernment that it would terminate 
the procedure when it recorded its ,agreement on the abovementioned calculation 
method and on the forwarding of an annual report on the loans actually granted. 
Moreover, it took note of the French Government's assurances that the aid ceilings 
laid down by the 1978 principles of coordination would be respected when 
assistance was graiued from the FSAI or when the loans in quasi-equity form were 
combined with other types of regional assistance. 
172. The Commission also authorized the extension of the area covered by the 
FSAI t~ the St Etienne e~ployme:n't area in the Loire and the mining areas of Albi-
1 ,Ninth Repo~t on Competition P~licy, points 148 and 149. 
2 OJ C 31,3.2.1979; Eighth Report on COII!petition Policy, points 151 to 156. 
3 Act No 78-741 of 13.7.1978: Journal otticiel de la Republique (ranfaise, 14.7,1978, p.2802, 
Articles 30 to 33; Decree No 79-286 of 6.4.1979: Journal officiel de la Republique franfaise, 
8.4.1979. 
4 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 146. 
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Carmaux (Tarn), Decazeville (Aveyron.) and Ales (Gard), all already receiving PDR 
at maximum rate. In taking this favourable decision the Commission took account 
of the small area in question, the deterioration of the socio-economic situation and 
the low intensity of the increased aid granted from FSAI. However, it reminded the 
French Government that FSAI assistance in these four areas would have to be 
granted in accordance' with the relevant conditions, which the Commission 
specified when initiating the procedure in respect of the loans in quasi-equity form. 
Ireland 
173. In May 1980 the Irish Government notified the Commission of the detailed 
plans 1 for the withdrawal of Export Sales Relief and Shannon Relief already 
announced in principle in December 1978. The Commission had made known its 
objections to these aids because they constitute export and operating aid. 
Under Export Sales Relief manufacturing companies eQuId claim relief from 
corporation tax on profits derived from export'Sales for 20 years. The legislation 
governing the system provided that the relief would expire in 1990 regardless of the 
number of years for which a company had benefited. Export Sales Relief was 
available throughout Ireland with the exception of the Shannon Free Airport Zone 
where a similar aid, Shannon Relief, applied. Shannon Relief was available for both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing activities and while it too was to terminate 
in 1990 there was no limitation on the period for which individual companies could 
benefit. I . . 
The plans notified to the Commission provided that the relief would cease to be 
. offered from 1 January 1981. Companies that had already qualified for the relief 
would, however, continue to do so in accordance with the terms of the existing 
legislation. 2 The plans also stated that any further companies offered relief before 
1 January 1981 would be entitled to the benefit of the existing legislation provided 
they had contracted by, 1 July 1981 to commence their projects. 
The Commission decided not to raise any objections under Articles 92 to 94 EEC to 
these plans. In order to be in a position to supervise the transitional arrangements 
the Commission will receive a list of projects where offers of relief have been made 
prior to 1 January 198i but where the investment has not started. 
The notification from, the Irish authorities confirmed that the supplementary 
depreciation allowance of 20% for plant and machinery in the designated, mainly 
1 Contained in Finance Act, 1980. 
2 Principal laws: Finance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956; Finance Act, 1969. 
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western, areas of the country was withdrawn from 1 January 1981. The 
Commission had also objected to this aid as it was not limited to initial investment 
and thus had the character of an operating aid. 
With the elimination of these problems the Commission now expects to be able to 
complete its review of the Irish aid system in 1981. 1 , ' 
Italy 
174, Act No 183 of 2 May 19762 concerning rules on regional aid in Italy, notably 
for the Mezzogiorno, for the five-year period from 1976 to 1980 and the 
implementing Decree No 902 of 9 November 19763 introduced a single fund for 
granting interest relief on loans taken out by industrial firms 4 and set an overall 
limit on the form and intensity of regional aid throughout the entire country. , 
Pursuant, to the 1978 principles of coordination in the Mezzogiorno and the 
Community's other less-,developed regions an aid ceiling of 25% in net 'grant-
equivalent of initial investment or 4 500 ECU per job created by the in'vestment 
applies from 1 January 1981 to aid other than that directly linked to initial 
investment or job creation. In order to make sure that the ceilings are respected, in 
March 1980 the Commission reminded the Italian authorities to take the steps 
required to coordinate assistance, both in relation to the various ministries 
responsible, the central administrative bodies and the administrative bodies in the 
autonomous regions. The latter are entitled to legislate in the field of aids. 
In November 1980 the Italian Go'vernment notified the Commission of the 
definitive demarcation of inadequately developed areas in central and northern 
Italy, which had been drawn up by the Interministerial Committee on Industrial 
Planning (CIPI) as required by Decree No 902. In the course of its constant review 
of existing aid schemes in the Member States pursuant to Article 93(1) EEC the 
Commission will analyse the socio-economic situation of the assisted areas to check 
whether they are compatible with the common market rules of competition. 
1 Principal statute: Industrial Development Act, 1969. 
2 Gazzetta Uf{iciale della Repubblica Italiana No 121, 8.5.1976. 
3 Gazzetta Uf{iciale della Repubblica Italiana No 8,11.1.1977. 
4 Seventh Report on Competition,Policy, point 180. 
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United Kingdom 
175. As part of the Article 93(1) EEC review of UK regional aid 1 and the 
application of the principles of coordination to regional aid schemes the 
Commission stated its views on one of the .scheme's most important measures, the 
Regional Development Grant (RDG) ; a decision will be taken in due course on the 
other measures and the assisted areas. 
The RDG is an investm~nt subsidy; some of its features constitute operating aid in 
that it is granted for all investment (including periodic renewal of plant and 
machinery) as a quasi-automatic item-based scheme. It has been introduced for an 
unlimited period. 
The Commission has aiways been opposed in principle to operating aids which 
neither promote nor facilitate the economic development of regions within the 
meaning of Article 92(3)(a) and (c). If such assistance is given to cover a firm's 
production costs (and n~t to establish, expand or engage in an activity involving a 
fundamental change) it does not bring to the area concerned any lasting increase in 
income or reduction in" unemployment. By favouring certain firms it is likely to 
distort competition in intra-Community trade without making any compensatory 
contribution to regional development. 
Following protracted :discussions between the British authorities and the 
Commission the United Kingdom agreed to amend the RDG by 1984 at the latest so 
as to eliminate its element of operating aid and make it compatible with the rules of 
the common market. . 
The British Government undertook that investment in capital equipment made by 
an existing firm for the purpose of keeping it"in business or maintaining its level of 
business without affecting any basic change would no longer qualify for assistance. 
The Commission will have to be informed in good time of the practical steps taken 
to implement this alteration. 
, I 
However, certain measures will be introduced in 1981: the minimum length of life 
of machines eligible for RDG will be raised from two to four years and the 
minimum value from UKL 500 to UKL 1 000, except, as regards the latter, in ·the 
case of premises where,less than 100 persons are employed. 
1 Principal statutes: Great Britain-Industry Act, 1972, Local Employment Act, 1972, Scottish 
Development Agency Act, 1975, Welsh Development Agency Act, 1975; Northern Ireland-
Industrial Investment (General Assistance) Acts (Northern Ireland), 1966 and 1971, Industrial 
Development Acts, 1966 and 1971, Selective Employment Payment Act, 1966. 
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The Commission decided to raise no objection to the maintenance of the existing 
total volume of UK regional aid, bearing in mind the amendments notified in 1979,1 
on condition that the aid ceilings laid down by the principles of coordination are 
respected and that there is no significant improvement in the socio-economic 
situation of the assisted areas concerned. 
1'76. The Commission also approved the British Government's upgrading of 
certain assisted areas affected by steel redundancies: Scunthorpe in the Yorkshi~e 
and Humberside region, Newport, Pontypool, Port Talbot and Shott on in Wales 
and Corby in the East Midlands. Aid intensity in -these areas was increased as a 
result of the upgrading and in the Scunthorpe, Newport, Pontypool and Corby 
areas the ceilings laid down by the principles of coordination were also exceeded. 
The Commission took into account the fact that these areas are all highly 
dependent on the steel industry (the British Steel Corporation in Shotton and 
. Corby) and their rate of unemployment is above the national and Community 
averages. Moreover, further redundancies are envisaged and the job situation will 
deteriorate further. 
The Commission therefore considered that the planned upgradings were warranted 
and granted a derogation from the principles of coordination for the areas in 
question on condition that the Community aid ceilings for Development Areas in 
Special Development Areas were respected. 
177. Similarly, the Commission raised no objection to a relatively slight 
amendment made by the British Government to its scheme of rent-free factories for 
industrial and trading firms. Prefabricated buildings are made available without 
charge to industrial and commercial firms for periods which vary in accordance 
with the length of time during which the factory in question has remained eqIpty. 
178. Finally, the Commission agreed to an application for derogation from the 
principles of coordination for a regional aid scheme submitted by the British 
Governm~nt, as required by point 7 of the principles. 
The application related to the regional aid scheme applicable in the Scottish 
Highlands and Islands, the part of the country covered by the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board (HIDB).2 The ceiling for aid intensity established by 
the principles of coordination for most of Scotland is 30% of initial investment or 
5 500 ECU per job created provided the amount of assistance does not exceed 40% 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 152. 
2 Development Board set up by the Highlands and Islands Act, 1965. 
COMP. REP. EC 1980 
124 COMPETITION POLICY AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
of investment; in 1975 and in 1978 1 the HIDB had already obtained derogations so 
the aid ceiling expressed.as a percentage of investment could be exceeded. In 1979 
the United Kingdom requested authorization for the HIDB to also increase to 
10 000 ECU the alternative ceiling per job created so that it could help small 
businesses with low investment in fixed assets. 
The Commission scrutinized the socio-economic situation in the area and 
established that, although there had been an improvement in the East, notably on 
account of North Sea oil, it was still experiencing genuine development difficulties 
on account of its peripheral location, harsh physical environment, low population 
in dispersed areas, transport problems, unbalanced industrial structure, outward 
migration and unemployment. 
The Commission also analysed some 20 individual cases of application and noted 
that in the case of establishments with 20 employees or less, whatever their 
circumstances, the effects of the aid 01) competition were extremely slight. 
The Commission therefore decided that the HIDB could grant assistance up to a 
75% ceiling of initial inyestment or 10000 ECU per job created to undertakings 
employing no more than 10 persons; for those employing more than 10, the HIDB 
will have to comply with an aid ceiling of 50% of initial investment or 5500 ECU 
per job created, except in the Nairn, Lerwick and Kirkwalliabour markets in the 
east of the region where the ceilings for Development Areas and. Special 
Development Areas are applicable. The Commission asked the British Government 
to notify in advance any project where fixed investment exceeds 600 000 ECU or 
the rate of assistance exceeds 30%. 
The Netherlands 
179. The Commission stated its views on amendments made by the Dutch 
Government to its aid scheme for Lelystad 2 and its general regional aid scheme 
(Investeringspremieregeling-IPR).3 
The scheme for Lelystad was approved by the Commission in 1974 and introduced 
a premium per job created in this new town, established in Oosterlijk Flevoland, 
the area reclaimed from the sea in the 1960s. The proposed amendment involved an 
increase in the premium and since it was designed merely to compensate for the 
1 Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 170. 
2 Notice No 680/316 of 23.4.1980: Staatscourant No 83, 1980. 
3 Ministerial Notice No 677/341 WJA of 7.6.1977: Staatscourant No 109, 8.6.1977. 
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premium's drop in real value since introduction as a result of inflation, the 
Commission has no reason to object. 
The IPR schemel covers the country's three northern provinces, part of Overijssel 
and Limburg and a number of development poles throughout the rest of the 
country. Aid is awarded as a straight cash grant or as a mixed premium (a cash 
grant and an amount per job created). The proposed amendment would increase 
tlie level of the straight grant from 25% to 35% until the end of 1980 in eight areas 
located in the provinces of Groningen, Drenthe and Limburg; however, the 
Community ceiling set for these areas would be respected whenever ai'd was 
granted. 
In five of the areas concerned (the labour exchange office areas of Winschoten, 
Stadskanaal, Emmen, Coeverden and Oostelijke Mijnstreek in the provinces of 
Groningen, Drentheand Limburg) combined regional aid-including that granted 
under the Investment Account Act2-had already attained the 20% net grant-
equivalent ceiling laid down by the principles of coordination and approved by the 
Commission; however, it'was.decided to raise no objection to the increase since the 
socio-economic situation of these areas still warranted the granting of regional 
assistance and there would be virtually no increase in aid. 
However, the proposed amendment would have led to ail. increase in the labour 
exchange office' areas of Veendam, Delfzijl and Uithuizen. 
The Commission compared the socio-economic situation in these areas with that of 
the rest of The Netherlands (rates of unemployment and industrialization, gross 
regional product, per capita income) and found that it had not worsened in recent 
years. It then scrutinized the intensity of regional aid granted on both sides of the 
German-Dutch border and established that levels were similar or even a little 
higher on the Dutch side. After carrying out a comparative analysis of the areas on 
both sides of the border the Commission noted that, although both areas had 
regionai problems, the socio-economic situation was slightly better on the Dutch 
side. . 
The Commission therefore considered that while maintenance of regional aid in 
these three areas could be' accepted, no increase was warranted. It accordingly 
initiated the procedure of Article 93(2) EEC in respect of the increase, thereby 
suspending introduction of the measures in question. 
1 Eighth'Report on Competition Policy, point 167. 
2 Wet Investeringsrekening (WIR): StaatsbLad No 368,1978; Eighth Report on Competition Policy, 
point 166. 
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§ 3 .....,... Aid schemes for specific industries . 
Aids to shipbuilding 
General 
180. The Fourth Council Directive on aids to shipbuilding 1 came to the end of its 
foreseen period of application on 31 December 1980. It had been introduced in 
1978, when the full gravity of the crisis facing shipbuilding worldwide, and 
particularly in Europe, was becoming apparent. The Directive recognized that the 
Community's shipbuilding industry would need assistance to survive the crisis; but 
at the same time it sought to ensure that the breathing space provided by the aids 
which it authorized was used to restructure· and adapt the industry so that in due 
course it could stand on:its own feet in the world market without aid. It was made a 
requirement therefore that aids should be linked with a national programme of 
restructuring designed to bring capacity more into line with potential demand, and, 
in order to give the yarps an incentive to proceed as quickly as possible with the 
necessary measures, aids were to be progressively reduced over time. The 
Commission also had to assure itself that the granting of aids by individual Member 
States did not distort competition within the Community in this.sector to an extent 
contrary to the common interest. ' 
During the currency of the Fourth Directive a considerable effort was made in most 
Member States to adapt the industry to the new perspectives of the market. 
Employment and output were reduced and shipyards attempted to switch 
production into sectors of the market where demand was least depressed. There 
was a noticeable trend towards an increase in naval shipbuilding in compensation 
for job losses in the merchant sector. In general it. may be claimed that Member 
States have recognized the seriousness of the situation and have given evidence of 
their willingness to take the (often very difficult) decisions which are necessary if 
their industries are to have a viable future. 
Despite these efforts, however, it became clear early in 1980 that market conditions 
in the early years of the new decade would continue to be as difficult as they had 
been in the recent past. The familiar problems of low freight rates, weak demand 
and surplus capacity, with consequent low prices and severe competition from 
third countries, would persist, so that the European industry would still find aid 
indispensable for securing orders and continuing its process of adaptation. The 
t OJ L 98, 11.4.1978. 
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Commission began, therefore, in consultation with representatives of the Member 
States, to elaborate a proposal for a new Directive to take over on the expiry of the 
Fourth, and the proposal was presented to the Council in September~ 1980. 
181. The proposed Fifth Directive! retains the spirit of its predecessor in 
authorizing aids only if they are linked with restructuring proposals and show a 
progressive reduction over time. In assessing the acceptability of an individual 
State's·restructuring programme, the Commission will take account of what has 
been achieved in that State in previous years. It recognizes that reductions of 
capacity and employment effected in recent years as part of restructuring 
programmes have brought the industry of some Member States close to size limits 
below which economic viability could be threatened. It is not to be expected, 
therefore, that in proposing new aid schemes such States could offer restructuring 
plans of the same type and scale as in the past. In these cases, it will be appropriate 
to shift the emphasis of the restructuring requirement from simple contraction to 
other aspects such as regrouping of enterprises, modernization, rationalization of 
production and so forth. 
The main differences between the Fourth Directive and proposed Fifth Directive 
may be regarded as the consequences of a concern which emerged during the period 
of the Fourth Directive that some State interventions which were; in practiCe if not 
by design, forms of aid to shipbuilding, were unfairly escaping the discipline to 
which other forms were submitted. The new proposal seeks to resolve this difficulty 
by adopting a more comprehensive approach which enables the Commission to 
demand that the common objectives, notably in regard to restructuring and 
avoidance of distortion of internal competition, should not be endangered in this 
way. Thus under the proposed Fifth Directive, the Commission would be able to 
consider whether aids to shipowners are, in present conditions, having an effect 
similar to aids to shipbuilding and, if so, to take steps to ensure that they do not 
inhibit restructuring or distort competition. Likewise, if the Commission concludes 
that various types of financial interventions by States which have been in evidence 
in ,recent years (e.g. coverage of losses, contributions to capital reorganization) 
contain elements of aid to shipbuilding, it would be able to examine the position 
with the same end in view. 
The purpose ofthesechanges is to make it clear that the fairness of the Directive 
will not be threatened because aids granted in certain forms or by certain 
mechanisms would be outside its controL 
1 OJ C 261, 8.10.1980. 
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The new proposal mak~s provisions similar to those in the Fourth Directive in 
respect of credit facilitie~ and investment aids. With regard to rescue aids, it aims to 
prevent these being used, at the moment of the taking of an order, as a means to 
exceed the normal maximum limit placed on proquction aid. 
I 
The new Directive shoul,d have been applied from 1 January 1981. However, as the 
Council did not take a decision on the Commission proposition in sufficient time, 
the Commission has proposed that the Fourth Directive be prolonged until 
31 March 1981. 1 
National measures 
I , 
182. 'Several aid scherPes were proposed by indi,vidual Member States to help 




183. The last report 2 outlined the reasons which led the Commission to initiate 
the procedure of Artitle 93(2) of the EEC Treaty in respect of the French 
Government's propose~ aid scheme for shipbuilding during 1979 and 1980. -In 
essence these were that ~he proposed rate of aid, at,30% of the contract price, was 
too high in comparison with the preceding Frerkh scheme and with schemes 
approved for other Member States in 1979, and that the link between the aid and 
the attainment of restriIcturing objectives was inadequate. ' 
J ' I I'
During the course of the procedure, the French Government decided to reduce the 
normal maximum rat~ of aid to 25% while reserving the possibility to seek 
authorization for 30% in exceptional cases. It was also agreed that this 25 % should 
include any aid from y.hich particular contracts might benefit under the price 
guarantee mechanism:(a form of insurance aga~nst cost increases during the 
construction period ofla ship). ' 
Further information ~as also provided on the r~structuring objectives for the 
industry, acceptance of.which by the yards was to be a condition for their receipt of 
aid. In particular, the French Government stressed the reductions of productive 
capacity and employm~nt envisaged during the p¢riod of the scheme and in the 
early 1980s. The Commission had reservations about the French Government's 
1 OJ L 43, 14.2.1981-
2 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 157. 
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policy of keeping in being all the large shipyards since, in its view, the reduced 
throughflow of orders these yards could expect would result in an increased burden I 
of fixed charges per contract and would militate against competitivity. 
Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that it could terminate the Article 93(2) 
EEC procedure on condition that the aid was used to secure a volume of orders not 
exceeding the restructuring objectives set by. the French Government. The 
Commission also made it clear that the scheme could apply only to orders taken 
between 27 ·September 1979 (the date of provision of full information on the 
scheme) and 31 December 1980. . 
184. The Commission closed the procedure of Article 93(2) which it had opened 
earlier against a proposed production aid for the construction of four ships for a 
Polish owner. The Commission opened the procedure .because the aid proposed 
~xceeded very significantly the level regarded as the normal maximum for 
production aids at this period (25%), and because no extraordinary restruct\~ring 
effort seemed to be proposed to accompany this exceptional aid. After considering 
the observations of the French Government, in particular those concerning the 
restructuring already undertaken in the two yards concerned and the precarious 
position in which they would be placed without these orders, the Commission 
· decided that the level of production aid which could be authorized in exceptional 
circumstances under the Fourth Directive (30% of the contract price) could be 
granted. 
It therefore closed the procedure on this condition. This decision meant that a 
· considerable proportion of the aid proposed could not be granted, at least in the 
form originally intended (production aid). The French Government had argued in 
its notification that that part of the aid which exceeded the normal maximum 
should be regarded as a rescue aid and not a production aid. The Commission did 
not accept this argument and it was in fact problems of this kind which led to the 
· proposal of a more explicit deficition of rescue aids for the Fifth Directive. 
The Commission indicated, however, that a proposal from the French Governri1ent 
to grant these yards a rescue aid in some other form under Article 5 of the Directive 
would be considered on its merits. 
185. The Commission opened the· Article 93(2) procedure in respect of a 
proposed aid for the construction of four container vessels in a French yard. Again 
the reason was that the rate of aid was well in excess of the maximum allowed for 
by the Commission in its approval of the aid scheme described above. The French 
Government argued that the order was necessary to maintain a minimum viable 
level of activity at the recipient yard. The Commission felt, however, that the 
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exceptionally high level of aid proposed required a fuller and more detailed 
justification. The procedure remained open at the end of the year. 
Italy 
186. The Italian Government's aid scheme under law No 231 of 1978 was 
described in a previous l report. 1 It applied to orders taken in the period up to 
30 September 1978. The Commission had approved the scheme subject to an aid 
ceiling of 30% of the contract price, selective use of the aid to promote adaptation 
of the industry and notification of each individual case. The cases of application of 
this law mentioned below were considered during the year. 
187. The Commission closed an Article 93(2) EEC procedure in respect of one 
case. The procedure had been opened principally because the level of aid proposed 
exceeded the limit of. 30% of the contract price. The Italian Government, in 
presenting its observations on the opening of the procedure, indicated that the yard 
which was'to benefit from' the aid was undertaking an extensive restructuring 
programme aimed at converting almost half of its workforce to non-shipbuilding 
activities. It showed that substantial progress had been made with this programme 
and that the order in qu~stion was important if continuation of this progress was 
not to be threatened. In t~e circumstances, the Commission concluded that it would 
be justified in approving the maximum aid of 30%. As with the French case 
discussed above, however, the Commission did not accept the argument that the 
part of the aid in excess of 30% should be regarded as a rescue aid and authorized 
under Article 5 of the Qirective. 
188. During the year, the Commission approved 15 cases of application of the aid 
scheme under law No 231. However, in respect of afurther 51 cases, (49 of which 
were notified simultaneously), it initiated the Article 93(2) EEC procedure. In the 
majority of these cases,: the aid proposed exceeded 30% of the contr~ct price. 
Further, this aid, when added to that previously disbursed under the scheme, took 
the total beyond the budgetary allocations for the s~heme originally notified by the 
Italian Government. 
The total tonnage of orders aided under law No 231 likewise exceeded the forecasts 
originally discussed with the Commission. The Commission also considered that, 
since the aids had been notified up to two years after the taking of the contracts to 
which they referred (to qualify for aid under law No 231, contracts had to be 
1 Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 186. 
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concluded between April 1977 and September 1978), assessment of the economic 
effe~ts of these aids at the moment of their influence on the market had been 
rendered impossible. Finally, the Commission noted an apparently systematic 
absence of invitations to yards in other Member States to tender for orders placed 
by Italian shipowners. The Italian Government again advanced the argument that 
in regard to some of the orders, part of the aid (up to 30%) should be regarded as 
production aid under Article 6 of the Directive and the rest as rescue aid under 
Article 5. It also stated, that high levels of aid were needed because in the period 
between the taking of orders and the actual payment of aid, the real value of the aid 
had been eroded by inflation and by the high interest costs which Italian yards had 
to pay for bridging finance. The apparent exceeding of the original forecasts of 
orders to be taken was explained by the fact that about half of the vessels aided were 
not new orders but had been under construction, on the yard's own initiative, when 
the law was introduced. The combination of these factors, it was argued, 
necessarily entailed the increasing of the original budgetary allocations for the 
scheme. The procedure remained open at the end of the year. , 
189., The Italian Government put forward a new shipbuilding aid scheme under 
law No 122 of 1980. This was to apply to contracts taken in 1979 and 1980 and, 
like its predecessor, was presentedas an interim measure pending the adoption by 
the Itali;lfl Parliament of a restructuring plan for the industry. ' 
The scheme proposed production aid to a maximum level of 30%, the precise 
amount to be determined in each case by means of criteria derived from the type of 
ship, the delivery period and the particular situation of the'yard taking the order. 
The budget for the scheme was LIT 110 000 million, spread over the two years. 
The Commission decided to initia~e the procedure of Article 93(2) of the Treaty in 
respect of this proposal, for the following reasons. The level of aid was higher than 
that authorized for other Member States whose aid schemes had recently been 
approved. There was no clear link between the granting of aid and the achievement 
of restructuring objectives; since the restructuring plan developed by the Italian 
Government had not been approved by Parliament, it had no official status and it 
was not clear that the targets it established would be worked towards in return for 
the aid. Finally, the scheme was notified to the Commission early in 1980, aithough 
its period of application also covered the previous year; the Commission felt that 
the retrospective approval for a period of over a year which it was being asked to 
give could not be justified unless exceptional grounds could be demonstrated. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
190. The Federal German Government sought the Commission's approval for the 
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extension of its aid scheme for a further year, up to the end of 1981. As indicated in 
the last Report, 1 the scheme had originally been designed to cover the three years 
1979 to 1981, but the Commission had approved it only up to 31 December 1980, 
the date of expiry of the Fourth Directive: The main features of the proposals for 
1981 were as described in the last Report: budgetary allocation reduced from 
DM 240 million to DM 180 million; maximum aid level reduced from 20% of 
contract price to 15% ~nd average aid from 10% to 7Y2%. 
I 
After consultation with the other Member States, the Commission decided to 
approve this extension. Since the scheme was to apply in the year 1981 and would 
therefore be in operation during the proposed period of validity of the Fifth 
Directive, the Commission took account, in its assessment, of the general principles 
of that document. Its approval was given provisionally, on the assumption that the 
proposed Fifth Directive would in time be adopted by the Council. 
In coming to its decision~ the Commission was influenced by the relatively low rates 
of aid proposed (which were degressive as compared with earlier years) and by the 
fact that the scheme was, to last for only one year. It also took into account the fact 
that the restructuring programme proposed for the German shipbuilding industry 
when the scheme was approved in 1979 had been largely implemented and had 
indeed in some respects (notably reduction of hours worked) proceeded at a faster 
rate than originally foreseen. The German Government's assurance that it would 
monitor the industry's progress towards achievement of the targets set for 
workforce reduction by 1982 enabled the Commission to accept that there was an 
adequate link between I the proposed aid and the further restructuring of the 
industry. The Commission asked to be informed of the results of the scheme and it 
reserved the right to fix a lower aid limit for smaller ships (under 6000 grt) if 
evidence emerged that the scheme was causing particular distortions of 
competition in that sector of the market. 
Ship repairing 
191~ The last Competition Report2 outlined the problems faced by the ship-
repair sector in the Community, as these had been analysed in the report submitted 
by the Commission to the Council on November 1979. An important conclusion of 
this study was that, in the existing market conditions, production aid should not be 
authorized for ship-repair undertakings. Ad hoc crisis aids might be considered if 
there were exceptional reasons for doing so, but if granted, such aid should be 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 158. 
2 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 161. 
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required to be linked to a, restructuring programme leading to capacity reductions. 
During the year, the Commission received notification from two Member States, 
Italy and Belgium, of proposals to provide aid to their ship-repairing industry. 
Italy 
192. The Italian proposal provided for a production aid of up to 15% of the 
contract price of repair or conversion work commenced in 1979 or 1980. The level 
of. aid in such individual cases would be determined in accordance with criteria 
which had n~t yet'been established when the proposal was notified; the highest 
rates, however, were to be reserved for undertakings located in the Mezzogiorno. 
The budget' for the scheme was LIT 25 000 million, spread over the two years. The 
Italian Government considered that the scheme was necessary because competition 
from third countries ·in the Mediterranean was endangering the survival of the 
~talian ship-repair industry. ' 
The Commission opened the Article 93(2) EEC procedure inrespect of this scheme. 
Consultations with other Member States had shown a general opposition to the 
extension of production aids to this sector, thus confirming the Commission's view 
as described in the Report to the Council mentioned above. The lack of any 
restructuring programme in return the aid also made it impossible to justify the 
scheme in the terms of the Report to the Council. The Commission considered in 
addition that it had not been proved that ship repair in the Mediterranean area 
could be considered as a separate entity which was subject to particular pressures 
and isolated from the rest of the market jon the contrary ship repairing was to be 
regiuded as a single market throughout the Community, so that the Italian 
proposals would distort competition with the industries of other Member States. 
Belgium 
193. The Belgian Government informed the Commission of its intention to 
provide aid for the ship-repair industry in Antwerp. The two main ship-repair 
companies in Antwerp, which between them account for ,about 90% of all ship-
repair work done in Belgium, have been experiencing a falling turnover in recent 
years, largely because their prices have become uncompetitive with those of ship 
repairers at other major ports in the region. Wage costs represent a major problem 
for these companies because of the 'agreed work-force' or 'contingent' system, 
under which workers who are part of the contingent receive a high proportion of 
their normal wage at times when their services are not required. Furthermore, the 
practice of employing, at full wage,'stand-by' workers who may have no work to 
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do produces a further burden on the costs of the firms. The duplication of services 
offered by the two cottipanies creates an element of inefficiency in the situation. 
It was therefore proposed to set in motion a plan to reduce the agreed workforce, 
discontinue the stand-by system and so reduce the variable costs falling on the 
firms. Voluntary early retirement was to be introduced for workers aged 55 agd 
over. Salaries and wages were to be reduced and efforts were to be made to increase 
the range of skills and the flexibility of the workers. A more thoroughgoing 
cooperation between the two enterprises was proposed (in the event, a merger was 
effected) to ensure a more rational utilization of plant and installations and to 
reduce fixed costs and administrative overheads. The aid which was intended to 
accompany this programme of reorganization consisted of a loan for one of the 
firms of BFR 200 million from the Natiorial Industrial Credit Corporation at 
market rates over 15 ye~rs (with a 5-year grace period); a further loan, to the single 
enterprise resulting from the merger, on the same terms, with the amount to be 
determined; and interest relief grants (given in exchange for convertible bonds 
issued by the companies) to cover all the interest of these loans. Negotiations were 
also to be undertaken with the firm's creditors with a view to deferring repayments 
of existing debts for fiv:e years. 
The Commission opened the Article 93(2) EEC procedure because it lacked the 
information to decide whether the proposed aid could be considered compatible 
with the common market. In particular it required further data on the future 
prospects of the industry in Antwerp and the trends in the trade of the port. It was 
therefore not in a position to assess what employment-level ship repairing in 
Antwerp was likely to 'be able to support nor whether the 'agreed workforce' 
foreseen was in line with the real 'requirements of the enterprise. . 
Iron and steel (applic"!tion of the ECSC and EEC Treaties) 
194. On 1 February 1980 the Commission adopted Decision No 257/S0/ECSC 
establishing Community rules for specific aids to the steel in~ustry.l At the same 
time and in accordance with the agreed view of the Council and the Commission on 
the need for all aid to steel to be subject to a coherent Community discipline, the 
Commission took action to ensure that non-specific aids (i.e .. aids not falling within 
the definition of Article 1 (2) of the Decision) would be subject to the same appraisal 
criteria and examination procedures as'apply in the case of specific aids. The legal 
basis for this latter action was a combined application of Articles 67 of the ECSC 
Treaty and 92 and 93 of the EEt Treaty. The Commission accordingly informed 
1 OJ L 29,6.2.1980. 
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the Member States that they should notify to it all individual proposals for non-
specific aid in advance of their implementation. The last Report described these 
new rules in detail. 1 
In.the course of the year the Commission took a position on aid proposals notified 
by Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. A number of 
other notifications were also. received and, apart from one which had been 
withdrawn; are still being examined. 
195. In its examination of these aids the Commission's principal concern was to 
ensure the· achievement of the two objectives of the aids 'discipline', i.e. that aid 
makes a genuine contribution to the restructuring of the industry and that it doe~ 
not cause unwarranted distortions of competition. . 
Investment aids 
196. The new rules establish the following criteria for appraisals of investment 
aids: 
(i) the investment programme must have been notified to the Commission for an 
opinion pursuant to Article 54 of the ECSC Treaty; 
(ii) the investment programme must take account of the general criteria for the 
restructuring of the steel industry and of the general objectives for steel; and 
(iii)the amount and intensity of the aid must be justified by the extent of the 
restruc'turing effort involved, account being taken of any structural problems in 
the region concerned. 
L:'~11·.~ ;_i!';~ '.:,,~:::,~i.:{.~,~:~,:~;" ::" , 
The criteria were applied in the case of aids for investment programmes in the 
Fede~al Republic of Germany and in Italy. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
197. The Commission was notified of an aid for a project to restructure and 
modenlize a steelworks at Dortmund ,by replacing open-hearth furnaces by an 
oxygen plant and ail associated continuous caster. The capacity of the new plant 
would be two-thirds of that of the open-hearth furnaces and the technology 
adopted would permit a substantially higher than normal scrap input as wdl as 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, points 165 to 170. 
COMP. REP. EC 1980 
136 COMPETmON POllCY AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
reduced energy consumption. There would be important reductions in employment 
at the works. The Commission gave a favourable opinion on this investment 
programme. 
The aid for this project would be in the form of a loan at a reduced rate of interest 
from the Federal and Land Governments. The net grant equivalent of the aid was 
estimated by the Commission to be of the order of 12 %. The Federal and Land 
Governments would re'ceive a share of any revenue from the licensing of the 
technology. ' 
Given the importance of the modernization and the extent of the capacity reduction 
for liquid steel as well as the existence of certain structural problems in the area 
concerned, the Commission considered that this aid conformed to the criteria set 
out above and accordingly decided not to raise any objections to its 
implementation. 
Italy 
198. The Italian Government informed the Commission of its intention to assist 
restructuring investment by the steel industry (including the restructuring of a steel 
works near Naples) by using existing general and regional aid regimes. 
Regional aid would be available in the Mezzogiorno in the form of grants at a rate 
of 20% on the basis of law No 183 of 2 May 1976 1 while general aid would be 
provided under law No 675 of 12 August 19772 in the form of interest relief grants 
or loans of up to 15 years with a 5-year grace period for up to 50% of investment 
costs. These interest relief grants would reduce the rate of interest to 30% of the 
reference rate. The com~ined net grant equivalent of these aids is estimated at 38%. 
The Commission examined this proposal in. two parts. First, as regards the 
restructuring of the ste'elworks near Naples, which involved the installation of 
continuous casting equipment, the modernization of the works' heavy-section mill 
and the construction of a hot-wide-strip mill, the Commission ,had given a 
favourable opinion under Article 54 of the ECSC Treaty. In view of the importance 
of the restructuring programme, of its compatibility with the Community's 
restructuring policy and of the location of the works in an area of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno suffering from' serious structural problems, the Commission 
considered that aids of this intensity were justifiable and accordingly decided not to 
raise any objection to their implementation. 
1 Seventh Report on Competition Policy, point 180. 
2 Seventh Report on Compctition Policy, poi)Jts 225 to 228. 
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Second, as regards the use of these aid systems· to assist other steel investment 
programmes, the Commission was unable to examine whether these aids met the 
criteria set out above in the absence of information on the projects that the Italian 
Government intended to support. This problem was explained to the Italian 
authorities, who in consequence undertook to notify in advance the other 
individual cases of application to steel of the aid regimes in question. Accordingly, 
the Commissi~n considered that this second part of the original notificat!on did not ' 
call for any further action at this stage. 
Aid to continued operation 
Denmark 
199. The Danish Government notified the Commission of its intention to 
introduce legislation empowering it to provide aid to a steel conipany to enable the 
latter to finance the final stages of a major restructuring programme involving a 
reduction in the capacity of the steelworks. Some aid for this programme had 
already been provided in 1978 but this had proved to be insufficient to resolve the 
company's difficulties in financing the restructuring, a failure attributed to the fact 
that the price of ferrous scrap (the company's main raw material) had risen ~ore 
rapidly in relation to steel prices than had been expected in 1978. 
The new aid to the company would be in the form of a participatory loan of 
DKR 108 million. This is a long-term unsecured loan which would be remunerated 
at a rate of interest equal to the rate of dividend on share capital up to 1985 and 
would thereafter bear a market rate of interest. 
The Commission had for some time had some reservations about the company's 
restructuring plan, in particular because it did not consider it sufficiently far-
reaching to secure its long-term competitiveness. Following discussions with the 
Danish authorities on the aid proposal, the Danish Government gave an 
undertaking to ensure the closure of the company's medium-section mill by 30 June 
1982 at the latest. In view of this undertaking the Commission was in a position 
fully to approve the restructuring programme. For this reason and in view also of 
the restructuring investment which the company had to carry out in the period up 
to 1985 the Commission considered that the aid could be considered an integral 
part of an approved restructuring programme. It was moreover of limited duration 
and of reasonable intensity and amount. In this latter connection it should be noted 
that the aid formed part of a total financial package ofDKR 450 million, the rest of 
which was to be provided by the shareholders and the banks. 
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, 
Accordingly, the Commission decided that the aid conformed to the criteria of 
Article 4 of Decision No 257/S0/ECSC and did not raise any objection to its 
implementation. 
Aid programme for the Belgian steel industry 
, ' 
200. In November 1980 the Belgian Government informed the Commission ofa 
number of aid decisions it had taken in the course of the year. The aids notified fall 
into four categories: 
(i) Aids for' strategic' investment programmes 
These are the more important investment programmes, involving a total capital 
expenditure of about BFR 22 000 million, and would be aided on the basis of the 
economic expansion laws of 17 July 19591 and 30 December 1970. 2 Nearly all of 
these investment programmes had been notified to the Commission for an opinion 
pursuant to Article 54 of the ECSC Treaty: (In two cases the expenditure was below 
the notification threshold of EVA:S million.) The following aids would be' granted: 
(a) an interest relief gr~nt of 7 percentage points for five years, with three years 
deferred amortization for three-quarters of, project costs, or an equivalent 
capital grant; 
(b) State guarantees for loans ranging in most cases from 50 to 60% of project 
costs; and 
(c) accelerated depreciation and ~xemptlon for three years fro~ the 'piecompte 
immobilier' (rates)." , 
The net grant equivalent of these aids varies from project to project between 14% 
and 17.5% as a percentage of fixed asset costs. ' 
(ii) Aids for 'minor' in~estment programmes 
These aids would be in the form of interest relief grants and State guarantees of up 
to,100% of expenditure. The aid intensity would not differ greatly from that for,the 
strategic programmes. These programmes had not been notified for an opinion 
under Article 54 ECSC since they were below the notification threshold. Total 
investment expenditure, was of the order of BFR 3 500 million; 
1 First Report on Competiti~n Policy, points 184 to' 18/? , , '." 
2 'Second Report on Competition Policy, points 90 and 116 to 118 ; Fifth Report on Competition Policy, 
point 135. ' 
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(iii) Emergency aids 
These were State guarantees for 15-yea~ loans at a market rate of interest and were 
required in order. to avoid the bankruptcy of three important steel companies. The 
total guaranteed was about BFR 2 000 million. These aids had already been granted 
at the time of notification. 
(iv) Social 'aids 
These aids had been given during the first half of the year in particular to finance 
payments in respect of early retirements and redundancies and were in the form·of 
interest-free loans for an amount of BFR 1 500 million. They were granted on the 
basis of agreements reached in June 1978 between the government, the employers 
and the unions. 
201. The Commission examined the conformity of these aids with the new rules 
for aid to stee1. Since the Belgian aids were applications of general and regional aid 
schemes and were to be granted on the normal conditions of these regimes they 
were in principle non-specific aids. Accordingly they fell to be examined under the 
combined application of Articles 67 of the ECSC Treaty and 92 and 93 of the EEC 
Treaty, but on the basis of the criteria of Decision No 257/80/ECSC. 
The Commission examined the investment aids in the context in particular of the 
restructuring plan for the Belgian steel industry. The aided investment programmes 
taken as a whole ,would result in an increase in 'production capacity even after 
taking account of the associated closures decided upon by the undertakings. 
Furthermore, there were serious doubts concerning the effectiveness of the 
restructuring plan in restoring the financial viability of the industry in the future. 
For these reasons the Commission considered that the investment aids did not meet 
the criteria of either Article 2 (for the 'strategic' investment programmes not 
notified and for the 'minor' investment programmes). 
For the emergency aids, the undertakings in question were all important sources of 
employment in areas suffering from regional problems. The Commission 
accordingly considered that they were required in order to cope with acute social 
difficulties pending the implementation of the restructuring plan. In view of their 
minimal intensity, it therefore raised no objection to these aids. 
However, the Commission learned that the Belgian Government had, without any 
notification, provided further guarantees for loans of up to BFR 1 500 million for 
undertakings of the 'Triangle de Charleroi'. In view of the effects that further 
emergency' aids of this amount could have on the steel market the Commission 
considered that this case should be examined more thoroughly, in particular so as 
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to ensure that the aids ~ould contribute to the attainment of a better equilibrium 
between supply and demand. 
I , 
As regards the social aids, the new rules provide for compatibility provided they are 
linked to total or partial closures. The Member States are required to submit 
detailed half-yearly reports on aids granted for this purpose (Article 3). The 
Commission therefore raised no objection to these aids but requested the Belgian 
Government to supply, the information in the form provided for in Decision 
No 257/80/ECSC. 
For these reasons the Commission initiated'the procedure of Article 93(2) of the 
EEC Treaty in respect of the investment aids and of the emergency aids for the 
undertakings of the 'Triangle de Charleroi'. 
The Commission also reminded the Belgian Government of its obligations as 
regards prior notification of all aids and requested it to confirm that it would in 
future respect this procedure. 
Textiles and clothing ! 
202. The general principles that guide the Commi~sion in its appraisals of aids to 
the textiles and clothing'industry have been described in previous Reports. 1 During 
the year the Commis!,ion applied these principles to aid schemes in The 
Netherlands and in Belgium and to the French aid scheme financed by a quasi-fiscal 
charge, which is discussed in a subsequent section of this Report. 2 ' 
The Netherlands: cotton and allied textiles and wool 
203. The effects of loy.r-priced imports from outside the Community (a general 
problem for the textiles and clothing industry) are particularly acute in the cotton 
and allied textiles sector; these imports concern both final products and yard and 
cloth, so that productioh and employment in the sector have fallen sharply in ·the 
Community where intra-Community competition is also intense. In The 
Netherlands employme~t in the sector fell from 28 000 to 16000 between 1974 and 
1978, and production capacities also declined substantially. (In other Member 
States the rate of decline has been of a similar order of magnitude.) Since 1975, and 
! 
1 First Report on C~mpetition Policy, point 171; Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 222 and 
ill. I ' 
2 Points 210 and 211. 
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thus coinciding with this period of decline; .The Netherlands cotton and allied 
textiles sector has been the beneficiary of three aid schemes, which were described 
in previous Reports, 1 designed to promote its modernization and restructuring. As 
a result of these schemes the sector has received aid in the form of grants and loans 
to a total of HFL 139million. 
The wool sector suffers from similar difficulties although perhaps in a rather less 
acute form. Its rate of decline in The Netherlands does not appear to be very 
different from that in other Member States, but employment has fallen sharply 
(from 6 000 in 1975 to 3 700 in 1979) as a result of major restructuring in the sector. 
This restructuring has been aided by the Netherlands Government under a 1975 aid 
scheme, 2 as a result of which the sector received loans and grants totalling HFL 
12.3 million. 
204. The Netherlands Government informed the Commission of a new aid 
scheme that it proposed to introduce to promote further modernizatio~ of these 
sectors and to encourage exports. The new scheme, with a budgetary allocation of 
HFL 30 million, would provide aid in the form of grants at a rate of 20% of costs for 
the purchase of new equipment, for the installation and displacement of equipment 
and for modifications to buildings. In . addition, grants at a rate of 40% (with a 
maximum of HFL 20000 per undertaking) would be available for costs incurred in 
participating in overseas trade fairs and at a rate of 50% of the costs of employing 
an expert to implement an export promotion policy . 
. The Commission was concerned that the aids granted by the Netherlands 
Government to the textile industry, and in particular those for the cotton and allied 
textiles sector, were assuming the character of production aid. Both the sectors 
concerned by the new scheme had already received significant aids under the earlier 
schemes and could be regarded as having been restructured and modernized. The 
scope for further modernization was very limited indeed and there did not therefore 
appear to be any justification for aid for this purpose. If the earlier aid schemes had 
not restored the sector's competitiveness it was improbable that the new scheme 
could· do so. To authorize the grant of further aid in these circumstances to sectors 
which were technically better equipped than most of their competitors in the other 
Member States would serve only to increase this disparity and would run the risk 
that other Member States might feel obliged to intervene in support of their 
industries, thus leading to an upbidding of aid levels. 
1 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 110 and 111; Sixth Report on Competition Policy, 
points 227 and 228, Seventh Report on Competition Policy, point 205 ; Ninth Report on Competition 
Policy, point 177. 
2 Fifth Report on Competition Policy, points 110 and 111. 
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The Commission was al$o concerned that the aids to encourage exporting would 
have a particularly adverse effect on competition and trade between Member States 
in these sectors. Moreover these aids would be contrary to the Commission's 
constantly reaffirmed position that export aids for intra-Community trade are 
incompatible with the common market. 1 
The Commission therefore decided to initiate the procedure of Article 93 (2) EEC in 
respect of this proposed: aid scheme. 
I 
Belgium· 
205. In April 1980 the Commission decided to reopen the procedure of 
Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty in respect of a Belgian aid scheme designed to 
maintain employment inithe textiles and clothing industry, during the preparation 
of a restructuring plan. 2 This procedure had originally been opened in 1978 on the 
grounds that the link between the aid and the restructuring of the industry was not 
sufficiently close for the former to be considered other than a production aid, and 
therefore as contrary·to the Commission's general principles on aid to the textiles 
and clothing industry. 
I 
Following a number of modifications to the scheme ·and in particular an 
undertaking by th~ Belgian Government. to supply to it an outline restructuring 
plan for the industry by 15 April 1979, the Commission decided that the aid could 
be assimilated to an aid for restructuring. Given that the modifications to the 
scheme meant that the aids would be in line with the general principles for aid to the' 
industry, the Commission accordingly decided in March 1979 to close this 
procedure. 
However, in the event tIle preparation of the restructuring plan proved to be much 
slower than expected and the Belgian authorities were unable to respect the 
deadline for its submission to the Commission. After first granting an extension to 
this deadline, the Commission felt that the continued grant of a production aid 
could no longer be justified in view of the delay in restructuring the industry. The 
Commission reopened the procedure of Article 93(2) EEC in April 1980 giving the 
Belgian Government up :to 31 July 1980 either to supply the detailed restructuring 
plan or to abolish the aid scheme. 
I . 
The Belgian Governmertt submitted a restructuring plan within this deadline, and 
the details of this plan were discussed with the Belgian authorities. The 
1 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, points 241 to 245. 
2 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, points 174 and 175. 
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Commission was still examining the plan at the end of the year in the light of the 
additional inform~tionsupplied during these discussions. 
Car industry 
206.' . Economic developments on the car market have led to'a worsening in the 
competitive 'position of some European car manufacturers, and shown up 
structural weaknesses in the Community car industry as compared with its 
competitors in certain non-Community countries. There is a general need for 
structural 'adaptation and adjustment,on a large scale in some cases, if the 
competitiveness of the European car industry as a whole' is to be maintained. 
The Commission has made arrangements to keep the development of the market 
under-review. It remains of the opinion that ultimately it rests with the firms 
themselves' to make the effort required to achieve the structural adaptation 
demanded by market developments. It is prepared, nevertheless, to make 
appropriate use of the rules laid down by the Treaty and in secondary legislation in 
order to support the industry's efforts, particularly by creating a favourable 
environment which allows the industry to take full advantage of the Community 
market and to meet the challenges of competition from non-Community countries. 
Thus from' the point of view of competition the Commission is prepared to 
recognize the value of certain forms of cooperatIon between undertakings, and of 
certain strictly necessary and temporary aid schemes at the close of which the 
recipient firm should once again.be able to compete normally in the market. 
It is this approach which has guided the Commission in its assessment of the 
natioqal projects submitted to it. 
Belgium· 
207. The Belgian Government informed the Commission of its intention to assist 
a car firm located in the Antwerp region. After the Commission had studied the 
project, the Belgian authorities agreed to confine financial assistance to the 
environmental improvements provided for in the project. The main improvement 
proposed here was in the firm's painting shops, for which a grant of 15% of 
qualifying expendirure may be given. The Commission authorized this assistance 
under the terms of the Community approach to State aids in environmental 
matters. 
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United Kingdom 
208. In January 1980 the British Government, since 1975 the main shareholder In 
British Leyland Ltd, informed the Commission that it wished to increase the capital 
of the company, under the 1980-85 corporate plan. The increase would amount to 
UKL 300 million; UKL 225 million would be accounted for by the balance of the 
total assistance authorized by the Commission. The British authorities further 
proposed to grant assistance of UKL 130 million for the reorganization needed over 
the period 1981-83. 
In its assessment of the c~se the Commission took the view that the assistance could 
be considered ·compatible with the Treaty, as it was aimed at accelerating the 
structur~l adjustments undertaken by the firm. The firm was in the course of 
making major changes i~ its product range, which were essential if it was to return 
to a sound footing, and during the period 1981-83 it would have to bear the 
additional financial burden of speeding up its rationalization operations. , 
The Netherlands 
209. In 1977, the Dutch authorities increased their stake in Volvo Car BV from 
25% to 45%. With the Commission's agreement they also granted the firm a range 
of aids towards rationalization and reorganization measures. 
In January 1980 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention 
to grant Volvo Car BV a further HFL 155 million in the form of grants or debt 
write-offs. . . 
In its assessment of the measure the Commission found thanhe agreement between· 
Volvo Car BV and AB Volvo, Sweden, concluded at the same time as the proposal 
for public assistance was notified, was aimed at consolidation, particularly through 
the adjustment of production capacity and the development of the product range, 
and thus at achieving normal viability for the Dutch firm. 
In its decision, therefore, the Commission took the view that given the objectives 
announced, the Dutch authorities, in granting public funds to the firm, were acting 
essentially iri their' capacity as· shareholders jointly with the other shareholders, 
who were taking parallel measures. 
I 
The Commission also to,ok account of the fact that the aid was intended to help put 
the final touches to the rationalization and reorganization operation which the 
Commission had approved in 1977. 
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Aids financed by quasi-fiscal charges 
France: textiles and clothing 
210. In 1965 the French' Government introduced an ~id scheme for the textiles 
and clothing industry financed by two quasi-fiscal charges. One of these charges 
wds levied on the turnover of French companies in the clothing sector and was 
allocated to the ,sector's Technical Ceritre, which makes studies and carries out 
research of general interest to the undertakings in the sector. It should be noted that 
the base for this charge was production in France and that imports :were not subject 
to it. The second quasi-fiscal charge was levied on the textile industry in the same 
way and 'at the same time as value-added tax (VAT). The product of the cha;ge was 
used both to finance the sector's technical centres and to grant aid directly to 
undertakings, especially to those of small and medium size, for restructuring, 
modernization and re~equipment. '. 
In 1969 the Commission adopted a decision requiring the FrenchGovernment to 
modify the financing mechanism for the second of these charge~ so ,as to exclude 
imports from the other Member States from the tax base. 1 While it had no 
objection to the aid scheme as such, the Commission considered that the method of 
financing the scheme which required the competitors of the French ind4stry .to 
contribute, to aid granted to it in proportion to their success in penetrating the 
French. market had a protective effect contrary to the common interest. 2 The 
French Government's. appeal against this decision to the Court of Justice was 
rejected by the, latter. 3 Following this judgment the French Government informed 
the Commission that it had abandoned its practice of levying the charge on 
products imported from the other Member States.' 
211. In October 1979 the French Government informed the Commission that it 
had decided to modify the firiancing system by abolishing the quasi-fiscal charge on 
the turnover of the clothing industry and extending the charge levied with V AT to 
clothing products, again excluding imports from the other Member States. The 
products of the new single charge would be distributed between the two sectors, but 
precise de,tails on their shares and on the forms to be taken by the aid had not yet 
1 First Report on Competition' Policy, poi~ts 182 and 183. . , ' 
2 For the Commission's general position on quasi-fiscal charges see First Report on Competition 
Policy, point 181, Second Report on Competition Policy, points 108 to 111, and Third Report on 
Competition Policy, points 102 to 104. 
3 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 25.6.1970 in Case 47/69: OJ C 97,29.7.1970. 
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I 
been determined. Both d;le aid scheme and the quasi-fiscal charge posed problems 
of compatibility with th'e common market. 
I 
For the aid scheme, the Commission noted that the 'aid for modernization and re-
equipment had been gra:nted continuously since 1965 with only a short break in 
1975 and 1976 and would, under the new proposals, continue until 1984. While the 
Commission could accept that tt;mporary aid for. the modernization and re-
equipment of the texqlbindustry was justified, it considered .that there .was ~ 
serious risk that the cont~inued grant of such aid over a long period would be likely 
to assist normal replacement investment and thus al1lount to an operating subsidy. 
As such it would be cohtrary .to the principl~s the Commission had developed 
regarding aid to the text~le industry. Accordingly, the Commission deCided that it 
could only authorize the grant of aid for this .purpose for a further three ye,ars. 
For the quasi-fiscal chatge, the fact that imports from the other Member States 
were not taxed at the frtintier was not sufficient to ensure that these imports were 
not subject to the charg~ at the following stage, sin~e the charge was levied in the 
same way as V AT. The C;:ommission had already required the French Government 
to modify its quasi-fiscal charge on the clock and watchmaking industry. 1 
.' I . . 
In that case the French Government had agreed not only to exempt imports from 
the other Member State$ from the charge at the frontier, but also to reiinburse to 
the importer the tax pa'id at the subsequent stage', This arrangement had been 
possible because of the c6ncentration of the industry in one locality. For the textile 
and clothing industry, ~hich is' dispersed around France, it did not seem that such 
an arrangement could b;e administered. It therefore appeared to' the Commission 
that the form of the cha~ge would therefore have to be modified so that it was no 
longer charged in the s4me way as V AT. ' ' . ' 
I 
For these reasons the Co'mmission decided to initiat~ the procedure of Article 93 (2) 
EEC in respect of the French Government's proposals. At the same time it decided 
to examine whether the existing quasi-fiscal charges effectively exempted intra-
Community imports as required by the decision it: has taken in 1969. ' 
, ! . . . 
Following the initiatio~ of this procedure the Freflch Government withdrew its 
proposals. For the existi,ng charge, the French Government was, moreover, unable 
to demonstrate that it Had effectively abided by the ComII].ission's 1969 decision. 
After first giving the Fr~nch Government four weeks within which to modify the 
basis on which this ch:arge was levied, the Commission decided· to bring this 
infringement of its obligations by the French Government before the Court of 
Justice. ; 
1 Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 217. 
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§ 4 - General aid schemes 
212. General aid schemes have presented specific problems to -the Commission 
from a control point of view. For reaso.ns which have been explained in previous 
Reports 1 the Commission is unable to take a definite position on such schemes 
when officially notified. These schemes comprise aids which are neither sectorally 
nor regionally specific and are given on the basis of general powers of intervention 
taken by Member States. Such -aids are not covered directly by the provisions in 
Article 92(3) EEC on account of their lack of specificity. Consequently, the 
Commission is unable to grant a derogation on the basis of the powers given to it by 
that article. Economically, this is logical since in the absence of any information on 
the beneficiaries of aid the Commission cannot determine the likely effects of such 
general aid schemes on competition and trade. Nevertheless, the Commission has 
recognized that it would be unreasonable to prohibit the entry into force of the legal 
basis of such aid schemes in view of the perceived need of Member States to have at 
their disposal general powers permittirig them to take action rapidly in 
circumstances where they consider this necessary. Accordingly, the Commission 
has developed the practice of allowing general aid schemes to be introduced while 
requiring Member States to notify in advance either the sectoral or regional 
schemes they wish to implement on the basis of the general powers, or failing that 
significant individual cases of aid. 2 It should be noted that the Commission 
underlines that raising no objection to the introduction to the general powers does 
not mean a favourable pre-judgment in respect of regional,sectoral or individual 
cases of application. 
It should also be noted that .cases not notified in advance are subject to an a 
posteriori reporting procedure which enables the Commission to keep the position 
under constant review and propose any appropriate measures. 
213. Given the nature of "interVentions Member St~tes undertake in the 
framework of their general aid schemes, the Commission has for some time been 
concerned that in its judgment of the in~ividual cases notified its criteria should be 
as stringent as those applied to sectoral or regional aid proposals. The lack of 
specificity in this respect of many interventions under such general aid systems in 
favour of major investment proposals has made this a difficult task. Different 
criteria might apply in the case of rescue operations or aid to sectors in difficulty 
1 Second Report on Competition Policy, points 116 to 118; Fifth Report· on Competition Policy, 
point 135. 
2 For current thresholds for notification which are fixed in terms of aid intensity and project size, see 
Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 184. 
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under general aid powers, where the social considerations -and consequences of 
restructuring measures -Would need to be taken into consideration. In seeking to 
formulate its position the Commission has developed the concept of compensatory 
justification, i.e. if the Commission has to use its discretionary power not to raise 
objection to an aid proposal, it must contain a compensatory justification which 
takes the form of a contribution by the beneficiary of aid over and above the effects 
of normal play of market forces to the achievement of Community objectives as 
contained in derogatioris of Article 92(3) EEC. The application of this policy is 
demonstrated in the case of Philip Morris, in which on appeal, the European Court 
delivered its judgment in September 1980 (Case 730179). 
The Philip Morris case 
214. In October 1978 the Netherlands Government notified the Commission of a 
proposal to grant aid: to Philip Morris Holland under Article 6 of the Wet 
Investedngsrekening (WIR), the aid amounting to HFL 6.2 million (2.3 million 
EUA). The aid was proposed in the context of plans by Philip Morris to concentrate 
their cigarette producing activities in Holland in Bergen-op-Zoom, with the 
corresponding closure of their establishment at Eindhoven. By its decision of 29 
July 19791 the Comr:nission enjoined the Netherlands Government not to 
implement the proposal in question. Philip Morris, unsupported by the 
Netherlands Government, brought proceedings to annul this decision under 
Article 173 of the Treaty. 
Philip Morris maintained that the Commission had infringed Community law as 
regards the interpretation and appli~ation of both paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 92, 
had violated one or more general principles of Community law, in particular the 
principles of good administration, the principle of justified confidence and 
proportionality and also one or more principles of competition policy. In addition, 
Philip Morris maintained that the Commission had failed to give sufficient reasons 
for its decision and had thereby infringed Article 190. 
As far as Article 92(1) EEC was concerned, Philip Morris maintained that the 
economiC appraisal given by the Commission ,in its decision was deficient in that it 
did not conform to the principles of economic analysis required, in its view, by 
Articles 85 and 86 ·of the Treaty. In particular, the Commission had not given a 
detailed analysis of the barket in question, nor of the number and relative strengths 
of competitors in it. Philip Morris further argued that the Commission had ignored 
the principle of de minimis which, it was alleged, operates in Article 92(1) as in both 
, 
1 Decision 791743/EEC: OJ L 217,25.8.1979. 
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Articles 85 and 86. Since the aid in question had only a marginal effect, it could not 
in any' event be regarded as. fulfilling the criteria of Article 92(1)~ Further, the 
Commission was alleged to have failed to specify-the geographical market and the 
period of time to' which the economic evaluation 'given related. 
As far as the derogations were concerne<l:, the Commiss~on's thesis was set'out in 
decision III(2), namely: . 
'Exemptions' to incompatibility included in Article 92(3) must be strictly 
interpreted, notably, aid may only be granted when the Commission can 
establish that it will contribute. to the attainment of the objectives specified in 
the exemption which, under normal market conditions, the recipient firms 
would not attairi by their own actions'. . 
:. ' 
Philip Morris alleged that not only was this general way 6f interpreting the Treaty 
incorrect but that further the Commission had misapplied and misinterpreted each 
of the individual derogations. In particular, Philip Morris allege that Ar-
ticle 92(3)(a), (b) and (c) had to be applied objectively and in a neutral fashion and 
that the only matter to which the Commission could address itself was whether or 
not the aid promoted the investment in question. The Commlssiqn, replied that a 
derogation could only be granted where it manifestly contributed t~the attainment 
of one of the Community objectives. If this was not the case, then aderogiltion was 
not justified. Assessment of the fulfilment of the criteria of each derogation had to 
be,looked at not only from the. point of view ofthe project, but from the standpoint 
of Community interest which, of course, included that, of the Member State 
concerned. Further, the Commission argued, contrary to Philip Morris, that it was 
entitled and indeed obliged to have regard to the effect which the granting of an aid 
would probably have on the location of an industry. 
The judgment 
215. ,In giving'its judgment the Court upheld entirely the decision and arguments 
of the Commission, dismissing those o~ Philip Morris. 
As far as Article 92(1) EEC is concerned, and the fulfilnient of the criteria laid 
down, the Court decided that: 
. 'If an aid granted by a State strengthens the position ,of an ul)dert~king' in 
comparison to other undertakings with which it competes in intra-
Community trade, the latter can be said to be affected by the aid'. 
In this particular case the Court found that since the aid under consideration 
concerned a company heavily engaged in inter-State trade, and the aid would 
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contribute to its productive capacity and thus reinforce its position in international 
trade, the criteria of Article 92(1) were fulfilled. Moreover, the aid diminished the 
cost of the concentration in question, thus giving the company a competitive 
advantage over others which have 'or had the intention of carrying out similar 
activities at their own expense. For these reasons the Court found that this ground 
of complaint was unfounded as regards substance and failure to give adequate 
. reasons. The principle of de minimis raised by Philip Morris was not taken up by 
the Court in its judgment. 
As far as Article 92(3) ~EC was concerned, the Court dismissed Philip Morris's 
entire submission on the interpretation and application of the derogations and in 
particular the argument that the Commission has wrongly introduced the notion 
that derogations could not be granted where normal market forces were sufficient 
to ensure the investment without State intervention. It said: 
'This argument ca:nnot be sustained. On the one hand Article 92(3) EEC 
contrary to Article 92(2) EEC gives a power of discretion to the Commission 
in that it foresees that the aid which it lists "may be considered compatible 
with the common tharket". On the other hand it would have the result that it 
allows Member Stites to undertake actions which lead to an improvement in 
the final situatic;m of the benefiting undertaking without that being necessary 
to attain the objecFves foreseen in Article 92(3) EEC. .. 
I I . 
It (the Court) underlines that the Commission in making use of its 
discretionary power, must exercise its analysis of the economic and social 
situation in the framework of the Community interest.' 
I 
Concerning the details: of the particular derogations, the Court found that the 
Commission had rightly refused a derogation under Article 92(3)(a). There was 
indeed a level of unemployment in Bergen-op-Zoom higher than that found in the 
rest of The Netherlands. However, the Commission had correctly assessed that this 
unemployment did not constitute an abnormally low standard of living or serious 
underemployment in i Community context. Equally, the Commission had 
correctly taken into account the displacement effect which the granting of an aid 
could have in considering whether or' not to grant a derogation under 
Article 92(3)(b). Lastly, the Court found that the Commission was justified to 
refuse a derogation under Article 92(3)(c) where market forces were sufficient in 
themselves to secure normal development without intervention of the State and to 
conclude from these facts that therefore the aid was not designed to 'facilitate' the 
development of" the sector. . 
, .. 
216. The Commission considers .that the judgment of the Court in the case of 
Philip Morris has considerably" clarified the position in regard to State aids in 
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general. The position can be summarized as follows: although the Commission has 
considerable discretionary power given to it by Article 92(3) EEC the basic 
principles in the Treaty are clear. State aids are in principle incompatible with the 
common market. The discretionary power of the Commission should only be 
exercised when the aids proposed by Member States contribute to the achievement 
of the Community objectives and interest set out in Article 92(3) EEe. The national 
interest of a Member State or the benefits obtained by' the recipieilt of aid in 
contributing to the national interest do not by themselves justify the' positive 
exercise of the Commission's discretionary powers. 
217. Because of the Philip Morris appeal the Commission delayed its final 
decision on a number ofindividual cases of application of general aid schemes, as 
can be seen from examination of the table at point 218 below . Work is now in hand 
for the Commission to take final decisions in these cases. 
Significant cases of application of general aid schemes 
218. In 1980 the Commission examined 29 individual cases. 1 The table below 
shows'the industries and Member States concerned., 
Member State 
IndustriaJ· sector Total' 
Belgium I GFR of I France I Italy I Nether- [ United ermany . ' lands Kingdom 
Chemicals' 1 4 3 8 
Mechanical engineering ,2 2 
Automobiles and sp~re p'arts 1 2 1 4 
Paper and printing 2 1 1 4 
Electronics/Information 1 1 2 
Aerospace 1 2 3 
Others 1 1 4 6 
, , 
Total 6 1 1 , 1 13 7 29 
-- ' 
The results of the Commission's examination of these cases are as follows: 
1 This figure excludes cases of shipbuilding and steel-industry aid which are dealt with in the relevant 
sections of this Report. 
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Cases examined 
Decisions to raise no objections 
Cases withdrawn by Member States after comments 
.. by the Commission: 
Initiation of Article 93(2) proceedings 
Cases still under examination 
Belgium 






219. On 28 November 1980 the Commission took a decision under Article 93(2) 
of the EEC Treaty requiring the Belgian Government not to grant its intended 
assistance to certain il)vestments carried out by the Belgian subsidiary of an 
international oil group at its refinery in Antwerp. 1 
The Commission had. previously objected to other aids which the Belgian 
Government had proposed to grarit, on other grounds, to the same refinery. In the 
case under discussion 'the Government envisaged aid of about 13% towards 
investments totalling BFR 1000 million to allow the refinery to convert heavy 
refined petroleum products into light refined products (motor spirit, naphtha and 
distillates) ; the investments had already been carried out and the new plant was in 
operation. 
The Commission pointed out that the Treaty allowed Member States to grant aids 
only where in their absence market forces alone would not enable the recipient 
firms to take measures contributing to the attainment of social or economic 
objectives desirable both in the national interest and in the common interest. The 
Commission took the yiew that the proposed aid did not meet this con.:iition. ' 
The aid could not be c6nsidered to contribute to a better regional balance, as the 
Antwerp area continues to enjoy a better socio-economic situation than that of 
miny other regions in Belgium and in the rest of the Community. 
Looking at the position of the industry, the aid was not necessary to facilitate the 
development of the industry or of the firm, while it would be likely to affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. ' 
While the Community refining industry had to convert its production structures as 
a result of the continui~g shift in demand from heavy petroleum products to light 
products, firms ought to be able to finance the change themselves. 
, 
1 OJ L 343, 18.12.1980. 
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In any case the position of the firm, which had trebled its Antwerp refining capacity 
several years before, did not justify an exception to the principle. Further 
confirmation was provided by the fact that the investment to be assisted had 
already been carried out and the new plant brought into operation before the 
proposed assistance was notified to the Commission; the firm had stated that it 
would have carried out the investment in any case with or witnout aid. 
Lastly, given the overcapacity in the refining industry in the Community, the fact 
that one Member State assisted investment which was indispensable to all firms in 
the industry was likely to transfer the burden of the inevitable reductions in 
production capacity to other Member States which did npt grant aid of this kind. 
, Italy.; 'tax relieffor bank consortia 
reorganizing certain large firms in difficulties 
220. Under Act No 787 of 5 December 1978 1 Italian banks may, 'within three 
years from the entry into force of the Act and with the agreement of the Banca 
d'ltalia, set up consortia to acquire interests (shares an~ convertible bonds) in 
industrial firms in difficulties which are carrying out reorganization programmes. 
The holdings must be for a limited duration, however, which may not exceed five 
years. 
To encourage banks to engage in transactions of this kind, the State will grant them 
certain tax advantages; thus they can deduct from their taxable revenue up to 75'10 
of their stake in the consortium, divided into three annual instalments of no more 
than 25%. Banks are also entitled to tax relief on the consolidation of loans to 
industrial firms before 31 July 1978. In order to qualify short or medium-term 
loans must be converted into loans with a term of more than five years, bearing an 
interest rate lower than that originally agreed. 
For their part, the firms concerned must implement reorganization programmes 
approved in advance by the Ministry oflndustry and by a committee of government 
ministers. 
The Commission took the view that these tax reliefs, although granted directly to 
banks, nevertheless had the effect of favouring the undertakings concerned for the 
purposes of Article 92(1) of the EEC· Treaty. The reorganization of these 
undertakings was made possible only by the fact that the State was applying tax 
measures to encourage the necessary bank operations. The measures allowed 
1 Gazzetta Ufficiale No 348, 14.12.1978. 
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undertakings to avail of capital on which they no longer needed to pay interest, or 
on which the interest nite was lower than previously, and they could also obtain 
new capital for reorganization purposes. 
As the scheme in the last analysis constituted aid to firms in difficulty, the 
Commission required the Italian Government to inform it under Article 93(3) EEC 
of all proposals for the formation of new bank consortia for the reorganization of 
manufacturing firms, tc! allow it to give its views on their compatibility with the 
common market. 
Discussions are continuing with the Italian authorities regarding the actio~ to be 
taken; the Italian Government denies that the measure constitutes an aid within the 
meaning of Article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty. 
Italy: relief on certain: social security contributions 
221. In order to redude the cost of labour as a factor of production in industrial 
I. . 
firms and certain firms in the services sector, the Italian Government in 1978 
introduced a scheme ~nder which the State took over part of the burden of 
employers' sickness insl,lrance contributions. 1 Although originally intended to run 
for a temporary six-month period, the scheme was extended several times and 
finally made permanent in December 1979. 2 
Initially, the reduction in the contribution such employers had to pay in respect of 
their employees was a standard LIT 24 500 per month for each male employee, 
while for female employees they were exempt from payments to sickness insurance 
schemes in respect of the first LIT 400 000 of wages and salaries per person per 
. month; this amounted to a potential reduction of LIT 64000, since employers' 
sickness .insurance contributions are set at 16% of wages and salaries. When the 
scheme was made permanent, the level of employers' sickness insurance 
contributions was red~ced by 4 percentage. points for male employees and by 
10 percentage points for female employees. 
The Commission initi~ted the procedure provided for by Article 93(2) EEC in 
respect of one feature of the scheme, the higher reduction in employers' 
contributions for ,their I female workers, on the grounds that this constituted aid 
within the meaning of; Article 92(1) EEC favouring the production of goods in 
which the use of female labour was particularly important. The main industries 
involved were textiles, ~lothing, footwear and leather. Women represented 70% of 
1 Law No 353 of 6.7.1978: Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana No 192,11.7.1978. 
2 Law No 633 of 30.12.1979: Gazzetta Ufficiale della RepubbLica ItaJiana No 355, 31.12.1979. 
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the labour force in these four industries as against only 25% in Italian industry as a 
wh9le. These industries were having difficulty in adapting to the current state of the 
market throughout the Community, and competition within the Community was 
stiff. 
" . 
As the assistance constituted a strictly conservatory operating aid which was not 
such as to facilitate development within the meaning of Article 92(3)(c) of the 
Treaty and thus to qualify for the. derogation it allows, and moreover was likely 
adversely to affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, 
the Commission took the view that the measure could not be considered 
compatible with the common market. On 15 September 1980, accordingly,"it took 
a final Decision 1 on the scheme, requiring the Italian Government within six 
. months expiring on 15 March 1981 to remove any difference in, the rate of 
reduction of employers'sickness insurance contributions as between male and 
female employees. The Commission stated that it was not opposed to relief on 
social security contributions as such, provided it was applied uniformly to the 
whole of industry and did not favour certain firms or the production of certain 
goods. 
§ 5 - Aids for environmental purposes 
. 222. The position of the Commission with regard to aids in this field must be seen 
in the light of the consideration that in the long term, protection of the environment 
can only be carried out efficiently and without distorting competition by means of a 
general application of the 'polluter pays' principle. This is one of the basic 
principles of the Community policy on environment and implies that the cost 
required to reduce nuisance and pollution to an acceptable level should normally be 
borne byihe undertakings whose activities are responsible for them. Accordingly, it 
follows from the general principles in the EEC Treaty concerning State aids that 
such'aids should only be applied in exceptional cases where existing undertakings 
are not "capable of supporting the new costs of investments for environmental 
protection imposed on them and where social or economic difficulties could arise in 
certain industries or in certain regions which need State intervention to be 
avoided. 2 
223. Wheri the protection of the environment became an important policy issue in 
the first years of the last decade, the Commission realized that the situation in the 
1 Decision 80/932/EEC: OJ L 264, 8.10.1980. 
2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, points 175 and 176. 
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Member States was ch'aracterized by a comprehensive lack of regulations for 
improving the quality bf the environment and embodying the 'polluter pays' 
principle. Taking into a~count the high degree of pollution produced and the costs 
of purification which 4ad to be defrayed by polluters, it was obvious that the 
introduction of such regulations could give rise tq serious difficulties. 1 
1 . \ 
In order to contribute, to a solution of this problem the Commission, by a 
Memorandum of 7 November 1974 to Member States entitled 'Community 
approach to State aids in environmental matters', ~eclared that for a transitional 
period from 1 January ,1975 to 31 December 1980, it was prepared to authorize 
aids in favour of inve~tments for the fulfilment' of new major environmental 
obligations which wereiimposed on existing firms (i.e. firms whose plants were in 
operation on 1 January 1975) in'so far as the aids expressed as a net after-tax 
subsidy did not exceed certain degressive levels (45% in 1975-76,30% in 1977-78, 
and 15% in 1979-80). Such aids, facilitating the introduction of regulations for the 
improvement of the en~ironment and the progressive application of the 'polluter 
pays' principle, could qualify for the exemption under Article 92(3)(b) of the EEC 
Treaty as aids to prorhote the execution of an important project of common 
European interest. 2 
As regards aids for t~e transitional period, whkh did not satisfy the above 
conditions, and all aid measures for environmental purposes after this period, the 
Commission stated in ~ts Memorandum that, according to its general principles 
based on the exemptions of Article 92(3)(a) or (c) EEC, they would only be 
authorized if they wereinecessary for the d(!velopment of undertakings in a certain 
regional or sectoral context. 3 In taking this position, the Commission relied on the 
assumption that the transitional period, ending on 31 December 1980, would be 
long enough to enable fhe Member States to adopt regulations ensuring a general 
application of the 'polluter pays' principle. 
I 
224. The Commission has watched closely the' developments in the field 
concerned and has asce~ained that, partly as a result of the aids it has authorized, 4 
appreciable progress has been achieved. However, it is apparent that the above 
objective is still far frqm being attained. 
, 
The economic recessiop which set in at the beginning of the transitional period, 
coupled with the need for industry to adjust to the new international situation, had 
i 
, I 
1 Fourth Report on Comp~tition Policy, points 177 and 178.' 
2 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 181. 
3 Fourth Report on Competition Policy, point 182. 
4 Sixth Report on Competi~ion Policy, points 247 to 252, 
! 
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the effect of restricting funds available for environmental protection, and of 
hampering legislative measures in this context. 
Moreover, the Commission became aware that problems relating to the drawing up 
of the rdevant laws and regulations, particularly at Community level and their 
subsequent national application, had proceeded more slowly than anticipated; that 
the improvement in the scientific and technological knowledge creates the need for 
new erivironmentallegislation ; and that there was an increasing public demand for 
action on environmental improvement beyond that so far achieved by 
governments. 
225. In this situation, the Commission considered it should continue to favour 
aids for environmental protection during an additional transitional period, so as to 
enable the Member States to put into full effect the 'polluter pays' principle as 
originally foreseen. This would make it necessary to update the definition of 
existing undertakings eligible to benefit from the aids and to change certain other 
conditions for the application of these measures. In particular, the Commission 
found that assistance should be granted only within the framework of legislation 
specifying the type of investments required for the pollution control. This would 
enable the Commission to check that the requirements in question were consistent 
with the general approach set out in the Community action programmes on the 
environment and make sure that the assistance granted still justified exemption 
under Article 92(3)(b) EEC as aid to promote the execution of an important project 
of common European interest. 
226. On the basis of these considerations the Commission, by letter of7 July 1980 
to the Member States, supplemented the 'Community approach to State aids in 
environmental matters' as follows: 1 
The transitional period will be extended to 31 December 1986. During this period 
aids for investments designed to implement new environmental standards may 
qualify for the exemption under Article 92(3)(b) EEC: 
(i) the aids must not exceed 15% in net grant equivalent;2 
(ii) only undertakings having installations in operation. for at least two years before 
entry into force of the standards in question may qualify for assistance. 
The Member States must send to the Commission an annual report on the 
implementation of programmes for environmental protection involving the grant 
1 Does not apply to investments related to agricultural production. 
2 The amount of corporation tax is deducted from the gross aid paid to arrive at its net value. 
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of these aids. Each report must contain statistics on the amount of aid granted in net 
grant equivalent and on assisted investment broken down by industry, by region, 
and by the type of pollution prevention pursued (water, atmospheric, noise, solid 
and effluent waste). 
Application of the guidelines to certain aids 
Denmark 
227. The Danish Government informed the Commission of a draft law providing 
for aids to environmental investments carried out during the period from 1 January 
1981 to 31 December 1986. These investments should aim at the introduction of 
less-pollutant technologies than those applied so far; at the implementation of anti-' 
pollution measures which are economically onerous for the undertakings because 
of the severity of the requirements for environmental protection or because of other 
particular reasons; an~ at the connection of undertakings to public sewerage 
plants. . 
The aids would be give':' in the form of grants amounting to 25% of the investments 
concerned. However, as the grants would be taxable and the company taxation 
amounts to 40%, the aias calculated in net grant equivalent would not exceed 15%. i . 
The aids could only; be granted in favour of private undertakings having 
installations in operation two years before the environmental requirements were 
imposed on them. However, in the case that the investment concerned aims at the 
introduction of less-pollutant technology which generally has an innovative 
character and does not correspond to specific requirements, the delay of two years 
needed for qualifying the undertaking as existing should be counted from the date 
of the investment. 
As the duration of this aid scheme, the level of aid and, essentially, the definition of 
the undertakings eligible to benefit from the aids, complied with the above 
Community provisions relating to the prolonged transitional period, the 
Commission decided to make no objection to the entry into force of the Danish 
draft law. . 
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Adjustment of State monopolies 
of a commercial character 
228. The changes the Commission considers necessary to complete the final stage 
of the adjustment of the remaining State monopolies of a commercial character in 
the nine Member States pursuant to Article 37 of the EEC Treaty are encountering 
increasing national resistance. This is no doubt natural, since the monopolies in 
question are those which for various reasons the Member States concerned regard 
as most important. Nevertheless, the disregard of time:limits for answering 
enquiries is causing considerable delays to the Commission's work in this area. 
Consequently the adjustment of the remaining State monopolies could I10t be 
completed during the reference period. This applies particularly to the French and 
Italian manufactured tobacco monopolies. Although France, for example, has 
abolished its exclusive import and wholesale· marketing rights in respect of 
manufactured tobacco from other Member States, soine features of the present 
system have still not been satisfactorily dealt with. the Commission therefore took 
the infringement procedure initiated in respect of France a stage further and 
delivered a reasoned opinion on 22 July 1980. One of the features the Commission 
considers contrary to the Treaty is the requirement that manufactured tobacco 
wholesalers from other Member States must have a permanent address in France. 
This would, in principle, constitute a measure having an effect equivalent to a 
quantitative H:striction within the meaning of ArtiCle 30 of theEEC Treaty,landit 
is at variance with Article 37 in that it is associated with a commercial monopoly. 
France abolished this residence requirement by Ministerial Decree No 80-262 of· 
3 April 1980,2 and to that extent put an end to the infringement. Another feature is 
the requirement that suppliers of manufactured tobacco from other Member States 
must supply all retailers. Although France is free to impose such an obligation on its 
own manufacturing monopoly (SEITA), the same requirement applied to small 
1 Article 2(3)(g) of Commission Directive 70lS0/EEC of 22 December 1969: OJ L 13, 19.1.1970. 
2 Journal o{ficiel de la RepubJique franf=aise, 13.4.1980, p. 937. 
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manufacturers from other Member States has the effect of excluding them from the 
French market as they are unable to supply, as in the case in point, 50000 retailers. 
This provision constitutes a form of discrimination prohibited by Article 37 of the 
EEC Treaty, which has still not been brought to an end by France. The 
infringement procedure also concerns the State monopoly represented by the 
present retail marketing arrangements. Licensed retailers must be French citizens 
and are classed as public servants ('pn:~poses de l'administration') and thereby made 
subject to disciplinary rules. One of the possible disciplinary measures which may 
be taken against them is revocation of their licence by the Ministry. The 
Commission considers that these rules substantially restrict retailers' independence 
in a way that is contrary to the EEC Treaty, particularly as the State also has a 
manufacturing monopoly and State-controlled retailers sell both the monopoly's 
products and competing products from other Member States. As long ago as the 
SAIL case 1 the Commission took the view that the simultaneous holding of 
manufacturing and marketing monopolies was intrinsically discriminatory and 
thus in conflict with Article 37. The two monopolies may remain side by side only 
where the retailers' independence from the State is safeguarded. The infringement 
proceedings also concern the State's fixing of retail margins and the rule~ on 
advertising. Uniform rates of trade discount for all tobacco products are likely to 
impair competition. 2 When they are associated, as here, with a retail marketing 
monopoly, they are ~lso contrary to Article 37. The advertising rules give the 
Ministry the power to allocate advertising space in retail shops to manufacturers 
where manufacturers: are unable to agree among themselves. Since the same 
Ministry is also responsible for· the State manufacturing monopoly, these 
arrangements, too, are in conflict with Article 37. 
229. The Commission initiated new infringement proceedings against ltaly3,and 
on 2 April 1980 sent the Italian Government a lett~r of formal notice. As in the case 
of France, the main points at issue are the independence of tobacco retailers, 
including the requirement of Italian nationality,' and the uniform rates of trade 
discount laid down by the State. Moreover, Italy has not yet passed the legislation 
necessary to introduce new wholesale distribution arrangements following the 
abolition of the import and wholesale monopoly by Act No 724 of 10 December 
1975. An earlier draft of this legislation sent to the Commission by the Italian 
authorities3 had been open to objection on many points. 
1 Case 82171, Judgment ~ven on 21 March 1972: [1972J ECR 119. 
2 See judgment given by CJEC on 29 October 1980 (not yet published) in Cases 209 to 215 and 218178 
(Fedetab). 
3 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 201. 
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The Italian Government replied to the letter giving formal notice on 7 July 1980, 
enclosing a Ministerial Order that had already been signed but not yet published. 
This is almost identical to the earlier draft, and is still open to the objection that 
imported tobacco products are singled out for special treatment. For example, the 
method of collecting tax by means of tax stamps is applied only to imported 
products but not to those of the State manufacturing monopoly. The provisions on 
the packaging of tobacco products and on the purchase and payment of tax stamps 
also discriminate against imported products in a manner. contrary to Article 37. 
The Commission therefore decided to continue with the infringement proceedings 
against Italy, and a reasoned opinion was served on the Italian Government on 
16 November 1980. Should Italy fail to comply with the opinion, the Commission 
intends to refer its case, like that of France, to the Court of Justice. 
230. Infringement p~oceedings are also pending against Italy for failure to carry 
out sufficient adjustment of its matches monopoly. These proceedings were 
suspended because the State retail marketing monopoly covers both matches and 
manufactured tobacco and it was desired to combine the two sets of proceedings. 1 
The monopoly in the retailing of matches was therefore included in the reasoned 
opinion served on the Italian Government on 16 November 1980 in respect of the 
manufactured tobacco monopoly. 
231. The Italian saccharin monopoly was abolished by an Act No 297, of 7 July 
1980. 2 The adjustment requirement under Article 37 has thus been satisfied. 
232. Turning to the French alcohol monopoly, as from 1 January 1980 France 
altered the selling prices for various types of alcohol to comply with the Court of 
Justice's ruling in Case 91178. 3 
The Commission was, however, unable to accept even these prices because spirits 
of comparable quality from other Member States, in particular wine spirits, were in 
the meantime being sold at much higher prices. After repeated talks with the French 
authorities, during which import documents showing the relevant prices were 
produced, the French Government announced its intention of changing prices 
again. The new prices entered into force on 1 September 1980. The Commission is 
keeping a close watch on prices so as to be ready to intervene again if necessary. 
1 Ninth Report on Competition Policy, point 202. 
2 Gazzetta Ufficiale No 185 of 8.7.1980, p. 5812. 
3 Judgment of 13 March 1979 (Hansen): [1979) ECR 935. 
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233. The pricing and sales policy of the German alcohol monopoly is also under 
continuous review. Although the actual level of prices has not yet given the 
Commission cause to take action, it has on several occasions made submissions to 
the European Court of Justice in relation to references for preliminary rulings 
under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. However, these were on issues not necessarily 
connected with the existence of the monopoly, such as the tax advantages granted 
to very small distilleries:and the calculation of production ceilings for entitlement 
to such, and therefore had to be judged by reference to Article 95 of the EEC Treaty 
and not Article 37. 
234. . The Commissiob carried out a preparatory examination of the State 
monopolies existing in Greece in preparation for that country's accession. Under 
Article 40 of the Accession Treaty,l Greece is required to abolish immediately all 
exclusive export rights and some exclusive import rights and to remove the 
remaining exclusive import and marketing rights in stages by 31 December 1985. 
The existing Member States have equivalent obligations towards Greece. The 
Commission is required to make recommendations to the Member States as from 
1 January 1981 as to the manner and time-scale of-these adjustments. 
1 0] L 291, 19.11.1979. 
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Public undertakings 
235. 'On 25 June 1980, the Commission adopted its Directive 801723/EEC on the 
transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertak-, 
ings. l This Directive, as has already been explained 2 imposes upon Member States 
the obligation to supply information to the .Commission should it so request, 
concerning the nature and effect of their financial links with their public 
undertakings. 
236. The Directive contains principally, apart from the abovementioned 
obligation: 
(i) a definition of the term ~public undertaking' based on the influence which the 
particular financial link between State and undertaking allows the former to 
exert upon the behaviour of the latter; 
(ii) examples of the type of financial relation subject to transparency. These 
examples cover not only what might be termed 'active' transfers of public funds 
to public undertakings, (e.g. provision of capital, loss-compensation) but also 
'passive' transfers (e.g. the forgoing of profits or of a normal return on the funds 
used}. It was also considered important to cite the example of compensation for 
financial burdens imposed on these undertakings by public authorities; 
(iii) clauses limiting its scope through both sectoral exclusions and threshold 
provisions. 
1 OJ L 195, 29.7.1980. 
2 Eighth Report on Competition Policy, points 253 and 254. 
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237. The Commission ~ction breaks new ground both as regards the object of the 
directive and the legal basis chosen. Concerning the object, the Commission has on 
several occasions drawn attention to the problems inherent in ensuring an equitable 
application of the Treaty rules on State aids to both private and public 
undertakings 1 because of the particular character of the financial relationship 
between the State and the latter. 
It is a fact that over recent years the import of the aid rules has become much clearer 
for Member States as a result of Commission decisions, guidelines and 
explanations and of European Court decisions, and the Commission is satisfied 
that the obligations arising from Article 92 et seq. of the EEC Treaty are well 
understood by Member:States. The problems arise when the State resources are 
used in ways sanctioned by Article 222 of the EEC Treaty, i.e. for investment, 
nationalization, participation purposes and so on, but where the dual role of the 
State as both investor and public authority is liable to cause the typical motivations 
and responsibilities of one and the other to overlap. At that point, the Member State 
may well consider that ir's action can be assimilated to that of a private investor and 
thus exclude the likelihood of this action having any aid effect liable to notification. 
In so far as the State resources are clearly being employed in an area outside that 
covered by the aid rule~, this attitude is understandable, but the Commission is 
having its attention drawn increasingly to cases where it seems unlikely that an 
investor following standard company practice in a market economy would have 
acted in a similar way. This is particularly so where rescue operations and replacing 
of loss-depleted capital are concerned. Without greater transparency, the 
Commission is unable to determine to what extent the transfers of public funds can 
be reconciled with Treaty rules. r 
238. The second innovation springs from the first and concerns the legal basis for 
the action. Given the situation described above and the fact that Article 90(3) of the 
EEC Treaty specifically enjoins the Commission to ensure the application of Treaty 
provisions in the case of public undertakings, the Commission had recourse to one 
of the two legal instru~ents which the same paragraph puts at its disposal in this 
context: the directive. It was in fact the first occasion on which the Commission 
availed itself of this possibility. 
239. In the course of preparing the directive, the Commission had detailed 
discussions with expert~ from the Member States and also consulted the European 
1 In particular, Sixth Repon; on Competition Policy, point 275 and Written Question No 701m by 
Mr Muller-Hermann. 
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Parliament (which had called for action in this field),l the Economic and Social 
Committee as well as certain other interested organizations. Although almost all 
the Member . States welcome the move towards greater transparency, there is 
reticence on the part of a minority concerning the legal basis used, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom having each brought an action against the Commission 
requiring that the directive be declared null and void. 2 
1 Resolution of 13 October 1978, Minutes No 34, p. 9, Document 55.323. 
2 OJ C 273, 22.10.1980 (Cases 188, 189 and 190/80). 
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Introduction 
240. This part of the Report looks into the present situation with regard to 
national and international takeovers and mergers, share purchases ,and new joint 
ventures; it also reviews the findings of industry and market studies conducted in 
1980. . 
The review applies a set of economic indicators chosen for the programme of 
studies and designed to analyse how competition operates in .the European 
Economic Community. '
§ 1 .-;.... National and international takeovers and mergers, share purchase 
and joint ventures in the Community from 1977 to 1979 
241. . The systematic gathering of information published in the press on national 
and international takeovers and mergers, share purchase and joint ventures.iil the 
Community continued in' 1980. Although the main aim of this exercise was to 
obtain qualitative data on specific operations of interest in the·determination of the 
Commission's competition policy, the following analysis of the trends in these 
operations has had to be quantitative. . 
Trend in the; number of operations 
242. While the total number of national and international operations in the 
Community remained almost the same between 1977 and 1978, they increased in 
1979 (Table 1), especially in'respect of national operations, which now account for 
three-quarters of all operations. ' 
Share purchases are increasingly becoming the most common type of operation. In 
1979, they account~ .for 80% of all operations. 
An analysis showed a marked decline in new joint ~entures involving international 
partners, so that for the first time the numbers of national and international 
operations were equal. 
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National and international operations in the Community, 1977-79 
Total Share purchase Joint ventures T akeove~s and merger~ 
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Total (na.tional and international) 
2320 100 , 1692 100 482 100 146 100 
2304 100 1727 100 440 100 137 100 
-1% +2%, -9% -6% 
2927 100 2342 100 439 100 146 100 
+27% "+36% " - +7% 
National operations 
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+1% +4% -17% -6% 
2186 75 ' 1824 78 216 49 146 100 
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A comparison by category of national and international operations shows similar 
patterns beginning to em-erge. Share purchase as a proportion of national 
operations rose from 79% in 1977 to 83% in 1979, while the proportion of new 
joint ventures fell from 12% in 1977 to 10% in 1979. At the same time, share 
purchase as a proportion of international operations increased sharply, from 59% 
in 1977 to 70% in 1979, while the proportion of new joint ventures fell, similarly, 
from 41 % in 1977 to 30% in 1979. 
The number of national takeovers and mergers was the same as in the two previous 
years, the 6% fall between 1977 and 1978 being offset by an equivalent increase. 
A breakdown of operations by number of firms participating shows that those 
involving two firms (bilateral operations) increased more than those involving 
more than two firms (multilateral operations). Thus, bilateral operations only 
accounted for close on 90% of the total. 
The breakdown mainly shows that with multilateral operations, the international 
share has contracted substantially from around one-half in the two previous years 
to just over one-third in 1979. 
This confirms the trend seen above in new international joint ventures. 
Trend in the number of firms involved in each operation 
243. In general, the number of firms involved in operations (Table 2) and the 
number of operations themselves follow the same trend. Both overall and within 
the individual categories of operation, the number of firms involved was 
consistently higher in 1979 than in 1978, the sole exception being in the group of 
international joint ventures. 
Nevertheless, in addition to this similarity in trend, three points stand out about the 
number of firms involved: 
(i) The number involved in international joint ventures was well below that for 
national joint ventures, although there were more international joint ventures 
than national ones. This was because, on average, more firms were involved in a 
national joint venture (3.7 in 1979) than in an international one (2.8 in 1979). 
(ii) The number of firms involved in all takeovers and mergers rose by only 1 % in 
1979, although the number of such operations increased by 7%. This was due 
to a fall in the average number of firms involved in such operations. 
(iii)By contrast, the number of firms involved in international multilateral 
operations in 1979 rose although the number of such operations declined. This 











Finns involved in national and international operations in the CommunitY, 1977-79 
In share In joint In takeovers Total 
, purchase ventures and mergers 
Number Number Number Number 
(and % % (and % % (and % % (and % % 
change) . change) change) change) 
- - '----- --- '---- -
'---_._-
---- ---- ----
Total firms involved (national and international operations) 
- 1977 5629 100 3637 100 1609 100 383 100 
1978 5205 100 3655 100 1235 100 315 ·100 
% change 1977 to 1978 -8% +1% -23% -8% 
1979 6670 100 4917 100 1434 100 319 100 
% change 1978 to 1979 +28% +35% +16% +1% 
----
- '----- - ---- -- --- -
National operations 
1977 3810 68 2688 74 739 46 383 100 
1978 3618 70 2763 76 540 44 315 100 
% change 1977 to 1978 -5% +3% -27% -18% 
1979 4911 74 3793 77 799 56 319 100 
% change 1978 to 1979 +36% +37% +48% +1% 
International operations 
1977 1 819 32 949 26 870 54 - -
1978 1587 30 892 24 695 56 - -
% change 1977 to 1978 -13% -6% -20% 
1979 1759 26 1 124 23 635 44 - -
% change 1978 to 1979 +11% +26% -9% 
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shows that the average number of firms involved in an international 
multilateral operation increased substantially. 
International operations by Member State 
244. In 1979, the majority of international operations in the Community took 
place, as in previous years, in the Benelux (Table 3), followed by the United 
Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany in that order. 
There has been a distinct tendency for the number of international operations 
carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany to decline, both in absolute terms 
, and as a percentage of those in the Community as a whole. By contrast, in Italy, 
where international operations were at a rather low level in 1977, there was a 
marked increase in the ensuing two years. The same trend was discernible in 
France. In the Benelux, on the other hand, the number of international operations 
tended to fall. No clear trends emerged in the other countries. 
Share purchase operations by Member State 
245. With the number of both national and international share purchase 
operations and of the firms involved growing, an analysis of these operations by 
Member State is called for (Table 4). 
It will be seen that, in 1979, the largest number of share purchase operations, in the 
Community, was in. the United Kingdom. Next came France, then the Federal 
Republic of Germany and, a long way behind, Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy. 
This table also shows the proportion of operations in which only Community firms 
were involved and a further analysis illustrates the number of operations that 
concerned only firms from a single Member State. 
These figures emphasize the predominant role played by national operations in 
share purchase operations generally. Apart from such purely national operations, 
we see that, in the Community, firms from other Member States were more 
numerous than non-Community firms in share purchase operations. 
However, this was not the pattern in the United Kingdom, Italy and The 
Netherlands, where more non~Community firms took part in international share 
purchase operations than Community firms. 
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TABLE 3 
International operations in the Community, by Member State, 1977-79 
Year FR of Germany France Italy The Netherlands Belgium 
Number of operations 
1977 164 97 19 73 135 
1978 137 103 25 40 121 
1979 101 138 47 74 127 
As % of EEC total 
1977 23 14 3 10 19 
1978 20 15 4 6 18 
1979 14 19 6 10 17 
.I 
TABLE 4 
National and international share purchase operations in the Community in 19791 
Member States in which 
J 
FR of Germany France Italy The Netherlands 1 
Total I 'Yo Total I 'Yo Total I 0/0 Total I 'Yo I 
Total 345 100 418 100 126 100 190 100 
of which: 
Firms from Member States 318 92 383 92 107 85 164 86 
of which: 
National firms 284 82 323 77 97 77 141 74 
I A share purchase operation involving only two firms, the one buying the share and the onc ~hose shares are bought, counts as a single 
operation in both Table I and Table 4. An operation in which two or more firms buy a share, still counts as a single operation in 
Table 1, but in Table 4 each of the purchasing firms is shown as an operation and the operation is recorded under the country in which 
the firm whose shares are being bought is situated. 


















Belgium LuXembourg United Kingdom 
Total I % Total I % Total I % 
224 100 22 100 1140 100 
196 88 16 73 1083 95 
: . 
134 60 1 5 1054 92 
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Share of non-Community firms in 
international operations in Member States 
246. A comparison ofthe number of international operations that involved firms 
from outside the Community with those that did no't (Table 5), shows that the 
observation made about share purchase operations also applies to international 
operations in general. 
In international operations carried out within the Community, firms from Member 
States outnumbered firms from outside the Community. 
This situation is the result of a clear tendency for the number of Community firms 
involved in international operations to increase between 1977 and 1979. 
The comparative equality noted in 1977 has given way to a situation in which 




International operations in the Community, 1977-79 - Operations involving 
Community firms only and operations involving non-Community firms 
Type of operation 
Year Share purchase Joint ventures Toral 
ECI I NMC2 I Total EO I NMCl I Total ECI I NMC2 I 
Number of operations 
1977 202 211 413 138 150 288 340 361 
1978 187 212 399 166 112 i78 353 324 
1979 273 245 518 135 88 223 408 333 
As percentage of total 
1977 49 51 100 48 52 100 49 51 
1978 47 53 ,100 60 ·40 100 52 48 
1979 .53 47 100 61 39 100 55. 45 
EC: Operations involving Community firms only. 
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parts 
Number of operations 
634 - -
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881 232 163 
., 
-- ---
As percentage of total 
27 - -
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30 8 6 
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. and companies 
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772 243 55 
656 182 58 
741, 234 44 
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Industry breakdown of national and 
international operations in the Community 
247. In 1979 as in 1978, the largest number and the greatest proportion of 
operations took place in the metal industries, followed by the services industry 
(Table 6). 
Within these two main groups, the most important sectors were those making 
machines and mechanical parts, on the one hand, and banking and insurance on the 
other. 
However, a comparison between 1978 and 1979 showed that the proportion of 
operations in the metal industries,· the chemical industry and the service sector 
declined, there had been no change in the proportion in the food industries and in 
the textiles industries, while the proportion in the energy sector and in other 
manufacturing industries had increased. 
§ 2 - Studies on the operation of competition in the Community 
Overall view of the present state of competition 
248. Cross-frontier competition actively benefits consumers while it strengthens 
the Community as an economic entity. Manufacturers adapt to compete in the 
larger market and organize the marketing of their products to meet the buying 
power of the major distributors. Production ,1Od marketing are .thus becoming 
increasingly complex, as manufacturers find it profitable to switch production of a 
number of components and parts to non-member countries and subsequently 
incorporate them into products for sale in the Community. 
Since in specific cases it might affect trade between Member States the Commission 
keeps a watch to see that no unwarranted restriction or distortion of competition 
takes place. 
The Commission realizes that the present trend in the structure of industry means it 
is sometimes-necessary to tolerate restrictions of competition, mainly for technical 
and financial reasons, so that Community firms, and especially small and medium-
sized ones, can become more competitive. 
COMP. REP. EC 1980 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION 179 
Findings of these. studies 
249. The latest studies conducted by the Commission 1 all highlight two major 
characteristics of ~ompetition today: 
(i) the arrival both of new products and new manufacturers which, together with 
changes in the market shares of the large firms, has helped to produce a shift in 
the market patterns for a number of mass-consumer goods; 
(ii) a fall in 'relative prices' (when expressed in real terms) in a large number of 
these markets. 
These developments clearly do /:lot occur simultaneously in all the Member States 
nor to the same extent' everywhere. However, despite the many special aspects 
involved, a tendency seems to be emerging towards keener competition in the. 
Community. 
" 
In some cases, such competition serves to temper the increase in producer prices 
(e.g. for certain foodstuffs) or to accentuate the tendency towards lower 'relative' 
prices (as in the case of some radio and TV industry products and hi-fi equipment, 
together known in the mass market for consumer electronic products as 'brown 
goods'). 
Although there is a tendency towards greater c.oncentration in distribution virtually 
everywhere in the Community, it would seem that distributors' mark-ups are 
tending to fall. This is confirmed by the examples of the sizes of mark-ups (§ 5(4), 
Table 9) taken from the studies on food products and beverages and ·by the 
information available on the shift mpatterns of distributi9n for electrical 
equipment (radio, TV, hi-fi, etc.). . 
Criteria used in the analyses 
250. Keener competition within the Community is not in itself incompatible with 
a high degree of concentration and a strong trend towards oligopoly in a number of 
industries. 
In practice an analysis is needed of the many factors that can chantcterize the way in 
which competition 'operates in its varous aspects. . , 
1 In 1980, some 30 reports were published, some in the 'Evolution of concentration and competition' 
series and the others in the 'Working papers' collection (see Annex), 
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Accordingly, for the purposes of its programme of studies, the Commission has 
chosen a set of indicators that make it possible to analyse specific competitive 
situations. 
These indicators can be divided into five categories, relating to: 
(i) the structure of an industry or a market; 
(ii) product definition; 
(iii) price structures; 
(iv) the financial control of firms; 
(v) the sociological factors reflecting the influence exercised by governments on 
industries and markets. . 
There follows examples from these studies, demonstrating the first three groups of 
indicators. 
§ 3 - The structures of industries and of markets 
251. . To study the change in industrial and, above all, market structures, use is 
made of a set of indicators, reflecting the way in which competition operates. These 
indicators focus on: . 
(i) monopolistic or oligopolistic dominance; 
(ii) trends in market shares; 
(iii)the stability of market shares; 
(iv) oligopolistic market-sharing, with differentiation between: 
(a) markets for products (qualitative dimension), 
(b) markets by region (geographic dimension). 
In assessing the effective degree of concentration, one should take account of the 
financial links caused by minority as well as majority holdings that may influence 
the production and marketing policies of the firms concerned. 
In practice there exists a large number of minority holdings which may under 
special conditions have much the same effect on behaviour as if the groups were 
holding a position of collective dominance. 
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From the reports which were published in 1980 we can cite the following industries 
or markets as examples: the food industry, the plastics industry, the cement 
industry, the industry for domestic electrical appliances and electronic goods and 
the market in classical records. 
The food industry in the Community 
252. I~ the food industry generally, there is some measure of equilibrium in the 
power of the major groups, and the pattern of the industry can be described as being 
a balanced and loose oligopoly; i.e. there is a relatively large number of major 
firms, dominated as is well-known by Unilever and Nestle. 
Between 1970 and 1977 the market shares in the food industry calculated as a 
percentage of total industry turnover in the Federal Republic of Germany changed 
as follows: ' 
('Yo) 
Firms 1970 1977 
A 5.3 5.3 
B 1.5 2.2 
C 1.5 1.9 
D 1.9 1.6 
E 1.4 1.6 
F 1.9 0.9 
Total market share of the 
six largest firms 13.5 13.5 
Thus while the market shares of fi~ms A, C, D and E showed some degree of 
stability, B's share expanded markedly and F's share declined substantially. So that 
even though the total, overall share of the six largest firms has remained the same, 
suggesting a tendency towards market equilibrium, there was also distin~t evidence 
that changes had taken place within this basic pattern. 
253. The market for products was, however, much more concentrated as can be 
seen from the following percentages showing the combined market share of the 
leading four firms in each market in 1977: 
(i) ice-cream: 90%, 
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(ii) spaghetti: 75%, 
(iii) margarine: 85 to 90%, 
(iv) potato-based products: 88%. 
This can be explained by the complex polices of specialization on the one hand and 
diversification on the other which are pursued by the leading groups in order to 
achieve economies of scale in both production and distribution. For example, in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the two main groups, Unilever and Nestle, seldom 
market the same products. 
While this does not hinder competition which can even be in certain cases intense, 
some firms hold substantial shares in the markets for particular products. The list 
below gives the most recent shares known f~)f these market leaders: 
(i) margarine: around 30 to 35% in Denmark, 45% in Italy, 50% in the United 
Kingdom, 65% in France and over 70% in the Federal Republic of Germany; 
, 
(ii) instant coffee: around 40% in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and 70% in Italy and France; 
(iii) tinned soups: 30% in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, 66% in the 
United Kingdom, and 74% in France; 
(iv) packaged soups: Around 50% in the United Kingdom and Denmark, 60% in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, 65% in France and 80% in Italy; 
(v) tea: 30 to 35% in the United Kingdom, Italy and France, and 40% in the 
Federal Republic of Germany; 
(vi) ice-cream: 30% in France, around 40% in Italy and the United Kingdom, 45% 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and 48% in Denmark; 
(vii) frozen foods: 24% in the Federal Republic of Germany, around 40% in the 
United Kingdom, 42% in France and 58% in Italy; 
(viii) baby foods: 30% in the Federal Republic of Germany, 50% in Italy and 
France, and 75% in Denmark. 
The plastics industry in the Community 
254. An analysis of total production capacities for the various types of plastic in 
the five leading producer countries in Western Europe, (the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium and The Netherlands), shows that 
in 1977 the four largest groups accounted for around 30% of total capacity for the 
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major thermoplastics, that is polyethylene (both high-density and low-density), 
polyvinyl chloride or PVC, polypropylene and polystyrene. In the case of semi-
finished or intermediate products, that is ethylene, styrene and vinyl chloride 
monomer (VCM), they accounted for some 37% of total capacity. 
Thus, while at industry level there is a loose oligopoly, the high degree of 
specialization leads to a more concentrated and less balanced situation when 
markets are broken down either in terms of specific products or of geographic 
regions. This is clearly demonstrated in Table 7 showing the position for France. 
TABLE 7 
Shares of production capacity in France for certain plastics, 1970 and 1977 
(%) 
Polyvinyl Low-density Polystyrene 
Chloride (PVC) polyethylene (LOPE) (PS) 
Group 
1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 
A 48 35 24 
B 56 45 15 41 
C 35 27 
D 14 10 
E 6 11 30 37 29 33 
F 32 26 
G 11 11 
H 16 
I 8 
Total percentage held by these 
leading groups 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In 1977 in the United Kingdom the three largest groups had 92 % of production 
capacity for PVC, the four largest had 100% of the capacity for making LDPE and 
97% of the capacity for making PS. 
Thus demonstrating: 
(i) the disparity in size that can exist in a market, after the three dominant firms, 
each of which hold substantial market shares; 1 
1 Eighth Report on Competition Policy, point 277. 
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(ii) the need to analyse the competitive structure which can lead firms to behave in 
quite different ways. 
The cement industry in the Community 
255. The production and supply of cement by the industry in the Community is 
characterized both by a stability of market shares and regional dominance. There is 
also a tendency in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark for the 
market shares of the largest firms to increase. 
In Denmark, the market now closely resembles a partial monopoly, while in France 
the share of the four largest firms rose from 65% to 80% and in the Federal 
Republic of Germany from 55% to 67% during 1968-75. In the United Kingdom, 
the largest group has had a share of around 60% since 1970. 
The importance of high transport costs should be emphasized together with the 
imposition of relatively inflexible pricing systems. These are either delivered prices 
calculated from certain base points or ex-works prices. 
The domestic appliance industry: 
electrical and electronic consumer goods 
1. Situation in the Community 
256. The industry manufacturing large domestic electrical appliances (mainly 
refrigerators, dishwashers, freezers and washing machines) in the Community as 
well as in Switzerland, Sweden and Austria, is dominated by three major groups 
that each produce over two million items annually and that together have some 
33% of this market.! 
These three groups are followed by five firms, each with an annual production of 
over one million items, and then by some 10 others, each producing over 300 000 
items each year. Next come some 12 smaller firms. The oligopoly in the industry 
thus comprises some 8 to 15 firms. At the European level, concentration is greater 
1 Note: The statement in point 253 of the Ninth Report on Competition Policy to the effect that the 
Philips Group in The Netherlands dominates the various product markets with the brands mentioned 
should not have included the brand Bauknecht. Bauknecht, which is 100% family-owned, is 
independent. The only link between Bauknecht and the Philips Group is through the jointly managed 
Euro-Hausgerate GmbH in Neunkirchen, which manufactures dishwashers. 
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in the markets for specific products. Thus, the three largest firms manufacturing 
refrigerators account for 45% of the European refrigerators produced while the 
four largest firms making freezers and washing machines account together for 42% 
and 38% of these markets. Thus, faced as they are by some 10 to 15 major 
manufacturers, European consumers have a range of several hundred models to 
choose from for each type of large electrical appliance. 
The effects on competition of the concentration of European production in the 
'brown goods' sector (television sets, radio-cassettes, etc.) must be seen in the light 
of the impact of the substantial volume of imports from non-member countries. 
Generally speaking, the situation in the different Member Stat_es is one of relatively 
balanced oligopoly, particularly in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. The situation in France does, however, 
merit special attention. 
2. Situation in France. 
257. In France, this industry which is more highly concentrated than in most 
other Member States has seen little change in manufacturers' positions in recent 
years: 
(i) demand for large domestic electrical appliances, a market already saturated, is 
growing slowly, and foreign competition is virtually non-existent. The quasi-
monopolistic position of the largest firm is less evident because its products are 
distributed under a number of different brands; 
(ii) the market for small domestic electrical appliances, which had a lower level of 
concentration to begin with as well as some foreign competition, grew less. As 
demand for these goods is more elastic, sales have suffered from the decline in 
households' pu'rchasing power; . 
(iii)then, consumer electronics has traditionally been characterized by a high level 
of concentration in radio and television and by competitive conditions in hi-fi 
equipment. However, recently the scale of foreign competition and a widening 
of the hi-fi market-reflecting low-pricing policies-have brought about a 
substantial change in the situation. The largest firms who are in a position to 
establish assembly lines in the Far East and to negotiate the purchase of (pre-
assembled) components from Japan, are best placed to cope on the domestic 
market with the wav.e of imports from outside Europe. 
Simultaneously, the leading firms (Thomson-Brandt, the Philips Group) have 
gained an increasing share of the hi-fi market, because by reducing costs they could 
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lower prices and tap a wider market. One advantage of this has been to curb the 
quasi-monopolistic position of Japanese imports on the market although this 
tendency still exists for high-technology products, such as video recorders. 
However, it has also led to an increase in concentration as smaller competitors face 
higher production costs because their goods, which are entirely home-produced, 
are being driven off the market. 
For the industry, the concentration of production is thus the price to be paid to 
maintain a national production capacity at a time of falling demand and intense 
foreign competition. 
Concentration in distribution has increased and the pattern of distribution has 
changed radically with considerable effect on the relations between manufacturers 
and distributors. 
Acquisitions have been the main cause of this concentration. Between 1973 and 
1978 there were 150 such purchases, most of which (two-thirds) were share 
purchase operations, mainly carried out by chain stores, and supermarket 
organizations. 
Simultaneously, with this trend towards concentration, the commercial policies of 
the different distributors have influenced their market shares: 
(i) 'Large specialists' (turnover exceeding FF 3 million) between 1974 and 1978 
increased their share of the market from 14% to 28% for domestic electrical 
appliances ('electrical white g9qd~') and their share of consumer electronics 
('brown goods') from 12% to 30%. 
(ii) Hypermarkets showed similar increases in the case of 'brown goods' with their 
market shares up from 1 % to 6% but were less successful with 'electrical white 
goods' (increase from 6% to 9%). This was because their market share for large 
domestic electrical appliances, which call for large storage space and 
sophisticated after-sales service, remained stable. 
(iii)Also between 1974 and 1978 the market share of the department stores stayed 
the same (at 6.5% for 'electrical white goods' and 3.5% for 'brown goods'), 
while the share of 'small specialists' (turnover of less than FF 1.5 million) in the 
total market fQr domestic electrical appliances was almost halved; only their 
sales of hi-fi equipment held out against this trend. 
This greater concentration, which results more from different commercial practices 
than from any attempts to grow in overall size, has led to increased power for 
distributors to pitt against the concentrated power of manufacturers. 
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3. Situation in the United Kingdom and in Ireland 
258. Surveys conducted by the Commission revealed the existence of a balanced 
oligopoly for most products. This can be seen from the combined share of the fotir 
leading firms for each product held in 1979. They are shown below for the United 
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There is little vertical integration of manufacturers and retailers, the only major 
exception being the Thorn Group in the United Kingdom, which owns a chain of 
electrical shops and leads the market for television rentals. 
Retailers in the United Kingdom constitute a powerful force and so can stand up to 
multinational manufacturers. 
§ 4 - Product make-up: domestic electrical and 
electronic consumer-goods industry 
Definition 
259. 'Product make-up' refers to the way tasks essential for the manufacturing 
and marketing of a product can be divided between a number of firms and also the 
diverse changes made to product presentation so as to anticipate future consumer 
needs. Such organization reflects the new strategies used by oligopolists. Certain 
1 Shares of the three largest firms, 
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activities that characterize their behaviour in.the domestic electrical and electronic 
goods industry are examined below. These are activities such as. oligopolistic 
function-sharing and product differentiation through multiplication and variation 
of brands and models. 
Some examples of oligopolistic 
function-sharing in production and distribution 
260. In the electrical 'white goods' sector, the major components (pumps, 
compressors, motors, etc.) are manufactured by a small group of industrial firms 
and sold to various firms who assemble the final products. 
Where products are sold under a particular brand name, this does·not necessarily· 
imply that they were assembled in a factory of the firm owning that name. Even if 
this is so, other manufacturers of parts and components may account for a greater 
proportion of production costs than the firm marketing the finished product. 
To take another example, the number of television tube manufacturers in Europe is 
very small. They supply tubes to a number of television manufacturers, and their 
sets are then marketed under a wide variety of competing brand names. 
Absence of any systematic link betwe.en 
oligopolistic function-sharing and market-sharing 
261. One important conclusion to be drawn from the studies is that there are two 
simultaneous but conflicting phenomena: 
(i) first, there is clear evidence of oligopolistic function-sharin'g in the manufacture 
of particular products; these may then be sold under different brand names 
which may be owned by the same oligopolists; 
(ii) second, such function-sharing does not seem to entail any oligopolistic sharing 
of geographic markets, and firms on these markets generally compete keenly 
with one another. 
Product multiplicity and variation: 
brands, types and models 
262. Because of the wide variety of brands and models available, dealers can offer 
a wide range of goods to cater for diverse consume~ needs, but without necessarily 
providing the consumer with the means to compare the prices for similar products 
sold under other designations. 
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The German market provides a number of striking examples. In 1980, the range of 
products available to consumers under different designations included 540 
refrigerators, 256 upright freezers, 433 washing machines, 245 dishwashers and 
837 electric cookers. In addition, a large number of new models appear each year to 
compete with existing ones, some of which may be phased out in many retail 
outlets. 
Surveys conducted in Belgium confirm the wide variety of brands, types and models 
available and the continuous changes made in them. For example, out o'f 142 
products (both 'white' an~ 'brown') on which the survey was based in November 
1978 only 33 reasonably comparable products (or less than 25%) were still 
available in November 1979. 
A similar situation was found in other countries in which surveys were carried out, 
notably in Italy, The Netherlands and France. . 
§ 5 - Price structures 
Variations and dispersion in prices 
263. One general conclusion can be drawn from the changes in price structures 
examined in the course of current research: by extending time coverage certain 
phenomena which might at a given juncture be regarded as 'abnormal' (a marked 
dispersion in prices and divergent price variations between different shops) are 
seen, in fact, to stem from competitive forces and also tend to fluctuate over time, 
affecting different goods to varying degrees. 
Thus, a period of price increases for particular products in certain countries can be 
followed by a period of price stability or even of price reduction for these same 
products in the same shops. 
Usually such changes indicate that competitive pressures are at work, causing the 
price differences in the first place while subsequently forcing them to level out 
again. There are, of course, . a number of exceptions to this rule, and these are 
. generally found in monopolistie or government-regulated markets. kmay be useful 
to illustrate the above observations with a number of examples. 
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The food industry 
1. The United Kingdom 
264. The United Kingdom is taken as an example because of its high rate of 
inflation in the period under investigation (1976-79). The prices of several types of 
non-alcoholic beverage (coffee, tea, mineral water) rose by some 65% between 
January 1976 and January 1977 and by nearly 50% in the first half of 1977 alone. 
For a number of fats, oils and margarines, the corresponding figures were 30% and 
some 27%. ' ' 
Even though the prices of other products did not rise quite so sharply, they did rise 
in most cases. But in spite of this high overall rate of inflation, the prices of certain 
products were cut in some shops. 
The number and the size of the disparate price variations illustrate that:, 
(i) changes in manufacturers' prices to dealers tend to affect retail prices to 
different extents (cf. coffee, tea and chocolate); 
(ii) many shops, whether superstores or even small retail outlets, follow their own 
independent pricing policies, and adjust so as to try and remain competitive. 
A different pattern is observed for other products whose price and price changes 
tend to be more or less uniform in the United Kingdom. In the main, these include a 
range of canned foods (fish, peas, meat, etc.) and packaged frozen foods. 
The pattern of price changes for the large majority.of products lies between these 
two extremes. Their price variations are sometimes more or less uniform and 
sometimes both different and disparate. This wide variety or variability in retail 
price trends for most products covered by the surveys gives further confirmation of 
the vigour of retail competition. 
2. International comparisons 
265. If it is accepted that reductions in retail prices always indicate that an 
effective competitive mechanism exists, it would seem useful to carry out a number 
of international comparisons that shed light on this phenomenon in some Member 
States. 
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Below is a list of the price reductions---expressed as a percentage of total price 
variations (up, unchanged or down)-recorded in the countries cited below during 
the relevant periods for a sample of shops and products: 
France 
Period: January 1978 to January 1979; total number of ca~es: 2 497 (i.e. number of 
products or articles, multiplied by the number of shops covered) ; price reductions 
in 15% of cases. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Period: January 1979 to July 1979; total number of cases: 3 894; price reductions 
in 14% of cases. 
The Netherlands 
(i) Period: February 1978 to August 1978; total number of cases: 2205; price 
reductions in 22% of cases; 
(ii) Period: August 1978 to March 1979; total number of cases: 1 026; price 
reductions in 28% of cases; 
(iii) Period : March 1979 to August 1979; total number of cases: 769; price 
reductions in 14% of cases. 
Belgium 
Period: February 1979 to July 1979; total number of cases: 3 183; price reductions 
in 14% of cases. 
Denmark 
Period: July 1977 to January 1978; total number of cases: 836; price reductions in 
18% of cases. 
The above figures suggest that, in spite of the numerous complex factors that 
influence the inflationary process, competition helps to curb inflationary pressures. 
















Spread of price differences in food and drink distribution by country 
Three groups: normal, divergent, uniform 
Percentage difference between maximum and minimum price 
Total Normal Divergent Uniform 
Survey No 
dates of 
cases '" 10% E Rp < 40% ERp ~ 40% E Rp < 10% 
No of cases I % of toral No of cases I 'Yo of rotal No of cases I % of total 
1976 30 16 54 13 ·43 1 3 
January 1977 30 20 67 10 33 - -
January 1978 167 89 53 62 37 16 10 
June 1978 169 102 60 59 35 8 5 
January 1979 169 101 60 58 34 10 6 
1976 44 24 55 19 43 1 2 
January 1977 46 19 42 25 54 2 4 
July 1979 288 203 70 68 24 17 6 
February 1978 212 48 35 17 
August 1978 229 45 41 14 
March 1979 200 39 34 27 
August 1979 197 42 18 40 
July 1978 537 257 48 23 4 257 48 
July 1979 645 326 51 53 8 266 41 
July 1978 200 98 49 6 3 96 49 
February 1979 248 114 46 9 3 125 50 
July 1979 250 125 50 11 4 114 46 
1976 57 27 47 28 49 2 4 
January 1977 72 38 53 25 35 9 12 
July 1978 68 57 84 2 3 9 13 
January 1979 68 52 77 4 6 12 18 
August 1978 35 30 86 3 8 2 6 
January 1979 35 29 83 3 9 3 9 
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3. Analysis of price disparities 
266. The existence of disparate price variations and the fact that the price of the 
same product may be raised in some shops while it is lowered in others leads to a 
range in retail prices for a given food product. Such differences in price at local level 
can thus be recorded at any gIven moment. 'Normal' disparity is where the 
difference between the price charged by the dearest shop and that charged by the 
cheapest shop for the same product, as a percentage of the price in the cheapest 
shop, is equal to, or more than, 10%, but less than 40%.1 
The extremes, i.e. where the difference is either 40% or more ('divergent' case) or 
less than 10% ('uniform' case), are found far less frequently. 
As Table 8 shows, the 'normal' case is the most common. 
4. Mark-ups 
267. The variations in prices and particularly the disparity in variations in price 
for the same product in different sales outlets are reflected in the retailers' gross 
mark-ups. The size, of mark-ups differs greatly and their structure shows 
considerable variation over time . 
. Table 9 shows the pattern of mark-ups in four Member States at two points in time. 
It should be read with the following points in mind: 
(i) Mark-ups applied by the major retail groups in most Member States are 
determined according to competitive criteria. The retailers try to maximize 
overall gross profit on their total receipts and this is achieved by making 
frequent and substantial adjustments in prices and hence in mark-ups for most 
products. Such changes are made according to the two following basic 
principles: 
(a) a very low mark-up is taken on the sort and type of product where sales can 
be won from competing outlets; 
1 The formula is; 
Maximum price - minimum price 
£Rp = ------------ x 100 
Minimum price 
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(b) a very high mark-up is taken on other sorts and types of product unless or 
until other shops begin to compete on price. When this happens, prices and 
mark-ups will be aligned on such competitors. 
The effect of the application of these strategies by the majority of retailers 
makes for keen competition which manifests itself in the substantial 
variations of both prices and mark-ups during a given period. 
(ii) Thus, at any moment, one can observe two different phenomena: 
(a) On the one hand some retailers apply inadequate and even negative mark-
ups (e.g. less than 10% of the purchase price) on certain products; 
(b) on the other hand some retailers may apply excessive mark-ups (over 50% 
of the purchase price) on other products. 
While this distinction remains relatively stable over time, most mark-ups taken by 
most retailers range between 10% and 30%, this being the mode of the distribution. 
Thus the current analytical method has provided measurements to confirm the 
existence of keen and effective competition in the distribution of food and 
beverages. 
COMPo REP. EC 1980 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCENTRATION 195 
TABLE 9 
Structure of mark-ups in the distribution of food p'roducts and beverages 
(%) 
France Italy Denmark FR of Germany 
Mark-up 1 
July July July July I July January I 1978 1978 1979 1979 1978 1979 
70% or more 3 2 4 4 1 1 
50 to 70% 9 7 7 9 5 5 
30 to 50% 15 14 18 17 22 20 
10 to 30% 38 42 47 26 53 52 
o to 10% 27 31 17 21 13 ' 15 
0 
-
- 1 } - -o to -10% 7 3 4 23 5, 6 Less than -10% 1 1 2 1 2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
1 The mark-ups in me table are the percentages added by retailers to their purchase prices to obtain the selling prices to the consumer 
(exclusive of VAT). . . 
The domestic appliance industry: 
electrical and electronic consumer goods 
1. Situation in the United Kingdom 
268. The generallevel of information available about products marketed by this 
industry in the United Kingdom amply demonstrates that competition has tended 
to level out prices, both between different retailers and different regions. This is 
accounted for in pan by the fact that the major retailers have branches in each 
region, and since in some cases they even fix prices centrally, this makes for similar 
prices in the main commercial centres.' 
Average price increases in 1978-79 were not excessive, bearing in mind the increases 
in VAT, which were to some degree absorbed by traders. Thus, margins were 
squeezed and price rises did not keep pace with the general rate of inflation. 
The number of brands and models available is such that retailers are able to stock 
only a.Iimited range of products and manufacturers who compete fiercely with one 
another may not impose their recommended prices on retailers. Thus, in some 
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cases, recommended prices serve as the basis from which retailers calculate their 
discounts to consumers; in others, there is no recommended price. 
2. Situation in France 
269. In France the large distributors cut prices instead of observing manu-
facturers' recommended prices. Thus because of their large turnovers, they can 
afford to reduce mark-ups. This forces out of business other establishments who, 
while they do offer specialist consumer-oriented services, cannot compete on price. 
Another result of this is that these large retailers can now by-pass the wholesale 
trade and negotiate their prices and terms direct with the makers and thus make a 
countervailing force to help curb manufacturing power in this concentrated 
industry. . 
. 3. Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany 
270. The increase in the prices of large domestic electrical appliances almost 
caught up with the rise in the cost of living in 1980. 
In consumer electronics the frequent renaming of models makes it difficult to 
compare price movements, but there seems no doubt that, at the retail level, price 
rises were the exception and that for many models average prices have fallen since 
the autumn of 1979. 
Because of excess production and because of extremely stiff retail competition, 
manufacturers have, on more than one occasion, been obliged to waive price rises 
previously announced. . 
In particular, the selling prices of radios, colour television sets and hi-fi systems 
have fallen substantially since 1978. 
The prices of classical records have not varied in recent years either. Given the 
impact of persistent, albeit low inflation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
classical records now cost less in real terms. Indeed, variations in exchange rates 
and differing price trends in the large Member States have helped to reduce 
disparities in the prices of classical records in the Community. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the intensification in competition has led to 
considerable growth in the market for boxed sets, containing two or more records 
by one well-known performer, which are the subject of special low-priced offers. 
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§ 6 - General conclusions 
271. By comparison with 1977, the total number of operations, national and 
international mergers, takeovers, share acquisitions and new joint ventures had 
remained fairly static in the Community in 1978 and 1979. In 1980, however, they 
again showed an increase similar to that in the earlier period. 
This renewed upward trend reflected the increase in the number of operations 
involving firms from one Member State, which now account' for three-quarters of 
all such operations. 
Share purchases (80% of cases) are increasingly becoming the most common form 
of operation. 
272. Internationally, while the number of share purchase operations rose and the 
number of new joint ventures fell, the proportion of multinational operations 
declined sharply. 
Once again, the most international operations were carried out in the Benelux and 
the noticeable fall in such operations in the Federal Republic of Germany was more 
than offset by increases in other Member States. 
While until 1977 there had been increasingly frequent cooperation between firms 
within and without the Community, the reversal of this trend, first seen in 1978, has 
accentuated. 
Taking all operations, the industry pattern remains virtually unchanged, with the 
metal industries retaining their dominant position, followed by the services 
industry. 
273. The following conclusions can be drawn from the latest studies on 
developments in: concentration and competition: 
(i) Increasingly keen competition for a number of products has led in many cases to 
relative falls in the prices of certain mass-consumer goods. This contrasts with 
the predominantly upward trend in prices, both generally and in the cost of 
living; 
(ii) The results from these studies, of a sample of markets for mass-consumer 
goods, indicate that a new pattern of markets is emerging which an! 
competitively open structures. The relatively high level of concentration and 
the oligopolistic nature of these markets do not impede new entrants and even 
encourage the development of competitive behaviour. 
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